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This paper analyses two reasons why inflation may interfere with price adjustment so as to create inefficiencies in resource allocation at low rates of inflation. The first argument is that the higher the rate of inflation the lower the likelihood that downward nominal rigidities are binding (the Tobin argument) which implies a non-linear Phillips-curve. The second argument is that low inflation strengthens nominal price rigidities and thus impairs the flexibility of the price system resulting in a less efficient resource allocation. It is argued that inflation can be too low from a welfare point of view due to the presence of nominal rigidities, but the quantitative importance is an open question.
We investigate the characteristics of infrastructure as an asset class from an investment perspective of a limited partner. While non U.S. institutional investors gain exposure to infrastructure assets through a mix of direct investments and private fund vehicles, U.S. investors predominantly invest in infrastructure through private funds. We find that the stream of cash flows delivered by private infrastructure funds to institutional investors is very similar to that delivered by other types of private equity, as reflected by the frequency and amounts of net cash flows. U.S. public pension funds perform worse than other institutional investors in their infrastructure fund investments, although they are exposed to underlying deals with very similar project stage, concession terms, ownership structure, industry, and geographical location. By selecting funds that invest in projects with poor financial performance, U.S. public pension funds have created an implicit subsidy to infrastructure as an asset class, which we estimate within the range of $730 million to $3.16 billion per year depending on the benchmark.
Shallow meritocracy
(2023)
Meritocracies aspire to reward hard work and promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances into which they were born. However, circumstances often shape the choice to work hard. I show that people's merit judgments are "shallow" and insensitive to this effect. They hold others responsible for their choices, even if these choices have been shaped by unequal circumstances. In an experiment, US participants judge how much money workers deserve for the effort they exert. Unequal circumstances disadvantage some workers and discourage them from working hard. Nonetheless, participants reward the effort of disadvantaged and advantaged workers identically, regardless of the circumstances under which choices are made. For some participants, this reflects their fundamental view regarding fair rewards. For others, the neglect results from the uncertain counterfactual. They understand that circumstances shape choices but do not correct for this because the counterfactual—what would have happened under equal circumstances—remains uncertain.
We document the individual willingness to act against climate change and study the role of social norms in a large sample of US adults. Individual beliefs about social norms positively predict pro-climate donations, comparable in strength to universal moral values and economic preferences such as patience and reciprocity. However, we document systematic misperceptions of social norms. Respondents vastly underestimate the prevalence of climate-friendly behaviors and norms. Correcting these misperceptions in an experiment causally raises individual willingness to act against climate change as well as individual support for climate policies. The effects are strongest for individuals who are skeptical about the existence and threat of global warming.
This paper shows that support for climate action is high across survey participants from all EU countries in three dimensions: (1) Participants are willing to contribute personally to combating climate change, (2) they approve of pro-climate social norms, and (3) they demand government action. In addition, there is a significant perception gap where individuals underestimate others' willingness to contribute to climate action by over 10 percentage points, influencing their own willingness to act. Policymakers should recognize the broad support for climate action among European citizens and communicate this effectively to counteract the vocal minority opposed to it.
Investors' return expectations are pivotal in stock markets, but the reasoning behind these expectations remains a black box for economists. This paper sheds light on economic agents' mental models -- their subjective understanding -- of the stock market, drawing on surveys with the US general population, US retail investors, US financial professionals, and academic experts. Respondents make return forecasts in scenarios describing stale news about the future earnings streams of companies, and we collect rich data on respondents' reasoning. We document three main results. First, inference from stale news is rare among academic experts but common among households and financial professionals, who believe that stale good news lead to persistently higher expected returns in the future. Second, while experts refer to the notion of market efficiency to explain their forecasts, households and financial professionals reveal a neglect of equilibrium forces. They naively equate higher future earnings with higher future returns, neglecting the offsetting effect of endogenous price adjustments. Third, a series of experimental interventions demonstrate that these naive forecasts do not result from inattention to trading or price responses but reflect a gap in respondents' mental models -- a fundamental unfamiliarity with the concept of equilibrium.
Speculative news on corporate takeovers may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced collaboration and morale among employees and managers. Using a panel of OECD-headquartered firms, we show that firm productivity temporarily declines upon announcements of speculative takeover rumors that do not materialize. This productivity dip is more pronounced for targets and for firms in countries with weaker employee rights and less long-term orientation. Abnormal stock returns mirror these results. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.
This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the dividend payout, there is strong evidence that the type of controlling shareholder matters as family controlled firms have high dividend payouts whereas bank controlled firms have low dividend payouts. However, there is no evidence that the dividend preference of the large shareholder has an impact on the dividend decision. JEL Classification: G32, G35 Keywords: Dividend Policy, Payout Policy, Lintner Dividend Model, Tax Clientele Effects, Corporate Governance
Recent advances in natural language processing have contributed to the development of market sentiment measures through text content analysis in news providers and social media. The effectiveness of these sentiment variables depends on the imple- mented techniques and the type of source on which they are based. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the release of public financial news on the S&P 500. Using automatic labeling techniques based on either stock index returns or dictionaries, we apply a classification problem based on long short-term memory neural networks to extract alternative proxies of investor sentiment. Our findings provide evidence that there exists an impact of those sentiments in the market on a 20-minute time frame. We find that dictionary-based sentiment provides meaningful results with respect to those based on stock index returns, which partly fails in the mapping process between news and financial returns.
