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Research on interbank networks and systemic importance is starting to recognise that the web of exposures linking banks balance sheets is more complex than the single-layer-of-exposure paradigm. We use data on exposures between large European banks broken down by both maturity and instrument type to characterise the main features of the multiplex structure of the network of large European banks. This multiplex network presents positive correlated multiplexity and a high similarity between layers, stemming both from standard similarity analyses as well as a core-periphery analyses of the different layers. We propose measures of systemic importance that fit the case in which banks are connected through an arbitrary number of layers (be it by instrument, maturity or a combination of both). Such measures allow for a decomposition of the global systemic importance index for any bank into the contributions of each of the sub-networks, providing a useful tool for banking regulators and supervisors. We use the dataset of exposures between large European banks to illustrate the proposed measures.
We uncover a new channel for spillovers of funding dry-ups. The 2016 US money market fund (MMF) reform exogenously reduced unsecured MMF funding for some banks. We use novel data to trace those banks to a platform for corporate deposit funding. We show that intensified competition for corporate deposits spilled the funding squeeze over to other banks with no MMF exposure. These banks paid more for deposits, and their pool of funding providers deteriorated. Moreover, their lending volumes and margins declined, and their stocks underperformed. Our results suggest that banks' competitiveness in funding markets affect their competitiveness in lending markets.
We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Market clearing takes place through a tâtonnement process which yields the equilibrium price, while traded quantities are determined by means of a matching algorithm. We compare three alternative matching algorithms: maximum entropy, closest matching and random matching. Contagion occurs through liquidity hoarding, interbank interlinkages and fire sale externalities. The resulting network configurations exhibits a core-periphery structure, dis-assortative behavior and low clustering coefficient. We measure systemic importance by means of network centrality and input-output metrics and the contribution of systemic risk by means of Shapley values. Within this framework we analyze the effects of prudential policies on the stability/efficiency trade-off. Liquidity requirements unequivocally decrease systemic risk but at the cost of lower efficiency (measured by aggregate investment in non-liquid assets); equity requirements tend to reduce risk (hence increase stability) without reducing significantly overall investment.
In many cases, the dire situation of public finances calls into question the very soundness of sovereigns and prompts corrective actions with far-reaching consequences. In this context, European authorities responded with several measures on different fronts, for instance by passing the "Fiscal Compact", which entered into force on January 1, 2013. Of critical importance in this framework is the assessment of a country’s situation by way of statistical measures, in order to take corrective actions when called for according to the letter of the law. If these statistics are not correct, there is a risk of imposing draconian measures on countries that do not really need it.
The implications of delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has become an area of significant interest over the past two decades, in the expectation that these reforms will lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. The move towards decentralization has, however, not been homogeneously implemented on the revenue and expenditure side: decentralization has materialized more substantially on the latter than on the former, creating "vertical fiscal imbalances". These imbalances measure the extent to which sub-national governments’ expenditures are financed through their own revenues. This mismatch between own revenues and expenditures may have negative consequences for public finances performance, for example by softening the budget constraint of sub-national governments. Using a large sample of countries covering a long time period from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, this paper is the first to examine the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances on fiscal performance through the accumulation of government debt. Our findings suggest that vertical fiscal imbalances are indeed relevant in explaining government debt accumulation, and call for a degree of caution when promoting fiscal decentralization.
In 2003, a number of banks adopted the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary Code of Conduct based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) performance standards, to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of project finance. These so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI) commit to requiring their borrowers to adopt sustainable management plans of environmental and social risks associated with their projects. The Principles apply to the project finance business segment of the banks and cover projects with a total cost of US $10 million or more. While for long developing countries relied on World Bank and other public assistance to finance infrastructure projects there has occurred a shift in recent years to private funding. The NGOs have been frustrated by this shift of project finance as they had spent their resources to exercise pressure on the public financial institutions to incorporate environmental and social standards in their project finance activities. However, after a shift of NGO pressure to private financial institutions the latter adopted the EPs for fear of reputational risks. NGOs had laid down their own more ambitious ideas about sustainable finance in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability. Legally speaking, the EPs are a self-regulatory soft law instrument. However, it has a hard law dimension as the Equator Banks require their borrowers to comply with the EPs through covenants in the loan contracts that may trigger a default in a case of violation. ...
