Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht
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81
The road to shareowner power
(1999)
A dramatic rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This will require changing the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new System. lt would eliminate the natura1 monopoly feature of the current System, and spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
18
For the German observer the idea of a Company repurchasing its own shares seems to resemble the picture of a snake eating its own tail. It appears to be highly unnatura1 and one wonders how the tail tan possibly be eatable for the snake. Not in the United States. Although repurchases have once been subject to the most stubbornly fought conflict in US Company law only some modest disclosure requirements and safeguards against overt market manipulation exist today. Large repurchases are an almost everyday event and there is an increasing tendency. The aggregate value of shares repurchased by NYSE listed companies has increased from $ 1 .l billion in 1975 to $ 6.3 billion in 1982 to $ 37.1 billion in 1985*. Few examples may illustrate this practice further: Within three years Ford Motor Corp. repurchased 30 million shares for $ 1.2 billion. In 1985 Phillips Petroleum Corp. was faced with two hostile bids and took several defensive Steps, one of which was to tender for 20 million of its own shares at a total tost of $ 1 billion. And by the end of 1988 Exxon Corp. retired 28 percent of its shares that had once been outstanding at an aggregate tost of $ 14.5 billion. The Situation in Germany is completely different. As it will be shown under German law repurchases are severely restricted and do appreciable amount at all. not take place at an In contrast to German law the United Kingdom does not prohibit repurchases but requires companies to comply with such complex rules that US companies would regard simply as limiting their economic freedom. Therefore UK companies very seldom repurchase their own shares, too. This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.
88
The institutionalization and internationalization of shareholdings, the globalization of capital markets and the rapid development of information technologies have placed our corporate law system under increasing pressure to adapt to the ever changing requirements of the market. For this reason, in May 2000, the German government called together a group of industrialists, representatives of shareholder associations and institutional investors, trade unionists, politicians and scholars to form an expert Panel with the task of reviewing the German corporate governance system. This Government Panel on Corporate Governance prepared a questionnaire on key issues in the field, and solicited responses and input from numerous national and international experts and institutions. In July 2001, the Commission presented its 320 page report (available at www.ottoschmidt. de/corporate_governance.htm) to the German Chancellor. The Report made nearly 150 recommendations for amendments or changes to existing provisions of German law and also set forth proposals on how the German corporate governance system should be further developed in order to maintain a normative framework that is suitable and attractive not only for companies, but also for domestic and foreign investors. In order that the Panel s proposals may receive careful consideration from a diverse audience, it seems very useful to keep a wider public informed of the Panel s recommendations. Therefore, also on behalf of the Panel, I very much appreciate that the international law firm Shearman & Sterling has taken the initiative to have the summary of the Panel s recommendations translated into English.