Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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155
We provide insights into determinants of the rating level of 371 issuers which defaulted in the years 1999 to 2003, and into the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The evidence for the rating level suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods before the default event. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causal-ity, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild down-grades. Further, our analysis of rating changes shows that issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also find that larger issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers.
152
This paper makes an attempt to present the economics of credit securitisation in a non-technical way, starting from the description and the analysis of a typical securitisation transaction. The paper sketches a theoretical explanation for why tranching, or nonproportional risk sharing, which is at the heart of securitisation transactions, may allow commercial banks to maximize their shareholder value. However, the analysis makes also clear that the conditions under which credit securitisation enhances welfare, are fairly restrictive, and require not only an active role of the banking supervisory authorities, but also a price tag on the implicit insurance currently provided by the lender of last resort.
153
We derive the effects of credit risk transfer (CRT) markets on real sector productivity and on the volume of financial intermediation in a model where banks choose their optimal degree of CRT and monitoring. We find that CRT increases productivity in the up-market real sector but decreases it in the low-end segment. If optimal, CRT unambiguously fosters financial deepening, i.e., it reduces credit-rationing in the economy. These effects rely upon the ability of banks to commit to the optimal CRT at the funding stage. The optimal degree of CRT depends on the combination of moral hazard, general riskiness, and the cost of monitoring in non-monotonic ways.
150
„Bedeutende Finanzplätze“ oder Finanzzentren sind eng abgegrenzte Orte mit einer beträchtlichen Konzentration wichtiger professioneller Aktivitäten aus dem Finanzdienstleistungsbereich und der entsprechenden Institutionen. Allerdings: „Finance is a footloose industry“: Die Finanzbranche kann abwandern, ein Finanzzentrum kann sich verlagern, möglicherweise auch einfach auflösen. Die Möglichkeit der Auflösung und der Abwanderung stellt eine Bedrohung dar, die in der Zeit der Globalisierung und der rasanten Fortschritte der Transport- und der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik ausgeprägter sein dürfte, als sie je war. Frankfurt ist zweifellos ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“, und manchen gilt er auch als bedroht. Allein deshalb ist unser Thema wichtig; und auch wenn die Einschätzungen von Bedeutung und Bedrohtheit keineswegs neu sind, ist es doch aktuell. Der Aspekt der Bedrohtheit prägt, wie wir die Frage im Titel verstehen und diskutieren möchten. Was ist ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“? Selbst wenn man das Attribut „bedeutend“ erst einmal beiseite lässt, ist die Frage keineswegs trivial. Sie zielt ja nicht nur auf eine Begriffsklärung, eine Sprachregelung ab. Hinter dem Begriff steht oft auch eine Vorstellung vom „Wesen“ dessen, was ein Begriff bezeichnet. Also: Was macht einen Finanzplatz aus? Und weiter: Warum gibt es überhaupt Finanzplätze als beträchtliche Konzentrationen von bestimmten wichtigen Aktivitäten und Institutionen? Welche Kräfte führen - oder zumindest führten - zu der räumlichen Konzentration der Aktivitäten und Institutionen, wie wirken diese Kräfte, und wie ändern sie sich gegebenenfalls? Diesen Fragen ist dieser Beitrag im Wesentlichen gewidmet, und sie prägen seinen Aufbau. Im Abschnitt II wird diskutiert, was ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“ ist oder woran man ihn erkennt und „was er braucht“. Im Abschnitt III gehen wir zuerst auf die Frage nach der in letzter Zeit unter dem Stichwort „the end of geography“ heftig diskutierten Vorstellung einer Auflösung oder Virtualisierung der Finanzplätze ein – nicht weil dies die wichtigere Bedrohung wäre, sondern weil es die grundlegendere Frage darstellt. Dann diskutieren wir den Wettbewerb von Finanzplätzen in Europa. Den Abschluss bilden Überlegungen zu den Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Frankfurt und der möglichen Förderung seiner Entwicklung.