[Tagungsbericht] Making finance sustainable: Ten years equator principles – success or letdown?
(2013)
In 2003, a number of banks adopted the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary Code of Conduct based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) performance standards, to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of project finance. These so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI) commit to requiring their borrowers to adopt sustainable management plans of environmental and social risks associated with their projects. The Principles apply to the project finance business segment of the banks and cover projects with a total cost of US $10 million or more. While for long developing countries relied on World Bank and other public assistance to finance infrastructure projects there has occurred a shift in recent years to private funding. The NGOs have been frustrated by this shift of project finance as they had spent their resources to exercise pressure on the public financial institutions to incorporate environmental and social standards in their project finance activities. However, after a shift of NGO pressure to private financial institutions the latter adopted the EPs for fear of reputational risks. NGOs had laid down their own more ambitious ideas about sustainable finance in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability. Legally speaking, the EPs are a self-regulatory soft law instrument. However, it has a hard law dimension as the Equator Banks require their borrowers to comply with the EPs through covenants in the loan contracts that may trigger a default in a case of violation. ...
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the macro-prudential policy paradigm has gained increasing prominence (Bank of England, 2009; Bernanke, 2011). The dynamics of this shift in the economic discourse, and the reasons this shift has not taken place prior to the crisis have not been addressed systemically. This paper investigates the evolution of the economic discourse on systemic risk and banking regulation to better understand these changes and their timing. Further, we use our sample to inquire whether, and if so, why the economic regulatory studies failed to recommend a reliable banking regulation prior to the crisis. By following a discourse analysis, we establish that the economic discourse on banking regulation has not been suitable for providing the knowledge basis required for a dynamically reliable banking regulation, and we identify the underlying reasons for such failure. These reasons include the obsession of economic discourse with optimization and particular forms of formalism, particularly, partial equilibrium analysis. Further, the economic discourse on banking regulation excludes historical and practitioners’ discourses and ignores weak signals. We point out that post-crisis, these epistemological failures of the economic discourse on banking regulation were not sufficiently recognized and that recent attempts to conceptualize systemic risk as a negative externality and to thus price it point to the persistence of formalism, equilibrium thinking and optimization, with their attending dangers.
We develop a novel empirical approach to identify the effectiveness of policies against a pandemic. The essence of our approach is the insight that epidemic dynamics are best tracked over stages, rather than over time. We use a normalization procedure that makes the pre-policy paths of the epidemic identical across regions. The procedure uncovers regional variation in the stage of the epidemic at the time of policy implementation. This variation delivers clean identification of the policy effect based on the epidemic path of a leading region that serves as a counterfactual for other regions. We apply our method to evaluate the effectiveness of the nationwide stay-home policy enacted in Spain against the Covid-19 pandemic. We find that the policy saved 15.9% of lives relative to the number of deaths that would have occurred had it not been for the policy intervention. Its effectiveness evolves with the epidemic and is larger when implemented at earlier stages.
We show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a fiscal adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather than of individual fiscal shocks. Simulation of fiscal plans adopted by 16 OECD countries over a 30-year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design. Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly, in terms of output losses, than tax-based ones and have especially low output costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go changes in taxes and spending. The difference between tax-based and spending-based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies, including monetary policy. It is mainly due to the different response of business confidence and private investment.
We develop a methodology to identify and rank “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs). Our approach is consistent with that followed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) but, unlike the latter, it is free of judgment and it is based entirely on publicly available data, thus filling the gap between the official views of the regulator and those that market participants can form with their own information set. We apply the methodology to annual data on three samples of banks (global, EU and euro area) for the years 2007-2012. We examine the evolution of the SIFIs over time and document the shifs in the relative weights of the major geographic areas. We also discuss the implication of the 2013 update of the identification methodology proposed by the FSB.
