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The international system of states displays an inherent drive to territorialize the global commons. But territorialization is not a continuous process—it occurs in episodes. In this article, I use one case from ocean governance, the expansion of territory into near‐shore areas of the seas, to advance a twofold argument about the nature of these episodes. First, I argue that the root causes of this drive to territorialize “empty space” are located in global politics, norms, and economics. Second, a territorializing episode occurs when there are impelling economic incentives, and when great powers are unable or unwilling to oppose territorialization. However, this can lead to different outcomes: sovereign territories, functional territories, or internationalized territories. Oceanic space has seen a series of these territorializing episodes since the end of the Second World War and functional territorialization has become more prevalent over time.
Das westphälische Modell für Staatsinstitutionen, einschließlich nationaler Exekutive, Legislative und Judikative, hat sich aus den Ereignissen europäischer Geschichte heraus entwickelt. Seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges dient es als grundlegendes Paradigma für Internationale Interventionen zum Wiederaufbau von gescheiterten - oder zum Aufbau von neuen - Staaten. Für die internationale Gemeinschaft fungiert das westphälische Modell als Maß zur Beurteilung ihrer Interventionen, wie zum Beispiel in Somalia, Kambodscha oder den Balkanstaaten. In den meisten Fällen gilt eine durch sie beaufsichtigte oder gar durchgeführte ‚freie und faire’ Wahl als hauptsächliche Massnahme zur Bildung eines ‚westphälischen’ und demokratischen Staates. Die Erfolgsrate solcher internationalen Friedenseinsätze und ‚state-building operations’ ist jedoch enttäuschend. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Misserfolge des letzten Jahrzehnts wird deutlich, daß sich die lokalen Gesellschaftssysteme der betroffenen Bevölkerungen oft beträchtlich von liberaler Demokratie unterscheiden. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall in Gesellschaften deren Ordnung nicht auf Staatsinstiutionen basiert. Ihnen liegen sozio-politische Systeme zugrunde die sich oft mit dem Paradigma des westlichen Staatssystems nur schwer vereinen lassen. Um im Rahmen internationaler Friedenseinsätze erfolgreich Staatstrukturen zu etablieren, ist es daher notwendig lokale Sozialstrukturen und lokale Konzepte politischer Legitimität und Autorität zu addressieren. Erst mit solchem Verständnis ist es möglich einen Staatsapparat in den Augen der Bevölkerung zu legitimieren. Ist Letzteres nicht der Fall, so kann sich eine Regierung zwar in Übereinstimmung mit internationalen Menschenrechten befinden, oder alle wichtigen demokratischen Einrichtungen vorweisen, jedoch dennoch dem Prinzip der Partizipation durch die Bevölkerung widersprechen. Ist dies das Endresultat eines internationalen Friedenseinsatzes, so hat die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre eigenen Werte bestaetigt. Jedoch herrscht kein Vertrauen zwischen der Bevölkerung und Regierung, da letztere nicht kompatibel mit dem Versaendnis der Bürger ist. Der ‚demokratische’ Staat ist nur schwerlich funktionsfähig.Der internationale Einsatz in Osttimor illustriert dieses Problem. Hier wurden die Vereinten Nationen (VN) mit dem Wiederaufbau und der Verwaltung eines Staates betraut (UNTAET ‚Übergangsregierung der Vereinten Nationen in Osttimor’). Zum ersten mal in der Geschichte übernahm die international Gemeinschaft damit die Souveränität über ein territoriales Gebiet...
The Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates the increasingly judicialized nature of international relations and geopolitics. By viewing aspects of the invasion as illegal – in particular through the identification of war crimes and crimes against humanity – the international response draws attention to the political geographies of international criminal investigation. Human rights groups, academics, journalists, and open-source forensic investigations have joined forces to collect, evaluate and analyze the violent nature of war crimes. While similar shifts in evidence gathering have been observed in the case of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war and the Assad regime's violence against Syrian citizens, the use of evidence-gathering technologies and evidence-securing institutions in the case of Ukraine is distinctive. In this scholarly intervention we seek to illustrate the intimate geopolitics of evidence gathering by zooming in on two different elements that shape evidential procedures in Ukraine: i) the blurring of civilian/military boundaries; and ii) the challenges of access. By evaluating what is new and what is similar to previous war sites, we suggest that these two areas reflect a geopolitics of evidence gathering, highlighting its global-local intimacies. Both these areas are well positioned to foster new research on the (geo)legal nature of war crimes in political geography and beyond.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates the increasingly judicialized nature of international relations and geopolitics. By viewing aspects of the invasion as illegal – in particular through the identification of war crimes and crimes against humanity – the international response draws attention to the political geographies of international criminal investigation. Human rights groups, academics, journalists, and open-source forensic investigations have joined forces to collect, evaluate and analyze the violent nature of war crimes. While similar shifts in evidence gathering have been observed in the case of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war and the Assad regime's violence against Syrian citizens, the use of evidence-gathering technologies and evidence-securing institutions in the case of Ukraine is distinctive. In this scholarly intervention we seek to illustrate the intimate geopolitics of evidence gathering by zooming in on two different elements that shape evidential procedures in Ukraine: i) the blurring of civilian/military boundaries; and ii) the challenges of access. By evaluating what is new and what is similar to previous war sites, we suggest that these two areas reflect a geopolitics of evidence gathering, highlighting its global-local intimacies. Both these areas are well positioned to foster new research on the (geo)legal nature of war crimes in political geography and beyond.