156
This article presents an overview of the contemporary German insurance market, its structure, players, and development trends. First, brief information about the history of the insurance industry in Germany is provided. Second, the contemporary market is analyzed in terms of its legal and economic structure, with statistics on the number of companies, insurance density and penetration, the role of insurers in the capital markets, premiums split, and main market players and their market shares. Furthermore, the three biggest insurance lines—life, health, and property and casualty—are considered in more detail, such as product range, country specifics, and insurance and investment results. A section on regulation outlines its implementation in the insurance sector, offering information on the underlying legislative basis, supervisory body, technical procedures, expected developments, and sources of more detailed information.
151
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system for cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the 'best' system for the Single European Financial Market.
157
Academic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have been predominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empirical literature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself. While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly driven by the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing business environment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affect stock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the best suited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchanges with differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first step individual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regress the derived values against variables that - amongst others - map the institutional arrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivity differences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges and (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We find evidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency than mutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth is concerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with a customer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership lie possibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneous members.
158
In recent years stock exchanges have been increasingly diversifying their operations into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services and software sales. This trend can be observed most notably among profit-oriented trading venues. While the pursuit for diversification is likely to be driven by the attractiveness of these investment opportunities, it is yet an open question whether certain integration activities are also efficient, both from a social welfare and from the exchanges' perspective. Academic contributions so far analyzed different business models primarily from the social welfare perspective, whereas there is only little literature considering their impact on the exchange itself. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the factor productivity of exchanges with different business models. Our findings suggest three conclusions: (1) Integration activity comes at the cost of increased operational complexity which in some cases outweigh the potential synergies between related activities and therefore leads to technical inefficiencies and lower productivity growth. (2) We find no evidence that vertical integration is more efficient and productive than other business models. This finding could contribute to the ongoing discussion about the merits of vertical integration from a social welfare perspective. (3) The existence of a strong in-house IT-competence seems to be beneficial to overcome.
148
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
149
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
160
In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating on the rated firms. Apart from hinting at explanations for several hypotheses with regard to agencies' optimal rating assessments, our model suggests that the existence of rating agencies may decrease the incidence of multiple equilibria. If investors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information, we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collection are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure uniqueness of equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark off a virtuous circle that increases the efficiency of the market outcome.
159
Kapitalmarktorientierte Risikosteuerung in Banken : Marktwertsteuerung statt Marktzinsmethode
(2005)
In diesem Beitrag wird das Konzept der Marktzinsmethode als Grundlage der dualen Risikosteuerung von Kredit- und Marktpreisrisiken in Frage gestellt. Die Kreditrisiken einer Bank implizieren bonitätsinduzierte Marktpreisrisiken und bankspezifische Refinanzierungskosten. Während die bonitätsinduzierten Marktpreisrisiken in der dualen Risikosteuerung keine Berücksichtigung finden, werden die bankspezifischen Refinanzierungskosten zwar erkannt, aber bankintern nicht verursachungsgerecht zugeordnet. Das Grundmodell der Marktzinsmethode bietet keine Lösungsansätze zur Behebung dieser Probleme. Demgegenüber lassen sich die Fehlsteuerungsimpulse von vornherein durch eine konsequente Marktbewertung (Mark to Market) aller Finanzinstrumente vermeiden. Als Ausblick werden erste Überlegungen zur Implementierung einer umfassenden Marktwertsteuerung in Banken entwickelt und exemplarisch ein hierfür geeignetes Bewertungsmodell vorgestellt.
154
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
91 rev.
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
126 , Vers
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in Technique Financière et Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks operating in several parts of the world. After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.
102 r
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
142
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.
141 , vers
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.
131
The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in particular given the European Union’s decision to require the application of IFRS by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common con-jecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which pre-adopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing avail-able implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.