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises. Klassifikation: G21, G22
When liquidity plays an important role as in times of financial crisis, asset prices in some markets may reflect the amount of liquidity available in the market rather than the future earning power of the asset. Mark-to-market accounting is not a desirable way to assess the solvency of a financial institution in such circumstances. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current value of banks’ assets to be less than the current value of their liabilities so the banks are insolvent. In contrast, if historic cost accounting is used, banks are allowed to continue and can meet all their future liabilities. Mark-to-market accounting can thus lead to contagion where none would occur with historic cost accounting. Klassifizierung: G21, G22, M41
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate. JEL Classification: G21, G38
We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholder-oriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies. JEL Classification: D02, D21, G34, L13, L21
Banking and markets
(2001)
This paper integrates a number of recent themes in the literature in banking and asset markets–optimal risk sharing, limited market participation, asset-price volatility, market liquidity, and financial crises–in a general-equilibrium theory of the financial system. A complex financial system comprises both financial markets financial institutions. Financial institutions can take the form of intermediaries or banks. Banks, inlike intermediaries, are subject to runs, but crises do not imply market failure. We show that a sophisticated financiel system–a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation–is incentive-efficient, if the institutions take the form of intermediaries, or else constrained-efficient, of they take the form of banks. We also consider an economy in which the markets for aggregate risks are incomplete. In this context, there is a rolefpr prudential regulation: regulating liquidity can improve welfare.
In this paper we propose a way forward towards increased financial resilience in times of growing disagreement concerning open borders, free trade and global regulatory standards. In light of these concerns, financial resilience remains a highly valued policy objective. We wish to contribute by suggesting an agenda of concrete, do-able steps supporting an enhanced level of resilience, combined with a deeper understanding of its relevance in the public domain.
First, remove inconsistencies across regulatory rules and territorial regimes, and ensure their credibility concerning implementation. Second, discourage the use of financial regulatory standards as means of international competition. Third, give more weight to pedagogically explaining the established regulatory standards in public, to strengthen their societal backing.
We study the information flow from the ECB on policy dates since its inception, using tick data. We show that three factors capture about all of the variation in the yield curve but that these are different factors with different variance shares in the window that contains the policy decision announcement and the window that contains the press conference. We also show that the QE-related policy factor has been dominant in the recent period and that Forward Guidance and QE effects have been very persistent on the longer-end of the yield curve. We further show that broad and banking stock indices' responses to monetary policy surprises depended on the perceived nature of the surprises. We find no evidence of asymmetric responses of financial markets to positive and negative surprises, in contrast to the literature on asymmetric real effects of monetary policy. Lastly, we show how to implement our methodology for any policy-related news release, such as policymaker speeches. To carry out the analysis, we construct the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event- Study Database (EA-MPD). This database, which contains intraday asset price changes around the policy decision announcement as well as around the press conference, is a contribution on its own right and we expect it to be the standard in monetary policy research for the euro area.
We investigate whether government credit guarantee schemes, extensively used at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, led to substitution of non-guaranteed with guaranteed credit rather than fully adding to the supply of lending. We study this issue using a unique euro-area credit register data, matched with supervisory bank data, and establish two main findings. First, guaranteed loans were mostly extended to small but comparatively creditworthy firms in sectors severely affected by the pandemic, borrowing from large, liquid and well-capitalized banks. Second, guaranteed loans partially substitute pre-existing non-guaranteed debt. For firms borrowing from multiple banks, the substitution mainly arises from the lending behavior of the bank extending guaranteed loans. Substitution was highest for funding granted to riskier and smaller firms in sectors more affected by the pandemic, and borrowing from larger and stronger banks. Overall, the evidence indicates that government guarantees contributed to the continued extension of credit to relatively creditworthy firms hit by the pandemic, but also benefited banks’ balance sheets to some extent.
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of changes in banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects during and after the crisis. First, public, bailed out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sovereign stress by purchasing domestic public debt more than other banks, with public banks’ purchases growing especially in coincidence with the largest ECB liquidity injections. Second, bank exposures significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending. This amplification of the impact on lending does not appear to arise from spurious correlation or reverse causality.