Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Using a structural life-cycle model and data on school visits from Safegraph and school closures from Burbio, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. Our data suggests that secondary schools were closed for in-person learning for longer periods than elementary schools (implying that younger children experienced less school closures than older children), and that private schools experienced shorter closures than public schools, and schools in poorer U.S. counties experienced shorter school closures. We then extend the structural life cycle model of private and public schooling investments studied in Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger, Ludwig, and Popova (2021) to include the choice of parents whether to send their children to private schools, empirically discipline it with data on parental investments from the PSID, and then feed into the model the school closure measures from our empirical analysis to quantify the long-run consequences of the Covid-19 school closures on the cohorts of children currently in school. Future earnings- and welfare losses are largest for children that started public secondary schools at the onset of the Covid-19 crisis. Comparing children from the topto children from the bottom quartile of the income distribution, welfare losses are ca. 0.8 percentage points larger for the poorer children if school closures were unrelated to income. Accounting for the longer school closures in richer counties reduces this gap by about 1/3. A policy intervention that extends schools by 3 months (6 weeks in the next two summers) generates significant welfare gains for the children and raises future tax revenues approximately sufficient to pay for the cost of this schooling expansion.
Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human capital at different stages in the children’s development process. We quantitatively characterize the long-term consequences from a Covid-19 induced loss of schooling, and find average losses in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of the affected children of close to 1%, as well as welfare losses equivalent to about 0.6% of permanent consumption. Due to self-productivity in the human capital production function, skill attainment at a younger stage of the life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages, and thus younger children are hurt more by the school closures than older children. We find that parental reactions reduce the negative impact of the school closures, but do not fully offset it. The negative impact of the crisis on children’s welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low assets. The school closures themselves are primarily responsible for the negative impact of the Covid-19 shock on the long-run welfare of the children, with the pandemic-induced income shock to parents playing a secondary role.
This paper discusses policy implications of a potential surge in NPLs due to COVID-19. The study provides an empirical assessment of potential scenarios and draws lessons from previous crises for effective NPL treatment. The paper highlights the importance of early and realistic assessment of loan losses to avoid adverse incentives for banks. Secondary loan markets would help in this process and further facilitate bank resolution as laid down in the BRRD, which should be uphold even in extreme scenarios.
This in-depth analysis proposes ways to retract from supervisory COVID-19 support measures without perils for financial stability. It simulates the likely impact of the corona crisis on euro area banks’ capital and predicts a significant capital shortfall. We recommend to end accounting practices that conceal loan losses and sustain capital relief measures. Our in-depth analysis also proposes how to address the impending capital shortfall in resolution/liquidation and a supranational recapitalisation.
The centrality of the United States in the global financial system is taken for granted, but its response to recent political and epidemiological events has suggested that China now holds a comparable position. Using minute-by-minute data from 2012 to 2020 on the financial performance of twelve country-specific exchange-traded funds, we construct daily snapshots of the global financial network and analyze them for the centrality and connectedness of each country in our sample. We find evidence that the U.S. was central to the global financial system into 2018, but that the U.S.-China trade war of 2018–2019 diminished its centrality, and the Covid-19 outbreak of 2019–2020 increased the centrality of China. These indicators may be the first signals that the global financial system is moving from a unipolar to a bipolar world.
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.