143
Seit der Einführung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Kodex) im Jahr 2002 sind deutsche börsennotierte Unternehmen zur Abgabe der Entsprechenserklärung gemäß § 161 AktG verpflichtet (Comply-or-Explain-Prinzip). Auf der Basis dieser Information soll durch den Druck des Kapitalmarkts die Einhaltung des Kodex überwacht und gegebenenfalls sanktioniert werden. Dabei wird regelmäßig postuliert, dass bei überdurchschnittlicher Befolgung bzw. Nichtbefolgung der Kodex-Empfehlungen eine Belohnung durch Kurszuschläge bzw. eine Sanktionierung durch Kursabschläge erfolgt. Die Ergebnisse einer Ereignisstudie zeigen, dass die Abgabe der Entsprechenserklärung keine erhebliche Kursbeeinflussung auslöst und die für das Enforcement des Kodex angenommene (und erforderliche) Selbstregulierung durch den Kapitalmarkt nicht stattfindet. Es wird daher kritisch hinterfragt, ob der für den Kodex gewählte und grundsätzlich zu begrüßende flexible Regulierungsansatz im System des zwingenden deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts einen geeigneten Enforcement-Mechanismus darstellt. This paper studies the short-run announcement effects of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code (‘the Code’) on firm value. Event study results suggest that firm value is unaffected by the announcement, although such market reactions to the first time disclosure of the declaration of conformity were widely assumed by the private and public promoters of the Code. This result from acceptance of the German Code add evidence to the hypothesis that regulatory corporate governance initiatives that rely on mandatory disclosure without monitoring and enforcement are ineffective in civil law countries.
137
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically unverifiable scale economies: preemtive resolution of banks´ financial distress. Such "distress mergers" can be a significant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganizations, realize diversification gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these potential benefits comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear. We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers. The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany´s savings and cooperatives banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced significant structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemtive distress resolution have moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do find strong evidence consistent with diversification gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have benefits without affecting systematic stability adversely.
127
Im Rahmen des Value Based Managements sollen alle Manahmen der Unternehmensfhrung auf die Steigerung des intrinsischen Marktwertes des Eigenkapitals ausgerichtet werden. Hauptanwendungsbereiche des Value Based Managements sind die Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung sowie die Bereichssteuerung. Eine konsequente shareholder-orientierte Steuerung beinhaltet eine adquate Ermittlung von Wertbeitrgen in den einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen. Hierzu dienen insbesondere absolute Wertbeitragskennzahlen in Form von Residualgewinnen. Residualgewinne sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Gewinn um eine auf das Gesamtkapital bezogene Capital bzw. Interest Charge reduziert wird. Der magebliche Gewinn sowie das Gesamtkapital ergeben sich, indem die handelsrechtlichen Gren durch mehr oder minder weitreichende Modifikationen angepasst werden. Die Berechnung der Interest Charge erfolgt entweder auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes oder auf Basis eines risikofreien Zinssatzes. In der Praxis finden sich zahlreiche unterschiedliche Residualgewinnkonzepte, die sich insbesondere durch die jeweils charakteristischen Modifikationen und durch den verwendeten Zinssatz zur Berechnung der Kapitalkosten unterscheiden.1) Herkmmliche Konzepte zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass die Interest Charge auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes berechnet wird. Das in Velthuis (2003c) theoretisch entworfene und von der KPMG in der Praxis umgesetzte Konzept Earnings less Riskfree Interest Charge, ERIC , ist hingegen dadurch charakterisiert, dass zur Berechnung der Interest Charge ein risikofreier Zinssatz verwendet wird. Ferner werden Modifikationen nur insofern vorgenommen, als dass eine vollstndige Bercksichtigung aller Erfolgskomponenten gewhrleistet wird. Glaubt man den Vertretern herkmmlicher Konzepte, basieren diese Konzepte auf einer hinreichenden theoretischen Fundierung. Diesem Anspruch gengen solche Konzepte tatschlich jedoch nicht, sie zeichnen sich gerade durch eine mangelnde theoretische Fundierung aus.2) In Velthuis (2003c) wird verdeutlicht, dass die in der Praxis verbreitete Vorgehensweise gerade zum Ausweis von Wertbeitrgen fhrt, die