Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Conditional yield skewness is an important summary statistic of the state of the economy. It exhibits pronounced variation over the business cycle and with the stance of monetary policy, and a tight relationship with the slope of the yield curve. Most importantly, variation in yield skewness has substantial forecasting power for future bond excess returns, high-frequency interest rate changes around FOMC announcements, and consensus survey forecast errors for the ten-year Treasury yield. The COVID pandemic did not disrupt these relations: historically high skewness correctly anticipated the run-up in long-term Treasury yields starting in late 2020. The connection between skewness, survey forecast errors, excess returns, and departures of yields from normality is consistent with a theoretical framework where one of the agents has biased beliefs.
The authors present evidence of a new propagation mechanism for wealth inequality, based on differential responses, by education, to greater inequality at the start of economic life. The paper is motivated by a novel positive cross-country relationship between wealth inequality and perceptions of opportunity and fairness, which holds only for the more educated. Using unique administrative micro data and a quasi-field experiment of exogenous allocation of households, the authors find that exposure to a greater top 10% wealth share at the start of economic life in the country leads only the more educated placed in locations with above-median wealth mobility to attain higher wealth levels and position in the cohort-specific wealth distribution later on. Underlying this effect is greater participation in risky financial and real assets and in self-employment, with no evidence for a labor income, unemployment risk, or human capital investment channel. This differential response is robust to controlling for initial exposure to fixed or other time-varying local features, including income inequality, and consistent with self-fulfilling responses of the more educated to perceived opportunities, without evidence of imitation or learning from those at the top.
The authors identify U.S. monetary and fiscal dominance regimes using machine learning techniques. The algorithms are trained and verified by employing simulated data from Markov-switching DSGE models, before they classify regimes from 1968-2017 using actual U.S. data. All machine learning methods outperform a standard logistic regression concerning the simulated data. Among those the Boosted Ensemble Trees classifier yields the best results. The authors find clear evidence of fiscal dominance before Volcker. Monetary dominance is detected between 1984-1988, before a fiscally led regime turns up around the stock market crash lasting until 1994. Until the beginning of the new century, monetary dominance is established, while the more recent evidence following the financial crisis is mixed with a tendency towards fiscal dominance.
This note argues that the European Central Bank should adjust its strategy in order to consider broader measures of inflation in its policy deliberations and communications. In particular, it points out that a broad measure of domestic goods and services price inflation such as the GDP deflator has increased along with the euro area recovery and the expansion of monetary policy since 2013, while HICP inflation has become more variable and, on average, has declined. Similarly, the cost of owner-occupied housing, which is excluded from the HICP, has risen during this period. Furthermore, it shows that optimal monetary policy at the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates aims to return inflation more slowly to the inflation target from below than in normal times because of uncertainty about the effects and potential side effects of quantitative easing.
Empirical estimates of equilibrium real interest rates are so far mostly limited to advanced economies, since no statistical procedure suitable for a large set of countries is available. This is surprising, as equilibrium rates have strong policy implications in emerging markets and developing economies as well; current estimates of the global equilibrium rate rely on only a few countries; and estimates for a more diverse set of countries can improve understanding of the drivers. The authors propose a model and estimation strategy that decompose ex ante real interest rates into a permanent and transitory component even with short samples and high volatility. This is done with an unobserved component local level stochastic volatility model, which is used to estimate equilibrium rates for 50 countries with Bayesian methods.
Equilibrium rates were lower in emerging markets and developing economies than in advanced economies in the 1980s, similar in the 1990s, and have been higher since 2000. In line with economic integration and rising global capital markets, synchronization has been rising over time and is higher among advanced economies. Equilibrium rates of countries with stronger trade linkages and similar demographic and economic trends are more synchronized.
The authors embed human capital-based endogenous growth into a New-Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market and skill obsolescence from long-term unemployment. The model can account for key features of the Great Recession: a decline in productivity growth, the relative stability of inflation despite a pronounced fall in output (the "missing disinflation puzzle"), and a permanent gap between output and the pre-crisis trend output.
In the model, lower aggregate demand raises unemployment and the training costs associated with skill obsolescence. Lower employment hinders learning-by-doing, which slows down human capital accumulation, feeding back into even fewer vacancies than justified by the demand shock alone. These feedback channels mitigate the disinflationary effect of the demand shock while amplifying its contractionary effect on output. The temporary growth slowdown translates into output hysteresis (permanently lower output and labor productivity).
Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, the authors compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). They find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.
Despite the increasing use of cashless payment instruments, the notion that cash loses importance over time can be unambiguously refuted. In contrast, the authors show that cash demand increased steeply over the past 30 years. This is not only true on a global scale, but also for the most important currencies in advanced countries (USD, EUR, CHF, GBP and JPY). In this paper, they focus especially on the role of different crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and analyse the demand for small and large banknote denominations since the 1990s in an international perspective. It is evident that cash demand always increases in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself. However, largely unaffected from crises we observe a trend increase in global cash aligned with a shift from transaction balances towards more hoarding, especially in the form of large denomination banknotes.
Occasionally binding constraints have become an important part of economic modelling, especially since western central banks see themselves (again) constraint by the so-called zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate. A binding ZLB constraint poses a major problem for a quantitative-structural analysis: Linear solution methods do no work in the presence of a non-linearity such as the ZLB and existing alternatives tend to be computationally demanding. The urge to study macroeconomic questions related to the Great Recession and the Covid-19 crisis in a quantitative-structural framework requires algorithms that are not only accurate, but that are also robust, fast, and computationally efficient.
A particularly important application where efficient and fast methods for occasionally binding constraints (OBCs) are needed is the Bayesian estimation of macroeconomic models. This paper shows that a linear dynamic rational expectations system with OBCs, depending on the expected duration of the constraint, can be represented in closed form. Combined with a set of simple equilibrium conditions, this can be exploited to avoid matrix inversions and simulations at runtime for signifcant gains in computational speed.
High-frequency changes in interest rates around FOMC announcements are a standard method of measuring monetary policy shocks. However, some recent studies have documented puzzling effects of these shocks on private-sector forecasts of GDP, unemployment, or inflation that are opposite in sign to what standard macroeconomic models would predict. This evidence has been viewed as supportive of a „Fed information effect“ channel of monetary policy, whereby an FOMC tightening (easing) communicates that the economy is stronger (weaker) than the public had expected.
The authors show that these empirical results are also consistent with a „Fed response to news“ channel, in which incoming, publicly available economic news causes both the Fed to change monetary policy and the private sector to revise its forecasts. They provide substantial new evidence that distinguishes between these two channels and strongly favors the latter; for example, regressions that include the previously omitted public macroeconomic news, high-frequency stock market responses to Fed announcements, and a new survey that they conduct of individual Blue Chip forecasters all indicate that the Fed and private sector are simply responding to the same public news, and that there is little if any role for a „Fed information effect“.