330 Wirtschaft
Refine
Year of publication
- 2021 (219)
- 2014 (181)
- 2017 (173)
- 2020 (173)
- 2022 (170)
- 2018 (164)
- 2023 (159)
- 2016 (150)
- 2013 (145)
- 2015 (141)
- 2019 (133)
- 2012 (106)
- 2008 (100)
- 2005 (96)
- 2003 (95)
- 2009 (93)
- 2010 (92)
- 2011 (90)
- 2024 (84)
- 2006 (82)
- 2004 (73)
- 2007 (68)
- 2002 (45)
- 2001 (41)
- 1999 (35)
- 2000 (33)
- 1998 (31)
- 1997 (11)
- 1996 (10)
- 1993 (5)
- 1994 (4)
- 1995 (3)
- 1992 (2)
- 1892 (1)
- 1943 (1)
- 1946 (1)
- 1976 (1)
- 1990 (1)
- 1991 (1)
Document Type
- Working Paper (1848)
- Article (488)
- Part of Periodical (455)
- Report (105)
- Doctoral Thesis (40)
- Book (28)
- Conference Proceeding (14)
- Periodical (11)
- Part of a Book (9)
- Review (7)
Language
- English (3014) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (3014)
Keywords
- Deutschland (117)
- Geldpolitik (55)
- USA (51)
- Financial Institutions (50)
- monetary policy (50)
- Schätzung (48)
- Europäische Union (44)
- Monetary Policy (44)
- ECB (43)
- Bank (39)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1897)
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1497)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (1077)
- House of Finance (HoF) (708)
- E-Finance Lab e.V. (358)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (195)
- Rechtswissenschaft (90)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (51)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (32)
- Institute for Law and Finance (ILF) (31)
We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risk-taking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs. This can be viewed as a retroactive tax that is levied only when a crisis occurs and that leads to a form of collective liability for bank managers. We develop a game-theoretic model of a banking sector whose shareholders have limited liability, so that society at large will suffer losses if a crisis occurs. Without Crisis Contracts, the managers' and shareholders' interests are aligned, and managers take more than the socially optimal level of risk. We investigate how the introduction of Crisis Contracts changes the equilibrium level of risk-taking and the remuneration of bank managers. We establish conditions under which the introduction of Crisis Contracts will reduce the probability of a banking crisis and improve social welfare. We explore how Crisis Contracts and capital requirements can supplement each other and we show that the efficacy of Crisis Contracts is not undermined by attempts to hedge.
Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the “democratization of tax enforcement,” by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.
Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the “democratization of tax enforcement,” by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs.
We design, field and exploit survey data from a representative sample of the French population to examine whether informative social interactions enter householdsístockholding decisions. Respondents report perceptions about their circle of peers with whom they interact about Önancial matters, their social circle and the population. We provide evidence for the presence of an information channel through which social interactions ináuence perceptions and expectations about stock returns, and financial behavior. We also find evidence of mindless imitation of peers in the outer social circle, but this does not permeate as many layers of financial behavior as informative social interactions do.
GAMESTOP, A COMPANY THAT WAS PRESUMED DEAD DUE TO SHRINKING PROFITS OFITS BRICK-AND-MORTAR BUSINESS MODEL, HIT THE HEADLINES BECAUSE OF ASHORT SQUEEZE OF ITS STOCK PRICE. THE POPULAR OPINION REPORTED BY MAIN-STREAM MEDIA SUGGESTED THAT THE GAMESTOP FRENZY WAS EXCLUSIVE TO YOUNGAND INEXPERIENCED INVESTORS GATHERING ON THE SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMREDDIT. IN CONTRAST, OUR RESULTS INDICATE THAT ALSO MORE EXPERIENCEDRETAIL INVESTORS IN GERMANY PARTICIPATED.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on results from the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model and fine that relative wealth equivalent losses are below 1.16% if the jump size is stochastic and below 1% if the jump size is constant and γ ≥ 5. We perform robustness checks for various levels of risk-aversion, expected jump size, and jump intensity.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on quantities known only in the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model. Our findings are threefold: Jumps matter more, i.e. our approximation is less accurate, if (i) the expected jump size or (ii) the jump intensity is large. Fixing the average impact of jumps, we find that (iii) rare, but severe jumps matter more than frequent, but small jumps.
The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.