inkonsistent mit der Zielsetzung der Shareholder sind. In allen Anwendungsbereichen des VBM zeigt sich nmlich aus theoretischer Sicht die Problematik der VerIm Rahmen des Value Based Managements sollen alle Maßnahmen der Unternehmensführung auf die Steigerung des intrinsischen Marktwertes des Eigenkapitals ausgerichtet werden. Hauptanwendungsbereiche des Value Based Managements sind die Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung sowie die Bereichssteuerung. Eine konsequente shareholder-orientierte Steuerung beinhaltet eine adäquate Ermittlung von Wertbeiträgen in den einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen. Hierzu dienen insbesondere absolute Wertbeitragskennzahlen in Form von Residualgewinnen. Residualgewinne sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Gewinn um eine auf das Gesamtkapital bezogene Capital bzw. Interest Charge reduziert wird. Der maßgebliche Gewinn sowie das Gesamtkapital ergeben sich, indem die handelsrechtlichen Größen durch mehr oder minder weitreichende Modifikationen angepasst werden. Die Berechnung der Interest Charge erfolgt entweder auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes oder auf Basis eines risikofreien Zinssatzes. In der Praxis finden sich zahlreiche unterschiedliche Residualgewinnkonzepte, die sich insbesondere durch die jeweils charakteristischen Modifikationen und durch den verwendeten Zinssatz zur Berechnung der Kapitalkosten unterscheiden.1) Herkömmliche Konzepte zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass die Interest Charge auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes berechnet wird. Das in Velthuis (2003c) theoretisch entworfene und von der KPMG in der Praxis umgesetzte Konzept Earnings less Riskfree Interest Charge, ERIC Ò , ist hingegen dadurch charakterisiert, dass zur Berechnung der Interest Charge ein risikofreier Zinssatz verwendet wird. Ferner werden Modifikationen nur insofern vorgenommen, als dass eine vollständige Berücksichtigung aller Erfolgskomponenten gewährleistet wird. Glaubt man den Vertretern herkömmlicher Konzepte, basieren diese Konzepte auf einer hinreichenden theoretischen Fundierung. Diesem Anspruch genügen solche Konzepte tatsächlich jedoch nicht, sie zeichnen sich gerade durch eine mangelnde theoretische Fundierung aus.2) In Velthuis (2003c) wird verdeutlicht, dass die in der Praxis verbreitete Vorgehensweise gerade zum Ausweis von Wertbeiträgen führt, die inkonsistent mit der Zielsetzung der Shareholder sind. In allen Anwendungsbereichen des VBM zeigt sich nämlich aus theoretischer Sicht die Problematik der Verwendung eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes zur Berechnung von Kapitalkosten: Schon die Verwendung eines risikoangepassten Kapitalkostensatzes im Rahmen der Planung kann problematisch sein. Die Verwendung risikoangepasster Kapitalkosten als Benchmark bei der Performancemessung ist sogar ganz abzulehnen, und bei der Managemententlohnung ist die Verrechnung von risikoangepassten Kapitalkosten zwingend mit Fehlanreizen verbunden. Aber auch praxisübliche Modifikationen erweisen sich als problematisch, da Erfolgskomponenten nicht bzw. nicht vollständig berücksichtigt werden. Im Gegensatz zu herkömmlichen Konzepten weist das VBM-Konzept ERIC eine tatsächliche theoretische Fundierung auf. In Velthuis (2003c) werden grundlegende theoretische und praktische Anforderungen für die einzelnen Anwendungsbereiche herausgearbeitet und es wird gezeigt, dass ein integriertes VBM-Konzept auf Basis des Residualgewinns ERIC diese Anforderungen stets erfüllt. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Grundkonzeption von ERIC theoretisch weiter zu entwickeln. Während in Velthuis (2003c) stets von einer sehr einfachen Idealwelt ausgegangen wird, soll hier zum einen verdeutlicht werden, wie ein erfolgreiches Value Based Management auf Basis von ERIC in komplexeren und realitätsnäheren Situationen erfolgen kann. Zum anderen gilt es, zusätzliche praktische Problembereiche zu erkennen und Lösungsmöglichkeiten aufzuzeigen. Der Aufsatz ist wie folgt aufgebaut: Zunächst wird gezeigt, wie der Residualgewinn ERIC zu berechnen ist, und es wird ein Überblick über die Anwendungsbereiche gegeben. Anschließend wird die grundlegende Entscheidungssituation für die späteren Darstellungen erörtert und es werden fundamentale Prinzipien des Value Based Managements und ihre Bedeutung für die einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen erläutert. Sodann wird für die einzelnen Bereichen des Value Based Managements, der Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung und der Bereichssteuerung gezeigt, wie ERIC anzuwenden ist, damit eine tatsächliche Shareholder-Orientierung gewährleistet wird. Die Darstellungen erfolgen dabei jeweils zunächst vor dem Hintergrund einer Idealwelt. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Entscheidungssituation jeweils modifiziert, um der Realität ein Stück näher zu kommen.
132
This paper compares the accuracy of credit ratings of Moody s and Standard&Poors. Based on 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in several datasets from 1999 to 2003 a slight advantage for the rating system of Moody s is detected. Compared to former research the robustness of the results is increased by using nonparametric bootstrap approaches. Furthermore, robustness checks are made to control for the impact of Watchlist entries, staleness of ratings and the effect of unsolicited ratings on the results.
128
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. For our comprehensive sample of 224 announcements that took place between May 1998 and April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-announcement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis or the tax-efficiency hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from initial statements of firms that they intend to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements.
129
We show that multi-bank loan pools improve the risk-return profile of banks’ loan business. Banks write simple contracts on the proceeds from pooled loan portfolios, taking into account the free-rider problems in joint loan production. Thus, banks benefit greatly from diversifying credit risk while limiting the efficiency loss due to adverse incentives. We present calibration results that the formation of loan pools reduce the volatility in default rates, proxying for credit risk, of participating banks’ loan portfolios by roughly 70% in our sample. Under reasonable assumptions, the gain in return on equity (in certainty equivalent terms) is around 20 basis points annually.
133
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
125
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
135
Tractable hedging - an implementation of robust hedging strategies : [This Version: March 30, 2004]
(2004)
This paper provides a theoretical and numerical analysis of robust hedging strategies in diffusion–type models including stochastic volatility models. A robust hedging strategy avoids any losses as long as the realised volatility stays within a given interval. We focus on the effects of restricting the set of admissible strategies to tractable strategies which are defined as the sum over Gaussian strategies. Although a trivial Gaussian hedge is either not robust or prohibitively expensive, this is not the case for the cheapest tractable robust hedge which consists of two Gaussian hedges for one long and one short position in convex claims which have to be chosen optimally.
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In this study, we develop a technique for estimating a firm’s expected cost of equity capital derived from analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices. Building on the work of Gebhardt/Lee/-Swaminathan (2001) and Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (2002), our approach allows daily estimation, using only publicly available information at that date. We then estimate the expected cost of equity capital at the market, industry and individual firm level using historical German data from 1989-2002 and examine firm characteristics which are systematically related to these estimates. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the concept in a contemporary case study for DaimlerChrysler and the European automobile industry.
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Der Bestimmung risikoadäquater Diskontierungssätze kommt bei der Unternehmensbedeutung eine zentrale Bedeutung zu. Wird zu deren Bestimmung in der praktischen Anwendung das CAPM verwendet, gilt es dabei, risikolose Zinssätze und Risikoprämien zu bestimmen, für die erwartete Renditen des Marktportfeuilles und Beta-Faktoren als Maßgrößen für das systematische Risiko benötigt werden. Passend zu den zu bewertenden erwarteten Überschussgrößen sollten auch die zur Diskontierung verwendeten Renditeforderungen die im Bewertungszeitpunkt erwarteten künftigen Renditen vergleichbarer Anlagen widerspiegeln. Die weitaus meisten Beiträge zur Operationalisierung des CAPM leiten die Renditeforderungen jedoch aus historischen Kapitalmarktrenditen ab. Wir zeigen in diesem Beitrag auf, wie erwartete künftige Renditen aus beobachtbaren Größen, vor allen den Zinsstrukturkurven und den beobachtbaren Analystenprognosen, zukunftsorientiert abgeleitet werden können. Damit wird eine konzeptionell schlüssigere Bewertung der im Bewertungszeitpunkt erwarteten künftigen Überschüsse mit den zeitgleich erwarteten künftigen Renditen ermöglicht.
136, Versi
Tests for the existence and the sign of the volatility risk premium are often based on expected option hedging errors. When the hedge is performed under the ideal conditions of continuous trading and correct model specification, the sign of the premium is the same as the sign of the mean hedging error for a large class of stochastic volatility option pricing models. We show, however, that the problems of discrete trading and model mis-specification, which are necessarily present in any empirical study, may cause the standard test to yield unreliable results.
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When options are traded, one can use their prices and price changes to draw inference about the set of risk factors and their risk premia. We analyze tests for the existence and the sign of the market prices of jump risk that are based on option hedging errors. We derive a closed-form solution for the option hedging error and its expectation in a stochastic jump model under continuous trading and correct model specification. Jump risk is structurally different from, e.g., stochastic volatility: there is one market price of risk for each jump size (and not just \emph{the} market price of jump risk). Thus, the expected hedging error cannot identify the exact structure of the compensation for jump risk. Furthermore, we derive closed form solutions for the expected option hedging error under discrete trading and model mis-specification. Compared to the ideal case, the sign of the expected hedging error can change, so that empirical tests based on simplifying assumptions about trading frequency and the model may lead to incorrect conclusions.
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This paper deals with the superhedging of derivatives and with the corresponding price bounds. A static superhedge results in trivial and fully nonparametric price bounds, which can be tightened if there exists a cheaper superhedge in the class of dynamic trading strategies. We focus on European path-independent claims and show under which conditions such an improvement is possible. For a stochastic volatility model with unbounded volatility, we show that a static superhedge is always optimal, and that, additionally, there may be infinitely many dynamic superhedges with the same initial capital. The trivial price bounds are thus the tightest ones. In a model with stochastic jumps or non-negative stochastic interest rates either a static or a dynamic superhedge is optimal. Finally, in a model with unbounded short rates, only a static superhedge is possible.
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What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
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Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for efficient project selection. In order to motivate a shortsighted manager to expend unobservable effort and to make efficient investment decisions, the principal sets up an incentive scheme based on residual income (e.g. EVATM). The paper shows that income smoothing generates a trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the costs associated with the "congruity" of residual earnings.
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An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.
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Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
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Under a new Basel capital accord, bank regulators might use quantitative measures when evaluating the eligibility of internal credit rating systems for the internal ratings based approach. Based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank and using a simulation approach, we find that it is possible to identify strongly inferior rating systems out-of time based on statistics that measure either the quality of ranking borrowers from good to bad, or the quality of individual default probability forecasts. Banks do not significantly improve system quality if they use credit scores instead of ratings, or logistic regression default probability estimates instead of historical data. Banks that are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers increase their average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital requirements function.
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This paper is a draft for the chapter German banks and banking structure of the forthcoming book The German financial system . As such, the paper starts out with a description of past and present structural features of the German banking industry. Given the presented empirical evidence it then argues that great care has to be taken when generalising structural trends from one financial system to another. Whilst conventio nal commercial banking is clearly in decline in the US, it is far from clear whether the dominance of banks in the German financial system has been significantly eroded over the last decades. We interpret the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patterns of firms between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for our view that the way in which and the extent to which German banks fulfil the central functions for the financial system are still consistent with the overall logic of the German financial system. In spite of the current dire business environment for financial intermediaries we do not expect the German financial system and its banking industry as an integral part of this system to converge to the institutional arrangements typical for a market-oriented financial system. This Version: March 25, 2003
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Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is an asset funding technique that involves the issuance of structured claims on the cash flow performance of a designated pool of underlying receivables. Efficient risk management and asset allocation in this growing segment of fixed income markets requires both investors and issuers to thoroughly understand the longitudinal properties of spread prices. We present a multi-factor GARCH process in order to model the heteroskedasticity of secondary market spreads for valuation and forecasting purposes. In particular, accounting for the variance of errors is instrumental in deriving more accurate estimators of time-varying forecast confidence intervals. On the basis of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief transactions as the most important asset classes of off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitisation in Europe we find that expected spread changes for these asset classes tends to be level stationary with model estimates indicating asymmetric mean reversion. Furthermore, spread volatility (conditional variance) is found to follow an asymmetric stochastic process contingent on the value of past residuals. This ABS spread behaviour implies negative investor sentiment during cyclical downturns, which is likely to escape stationary approximation the longer this market situation lasts.
