Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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We study risk taking in a panel of subjects in Wuhan, China - before, during the COVID-19 crisis, and after the country reopened. Subjects in our sample traveled for semester break in January, generating variation in exposure to the virus and quarantine in Wuhan. Higher exposure leads subjects to reduce planned risk taking, risky investments, and optimism. Our findings help unify existing studies by showing that aggregate shocks affect general preferences for risk and economic expectations, while heterogeneity in experience further affect risk taking through beliefs about individuals’ own outcomes such as luck and sense of control.
JEL Classification: G50, G51, G11, D14, G41
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.
This policy white paper shows, using data on European Commission (EC) lobby meetings, that financial institutions and finance trade associations have substantial access to EC policymakers. While lobbying could transfer policy-relevant information and expertise to policymakers, it could also result in the capture of policymakers by the industry, which could harm consumers and taxpayers. How could policymakers prevent regulatory capture, but retain the benefits of the sector expertise in policy decisions? Awareness of regulatory capture by policymakers is one of the most important remedies. This paper provides an overview of the origins of the regulatory capture theory and recent academic evidence. The paper shows that regulatory capture could emerge in a variety of institutions and policy areas but is not ubiquitous and depends on the incentives of policymakers and the policy environment. Subsequently, the paper discusses various measures to prevent regulatory capture, such as more transparency, diverse expert groups, and cooling-off periods.