E52 Monetary Policy
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Central bank intervention in the form of quantitative easing (QE) during times of low interest rates is a controversial topic. The author introduces a novel approach to study the effectiveness of such unconventional measures. Using U.S. data on six key financial and macroeconomic variables between 1990 and 2015, the economy is estimated by artificial neural networks. Historical counterfactual analyses show that real effects are less pronounced than yield effects.
Disentangling the effects of the individual asset purchase programs, impulse response functions provide evidence for QE being less effective the more the crisis is overcome. The peak effects of all QE interventions during the Financial Crisis only amounts to 1.3 pp for GDP growth and 0.6 pp for inflation respectively. Hence, the time as well as the volume of the interventions should be deliberated.
This paper sheds light on the life insurance sector’s liquidity risk exposure. Life insurers are important long-term investors on financial markets. Due to their long-term investment horizon they cannot quickly adapt to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Rising interest rates in particular can expose life insurers to run-like situations, since a slow interest rate passthrough incentivizes policyholders to terminate insurance policies and invest the proceeds at relatively high market interest rates. We develop and empirically calibrate a granular model of policyholder behavior and life insurance cash flows to quantify insurers’ liquidity risk exposure stemming from policy terminations. Our model predicts that a sharp interest rate rise by 4.5pp within two years would force life insurers to liquidate 12% of their initial assets. While the associated fire sale costs are small under reasonable assumptions, policy terminations plausibly erase 30% of life insurers’ capital due to mark-to-market accounting. Our analysis reveals a mechanism by which monetary policy tightening increases liquidity risk exposure of non-bank financial intermediaries with long-term assets.
Life insurance convexity
(2023)
Life insurers sell savings contracts with surrender options, which allow policyholders to prematurely receive guaranteed surrender values. These surrender options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Hence, higher interest rates raise surrender rates, as we document empirically by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in monetary policy. Using a calibrated model, we then estimate that surrender options would force insurers to sell up to 2% of their investments during an enduring interest rate rise of 25 bps per year. We show that these fire sales are fueled by surrender value guarantees and insurers’ long-term investments.
Life insurance convexity
(2021)
Life insurers massively sell savings contracts with surrender options which allow policyholders to withdraw a guaranteed amount before maturity. These options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Using data on German life insurers, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates raises surrender rates by 17 basis points. We quantify the resulting liquidity risk in a calibrated model of surrender decisions and insurance cash flows. Simulations predict that surrender options can force insurers to sell up to 3% of their assets, depressing asset prices by 90 basis points. The effect is amplified by the duration of insurers' investments, and its impact on the term structure of interest rates depends on life insurers' investment strategy.
The Federal Reserve has been publishing federal funds rate prescriptions from Taylor rules in its Monetary Policy Report since 2017. The signals from the rules aligned with Fed action on many occasions, but in some cases the Fed opted for a different route. This paper reviews the implications of the rules during the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge and derives projections for the future.
In 2020, the Fed took the negative prescribed rates, which were far below the effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as support for extensive and long-lasting quantitative easing. Yet, the calculations overstate the extent of the constraint, because they neglect the supply side effects of the pandemic.
The paper proposes a simple model-based adjustment to the resource gap used by the rules for 2020. In 2021, the rules clearly signaled the need for tightening because of the rise of inflation, yet the Fed waited until spring 2022 to raise the federal funds rate. With the decline of inflation over the course of 2023, the rules’ prescriptions have also come down. They fall below the actual federal funds rate target range in 2024. Several caveats concerning the projections of the interest rate prescriptions are discussed.
Despite a number of helpful changes, including the adoption of an inflation target, the Fed’s monetary policy strategy proved insufficiently resilient in recent years. While the Fed eased policy appropriately during the pandemic, it fell behind the curve during the post-pandemic recovery. During 2021, the Fed kept easing policy while the inflation outlook was deteriorating and the economy was growing considerably faster than the economy’s natural growth rate—the sum of the Fed’s 2% inflation goal and the growth rate of potential output.
The resilience of the Fed’s monetary policy strategy could be enhanced, and such errors be avoided with guidance from a simple natural growth targeting rule that prescribes that the federal funds rate during each quarter be raised (cut) when projected nominal income growth exceeds (falls short) of the economy’s natural growth rate. An illustration with real-time data and forecasts since the early 1990s shows that Fed policy has not persistently deviated from this simple rule with the notable exception of the period coinciding with the Fed’s post-pandemic policy error.
Whatever it takes to understand a central banker : embedding their words using neural networks
(2023)
Dictionary approaches are at the forefront of current techniques for quantifying central bank communication. In this paper, the author propose a novel language model that is able to capture subtleties of messages such as one of the most famous sentences in central bank communications when ECB President Mario Draghi stated that "within [its] mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro".
The authors utilize a text corpus that is unparalleled in size and diversity in the central bank communication literature, as well as introduce a novel approach to text quantication from computational linguistics. This allows them to provide high-quality central bank-specific textual representations and demonstrate their applicability by developing an index that tracks deviations in the Fed's communication towards inflation targeting. Their findings indicate that these deviations in communication significantly impact monetary policy actions, substantially reducing the reaction towards inflation deviation in the US.
This paper studies the macro-financial implications of using carbon prices to achieve ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets. My empirical evidence shows a 0.6% output loss and a rise of 0.3% in inflation in response to a 1% shock on carbon policy. Furthermore, I also observe financial instability and allocation effects between the clean and highly polluted energy sectors. To have a better prediction of medium and long-term impact, using a medium-large macro-financial DSGE model with environmental aspects, I show the recessionary effect of an ambitious carbon price implementation to achieve climate targets, a 40% reduction in GHG emission causes a 0.7% output loss while reaching a zero-emission economy in 30 years causes a 2.6% output loss. I document an amplified effect of the banking sector during the transition path. The paper also uncovers the beneficial role of pre-announcements of carbon policies in mitigating inflation volatility by 0.2% at its peak, and our results suggest well-communicated carbon policies from authorities and investing to expand the green sector. My findings also stress the use of optimal green monetary and financial policies in mitigating the effects of transition risk and assisting the transition to a zero-emission world. Utilizing a heterogeneous approach with macroprudential tools, I find that optimal macroprudential tools can mitigate the output loss by 0.1% and investment loss by 1%. Importantly, my work highlights the use of capital flow management in the green transition when a global cooperative solution is challenging.
The forward guidance trap
(2023)
This paper examines the policy experience of the Fed, ECB and BOJ during and after the Covid-19 pandemic and draws lessons for monetary policy strategy and ist communication. All three central banks provided appropriate accommodation during the pandemic but two failed to unwind this accommodation in a timely manner. The Fed and ECB guided real interest rates to inappropriately negative levels as the economy recovered from the pandemic, fueling high inflation. The policy error can be traced to decisions regarding forward guidance on policy rates that delayed lift-off while the two central banks continued to expand their balance sheets. The Fed and the ECB fell into the forward guidance trap. This could have been avoided if policy were guided by a forward- looking rule that properly adjusted the nominal interest rate with the evolution of the inflation outlook.