Discussions about the banking union have restarted. Its success so far is limited: national banking sectors are still overwhelmingly exposed to their own countries’ economies, cross border banking has not increased and capital and liquidity remain locked within national boundaries. The policy letter highlights that the current debate, centered on sovereign exposures and deposit insurance, misses critical underlying problems in the supervision and resolution frameworks. The ECB supervisors’ efforts to facilitate cross-border banking have been hampered by national ringfencing. The resolution framework is not up to its task: limited powers of the SRB, prohibitive access conditions and limited size of the Single Resolution Fund limit its effectiveness. A lack of a coherent European framework for insolvency unlevels the regulatory field and creates incentives to bypass European rules. The new Commission and European Parliament, with the new ECB leadership, provide a unique opportunity to address these shortcomings and make the banking union work.
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
We assess, through VAR evidence, the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining fragile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore dampening the conventional amplification effect of the financial accelerator.
We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel - monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output.
Exit strategies
(2010)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using the model of Angeloni and Faia (2010), that combines a standard DSGE framework with a fragile banking sector, suitably modified and calibrated for the euro area. Credibly announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate – based on simple criteria – alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. The fiscal adjustment should be based on spending cuts or else be relatively skewed towards consumption taxes. The phasing out of monetary accommodation should be simultaneous or slightly delayed. We also find that, contrary to widespread belief, Basel III may well have an expansionary macroeconomic effect. Keywords: Exit Strategies , Debt Consolidation , Fiscal Policy , Monetary Policy , Capital Requirements , Bank Runs JEL Classification: G01, E63, H12
Exit strategies
(2014)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using a macromodel where banks choose their capital structure and are subject to runs. Under a Taylor rule, the post-crisis interest rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB) and remains there for several years. In that condition, pre-announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate - based on output and inflation performance and bank stability - alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. We also examine an alternative monetary strategy in which the interest rate does not reach the ZLB; the benefits from fiscal consolidation persist, but are more nuanced.
We present new statistical indicators of the structure and performance of US banks from 1990 to today, geographically disaggregated at the level of individual counties. The constructed data set (20 indicators for some 3150 counties over 31 years, for a total of about 2 million data points) conveys a detailed picture of how the geography of US banking has evolved in the last three decades. We consider the data as a stepping stone to understand the role banks and banking policies may have played in mitigating, or exacerbating, the rise of poverty and inequality in certain US regions.
We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risk-taking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs. This can be viewed as a retroactive tax that is levied only when a crisis occurs and that leads to a form of collective liability for bank managers. We develop a game-theoretic model of a banking sector whose shareholders have limited liability, so that society at large will suffer losses if a crisis occurs. Without Crisis Contracts, the managers' and shareholders' interests are aligned, and managers take more than the socially optimal level of risk. We investigate how the introduction of Crisis Contracts changes the equilibrium level of risk-taking and the remuneration of bank managers. We establish conditions under which the introduction of Crisis Contracts will reduce the probability of a banking crisis and improve social welfare. We explore how Crisis Contracts and capital requirements can supplement each other and we show that the efficacy of Crisis Contracts is not undermined by attempts to hedge.
Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the “democratization of tax enforcement,” by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.
Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the “democratization of tax enforcement,” by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs.
We design, field and exploit survey data from a representative sample of the French population to examine whether informative social interactions enter householdsístockholding decisions. Respondents report perceptions about their circle of peers with whom they interact about Önancial matters, their social circle and the population. We provide evidence for the presence of an information channel through which social interactions ináuence perceptions and expectations about stock returns, and financial behavior. We also find evidence of mindless imitation of peers in the outer social circle, but this does not permeate as many layers of financial behavior as informative social interactions do.
GAMESTOP, A COMPANY THAT WAS PRESUMED DEAD DUE TO SHRINKING PROFITS OFITS BRICK-AND-MORTAR BUSINESS MODEL, HIT THE HEADLINES BECAUSE OF ASHORT SQUEEZE OF ITS STOCK PRICE. THE POPULAR OPINION REPORTED BY MAIN-STREAM MEDIA SUGGESTED THAT THE GAMESTOP FRENZY WAS EXCLUSIVE TO YOUNGAND INEXPERIENCED INVESTORS GATHERING ON THE SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMREDDIT. IN CONTRAST, OUR RESULTS INDICATE THAT ALSO MORE EXPERIENCEDRETAIL INVESTORS IN GERMANY PARTICIPATED.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on results from the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model and fine that relative wealth equivalent losses are below 1.16% if the jump size is stochastic and below 1% if the jump size is constant and γ ≥ 5. We perform robustness checks for various levels of risk-aversion, expected jump size, and jump intensity.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on quantities known only in the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model. Our findings are threefold: Jumps matter more, i.e. our approximation is less accurate, if (i) the expected jump size or (ii) the jump intensity is large. Fixing the average impact of jumps, we find that (iii) rare, but severe jumps matter more than frequent, but small jumps.
Extending the data set used in Beyer (2009) to 2017, we estimate I(1) and I(2) money demand models for euro area M3. After including two broken trends and a few dummies to account for shifts in the variables following the global financial crisis and the ECB's non-standard monetary policy measures, we find that the money demand and the real wealth relations identified in Beyer (2009) have remained remarkably stable throughout the extended sample period. Testing for price homogeneity in the I(2) model we find that the nominal-to-real transformation is not rejected for the money relation whereas the wealth relation cannot be expressed in real terms.
Ensuring financial stability : financial structure and the impact of monetary policy on asset prices
(2008)
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guard against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited. Keywords: asset prices, monetary policy, panel VAR. JEL Number: C23, E52
We study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006, using single-country VARs and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries depending on their financial systems. The effect of monetary policy on property prices is about three times as large as its impact on GDP. Using monetary policy to guard against financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements thus has sizable effects on economic activity. While the financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited.