Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
Flows of funds run by banks or by firms that belong to the same financial group as a bank are less volatile and less sensitive to bad past performance. This enables bank-affiliated funds to better weather distress and to hold lower precautionary cash buffers in comparison with their unaffiliated peers. Banks provide liquidity support to distressed affiliated funds by buying shares of those funds that are experiencing large outflows. This, in turn, diminishes the severity of strategic complementarities in investors’ redemptions. Liquidity support and other benefits of bank affiliation are conditional on the financial health of the parent company. Distress in the banking system spills over to the mutual fund sector via ownership links. Our research high-lights substantial dependencies between the banking system and the asset management industry, and identifies an important channel via which financial stability risks depend on the organisational structure of the financial sector.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
SAFE Update February 2023
(2023)
Lack of privacy due to surveillance of personal data, which is becoming ubiquitous around the world, induces persistent conformity to the norms prevalent under the surveillance regime. We document this channel in a unique laboratory---the widespread surveillance of private citizens in East Germany. Exploiting localized variation in the intensity of surveillance before the fall of the Berlin Wall, we show that, at the present day, individuals who lived in high-surveillance counties are more likely to recall they were spied upon, display more conformist beliefs about society and individual interactions, and are hesitant about institutional and social change. Social conformity is accompanied by conformist economic choices: individuals in high-surveillance counties save more and are less likely to take out credit, consistent with norms of frugality. The lack of differences in risk aversion and binding financial constraints by exposure to surveillance helps to support a beliefs channel.
Supranational supervision
(2022)
We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks’ risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.