Coming of voting age. Evidence from a natural experiment on the effects of electoral eligibility
(2024)
In recent years, several jurisdictions have lowered the voting age, with many more discussing it. Sceptics question whether young people are ready to vote, while supporters argue that allowing them to vote would increase their specific engagement with politics. To test the latter argument, we use a series of register-based surveys of over 10,000 German adolescents. Knowing the exact birthdates of our respondents, we estimate the causal effect of eligibility on their information-seeking behaviour in a regression discontinuity design. While eligible and non-eligible respondents do not differ in their fundamental political dispositions, those allowed to vote are more likely to discuss politics with their family and friends and to use a voting advice application. This effect appears to be stronger for voting age 16 than for 18. The right to vote changes behaviour. Therefore, we cannot conclude from the behaviour of ineligible citizens that they are unfit to vote.
Voting advice applications (VAAs) are online tools providing voting advice to their users. This voting advice is based on the match between the answers of the user and the answers of several political parties to a common questionnaire on political attitudes. To visualize this match, VAAs use a wide array of visualisations, most popular of which are the two-dimensional political maps. These maps show the position of both the political parties and the user in the political landscape, allowing the user to understand both their own position and their relation to the political parties. To construct these maps, VAAs require scales that represent the main underlying dimensions of the political space. This makes the correct construction of these scales important if the VAA aims to provide accurate and helpful voting advice. This paper presents three criteria that assess if a VAA achieves this aim. To illustrate their usefulness, these three criteria—unidimensionality, reliability and quality—are used to assess the scales in the cross-national EUVox VAA, a VAA designed for the European Parliament elections of 2014. Using techniques from Mokken scaling analysis and categorical principal component analysis to capture the metrics, I find that most scales show low unidimensionality and reliability. Moreover, even while designers can—and sometimes do—use certain techniques to improve their scales, these improvements are rarely enough to overcome all of the problems regarding unidimensionality, reliability and quality. This leaves certain problems for the designers of VAAs and designers of similar type online surveys.
This study investigates a historical event that occurred during the Indonesian Revolution as depicted in Indonesian historical films and argues that these films not only attempt to depict the past but also use the past as a means of social commentary, teaching moral insight, and historical reinforcement. The historical films selected are The Long March (Darah dan Do’a) (1950) and Mereka Kembali (1972). Both films deal with the Long March event experienced by the troops of the Siliwangi Division in 1948. These troops were previously assigned to infiltrate Yogyakarta and its surrounding areas. They were instructed to march back to their original base in West Java as a part of the military strategies to confront the Dutch during the Indonesian Revolution, also known as the Indonesian War of Independence. This event became known as the Long March of the Siliwangi Division. This study examines not only the representation of the past or the texts of the films but also the production process, which includes the motivations of the filmmakers and the public reception when the films were screened for the public at the time—in 1950 and 1972, respectively. This approach provides a broader and richer dimension, valuable insights into the behind-the-scenes process of making the selected historical films, and essential information about the public reception of the films. From the production point of view, there are two main reasons for making these historical films: personal reason and social engagement. Further, the military also plays a vital role in these historical film productions. From the historical representation aspect, these two films depict the events of the Long March of the Siliwangi Division as a journey full of various obstacles and difficulties, such as harsh terrain, lack of food, battles against the Dutch, and internal disputes with fellow Indonesians: Darul Islam. From the reception aspect, the audience’s point of view, these films provide several representations that meet their expectations about the Long March of the Siliwangi Division. However, the audience disagrees with some of the other representations. Finally, the study revealed that historical films are potential vehicles for telling, interpreting, entertaining, legitimating and preserving the past. In addition, this study has a vital implication for reopening the tradition of Indonesian film studies and reigniting attention to old films.
After a recent spate of terrorist attacks in European and American cities, liberal democracies are reintroducing emergency securitarian measures (ESMs) that curtail rights and/or expand police powers. Political theorists who study ESMs are familiar with how such measures become instruments of discrimination and abuse, but the fundamental conflict ESMs pose for not just civil liberty but also democratic equality still remains insufficiently explored. Such phenomena are usually explained as a function of public panic or fear-mongering in times of crisis, but I show that the tension between security and equality is in fact much deeper and more general. It follows a different logic than the more familiar tension between security and liberty, and it concerns not just the rule of law in protecting liberty but also the role of law in integrating new or previously subjected groups into a democratic community. As liberal-democratic societies become increasingly diverse and multicultural in the present era of mass immigration and global interconnectedness, this tension between security and equality is likely to become more pronounced.
In this article, I question the use of the notion of ‘constituent power’ as a tool for the democratization of the European Union (EU). Rather than seeing the absence of a transnational constituent power as a cause of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, I identify it as an opportunity for unfettered democratic participation. Against the reification of power-in-action into a power-constituted-in-law, I argue that the democratization of the EU can only be achieved through the multiplication of ‘constituent moments’. I begin by deconstructing the normative justifications surrounding the concept of constituent power. Here I analyze the structural aporia of constituent power and question the autonomous and emancipatory dimension of this notion. I then test the theoretical hypothesis of this structural aporia of the popular constituent power by comparing it with the historical experiments of a European popular constituent power. Finally, based on these theoretical and empirical observations, I propose to replace the ambivalence of the concept of popular constituent power with a more cautious approach to the bottom-up democratization of European integration: that of a multiplication of transnational constituent moments.