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Ziel dieser Präsentation (anlässlich des Seminars „Die Auswirkungen von Asset Securitisation auf die Stabilität des Finanzmarktes“ Österreichische Nationalbank (ÖNB), Wien 1. Oktober 2003) ist es, eine Verbindung zwischen Verbriefung und Finanzmarkstabilität unter Berücksichtigung veränderter Finanzintermediation herzustellen. In der folgenden Abhandlung soll nun zunächst auf die Natur der Verbriefung per se eingegangen werden, um sodann anhand theoretischer Überlegungen und empirischer Beobachtungen mögliche Quelle systemischen Risikos in der Kreditverbriefung aufzuzeigen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um die Informationsasymmetrien und die durch Handelbarkeit von Kreditrisiko bestimmte Transaktionsstruktur („security design“), die bei regulatorischer Nichtberücksichtigung eine destabilisierende Wirkung nicht nur im Bereich der Verbriefung, sondern auch hinsichtlich der gegenseitigen Zahlungsverpflichtungen von Finanzintermediären begründen könnte.
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Intangible assets as goodwill, licenses, research and development or customer relations become in high technology and service orientated economies more and more important. But comparing the book values of listed companies and their market capitalization the financial reports seems to fail the information needs of market participants regarding the estimate of the proper firm value. Moreover, with the introduction of Anglo-American accounting systems in Europe and Asia we can observe even in the accounts of companies sited in the same jurisdiction diverging accounting practices for intangible assets caused by different accounting standards. To assess the relevance of intangible assets in Japanese and German accounts of listed companies we therefore measure certain balance sheet and profit and loss relations according to goodwill and self-developed software. We compare and analyze valuation rules for goodwill and software costs according to German GAAP, Japanese GAAP, US GAAP and IAS to determine the possible impact of diverging rules in the comparability of the accounts. Our results show that the comparability of the accounts is impaired because of different accounting practices. The recognition and valuation of goodwill and self-developed software varies significantly according to the accounting regime applied. However, for the recognition of self-developed software, the effect on the average impact on asset coefficients or profit is not that high. Moreover, an industry bias can only be found for the financial industry. In contrast, for goodwill accounting we found major differences especially between German and Japanese Blue Chips. The introduction of the new goodwill impairment only approach and the prohibition of the pooling method may have a major impact especially for Japanese companies’ accounts.
113
Das Firmenkundensegment und die Präsenz auf den internationalen Märkten für gewerblichen Hypothekarkredit und der Finanzierung öffentlicher Haushalte gewinnen für die deutschen Hypothekenbanken bis zum Jahr 2007 erheblich an Bedeutung, so das Ergebnis eines Forschungsprojekts der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Die Immobilienfinanziers werden ihre Geschäftsbeziehungen zu Unternehmen in den nächsten fünf Jahren sowohl qualitativ als auch räumlich ausbauen. Real Estate Investment Banking und Expansion ins Ausland stehen auf der strategischen Agenda der Hypothekenbanken ganz oben.
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This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
122 r
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
117
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
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A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
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Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
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Die durch jahrzehntelange Planwirtschaft geprägten Strukturen sind in Russland noch fest verwurzelt. Dementsprechend ist das Bankensystem auch zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes unterentwickelt. Die markantesten Merkmale der Finanzwirtschaft sind die ungewöhnliche Größenstruktur der Banken; deren Schwierigkeiten, die rapide zunehmende Zahl kleinster, kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen mit Finanzdienstleistungen zu versorgen sowie die geringe Rolle ausländischer Banken. Überdies sind die weiterhin bestehenden Systemrisiken nicht zu unterschätzen.
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Open-end real estate funds (so called “Offene Immobilienfonds”) play a major role in the German market for securitised real estate investments. Such funds are pools of money from many investors, which are invested in real estate by special investment management companies. This study seeks to identify the risk and return profile of this investment vehicle (before and after income taxes), to compare them with those of other major asset classes, and to provide implications for their appropriate role in a mixed-asset portfolio. Addition-ally, an overview of the institutional architecture and role of German open-end real estate funds is given. Empirical evidence suggests that the financial characteristics of open-end real estate funds are in many respects similar to those reported for direct real estate invest-ments. Accordingly, German open-end real estate funds qualify for medium and long-term investment horizons, rather than for shorter holding periods.