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89
Im Normalfall, in dem Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat den Jahresabschluß feststellen (vgl. § 172 AktG), können sie einen Teil des Jahresüberschusses, höchstens jedoch die Hälfte, in „andere Gewinnrücklagen“1 einstellen (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 1 AktG). Die Satzung kann Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat zur Einstellung eines größeren oder kleineren Teils des Jahresüberschusses ermächtigen; allerdings darf die Verwaltung aufgrund einer solchen Satzungsbestimmung keine Beträge in andere Gewinnrücklagen einstellen, wenn die anderen Gewinnrücklagen die Hälfte des Grundkapitals übersteigen oder soweit sie nach der Einstellung die Hälfte übersteigen würden (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 2, 3 AktG). Nach § 58 Abs. 3 AktG kann die Hauptversammlung sodann in ihrem Beschluß über die Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns (vgl. § 174 AktG) weitere Beträge in Gewinnrücklagen einstellen oder als Gewinn vortragen. Im Folgenden werden nach einer Sichtung wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Erwägungen zu Thesaurierung und Ausschüttung (unten II.) die Pflichten und die Kontrolle der Entscheidungen über die Gewinnverwendung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat einerseits (unten III.) und der Hauptversammlung andererseits (unten IV.) erörtert. V. faßt die Ergebnisse zusammen. Die besonderen Rechtsfragen, die sich bei Rücklagenbildung in abhängigen Gesellschaften ergeben, werden nicht behandelt.
40
This paper has shown that some of the principal arguments against shareholder voice are unfounded. It has shown that shareholders do own corporations, and that the nature of their property interest is structured to meet the needs of the relationships found in stock corporations. The paper has explained that fiduciary and other duties restrain the actions of shareholders just as they do those of management, and that critics cannot reasonably expect court-imposed fiduciary duties to extend beyond the actual powers of shareholders. It has also illustrated how, although corporate statutes give shareholders complete power to structure governance as they will, the default governance structures of U.S. corporations leaves shareholders almost powerless to initiate any sort of action, and the interaction between state and federal law makes it almost impossible for shareholders to elect directors of their choice. Lastly, the paper has recalled how the percentage of U.S. corporate equities owned by institutional investors has increased dramatically in recent decades, and it has outlined some of the major developments in shareholder rights that followed this increase. I hope that this paper deflated some of the strong rhetoric used against shareholder voice by contrasting rhetoric to law, and that it illustrated why the picture of weak owners painted in the early 20th century should be updated to new circumstances, which will help avoid projecting an old description as a current normative model that perpetuates the inevitability of "managerialsm", perhaps better known as "dirigisme".
10
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
16
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
22
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
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On 27 and 28 September 2007, a commission formed on the initiative of the authors held its first meeting in Aarhus, Denmark to deliberate on its goal of drafting a "European Model Company Law Act" (EMCLA). This project, outlined in the following pages, aims neither to force a mandatory harmonization of national company law nor to create a further, European corporate form. The goal is rather to draft model rules for a corporation that national legislatures would be free to adopt in whole or in part. Thus, the project is thought as an alternative and supplement to the existing EU instruments for the convergence of company law. The present EU instruments, their prerequisites and limits will be discussed in more detail in Part II, below. Part III will examine the US experience with such "model acts" in the area of company law. Part IV will then conclude by discussing several topics concerning the content of an EMCLA, introducing the members of the EMCLA Working Group, and explaining the Group's preliminary working plan.
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After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 and the Brazilian “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas” of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies (“Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”. This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP – Banco Comercial Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, “Portugal-Telecom”).
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The market reaction to legal shocks and their antidotes : lessons from the sovereign debt market
(2008)
This Article examines the market reaction to a series of legal events concerning the judicial interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. More generally, the Article provides insights into the reactions of investors (predominantly financial institutions), issuers (sovereigns), and those who draft bond covenants (lawyers), to unanticipated changes in the judicial interpretation of certain covenant terms.
21
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
9
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
86
Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups – The Committee on Capital Market Regulation, The Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company. Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While multiple regulatory forces are targeted by each report’s call for reform, each of the reports singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the not too distant past. Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 Among the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which the court chooses from among competing petitioners a lead plaintiff for the class. The statute commands that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness to the plaintiff’s economic self interest to the suits’ prosecution. Also, by eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel which Congress believed too frequently gave rise to incomplete and insubstantially pled causes of action. The PSLRA also introduced for securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement8 as well as a bar to the plaintiff obtaining any discovery prior to the district court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. By introducing the requirement that allegations involving fraud must be plead not only with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside, albeit only for securities actions, the much lower notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of American civil procedure for decades. Substantive changes to the law were also introduced by the PSLRA. With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced by proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is capped by that defendant’s relative degree of fault. Similarly, contribution rights among co-violators are also based on proportionate fault of each defendant. Three years after the PSLRA, Congress returned to the topic again by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act;13 this provision was prompted by aggressive efforts of plaintiff lawyers to bypass the limitations, most notably the bar to discovery and higher pleading requirement, of the PSLRA by bringing suit in state court. Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are exclusively the domain of the federal court. In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums – small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendantcompany, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.” Part I of this paper sets forth the contemporary debate surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In this section, we set forth the insights advanced in three prominent reports focused on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. In Part II we first provide descriptive statistics of our extensive data set, and thenuse multivariate regression analysis to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely examine small settlements for clues to whether they reflect evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy recommendations based on our analysis of the data. Our goals in this paper are more modest than the Committee Report, the Chamber Report and the McKinsey Report, each of which called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed securities fraud settlements so as to determine whether the reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think it was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further cutbacks in private securities class action so soon after the Act was passed.
44
This Paper will look at the changing nature of asset management, and will examine the nature of the European framework for collective investment undertakings, enshrined in the UCITS Directive2 in that light. This question whether the UCITS Directive in its current form remains an appropriate European response to the changing investment management landscape is an issue with which the European Commission is actively engaging through its Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds, published in July 2005.3 But before considering these important questions, it is necessary to begin with an idea of what a collective investment, more specifically a UCITS actually is and how it fits conceptually in the broader world of pooled investments.....
52
Die Studie befaßt sich mit den rechtlichen Anforderungen an die Umwandlung und den Umtausch von Finanzinstrumenten. Finanzinstrumente in dem hier gemeinten Sinne sind Aktien und ausgewählte Schuldverschreibungsformen (Finanzierungsgenußrechte; Wandelschuldverschreibungen; einfache Schuldverschreibungen). Die Umwandlung oder der Umtausch von Finanzinstrumenten, zusammenfassend auch als Konversion bezeichnet, sind Verfügungsgeschäfte. Dabei werden hier nur Verfügungsgeschäfte zwischen dem Emittenten und dem Investor betrachtet. Nicht behandelt werden auch die besonderen Gestaltungsfragen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten, die sich für die Emittenten und Investoren bei der Umstrukturierung (Umwandlung, Konzernierung usw.) des Emittenten selbst ergeben. ....
1
Bei der Bestimmung von Eingriffsbefugnissen der BaFin jenseits der vom Gesetz vorgesehenen besonderen Kompetenzen ist Zurückhaltung geboten: Die Auffangermächtigung nach § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG ist keine Allzweckwaffe nach Art der polizeilichen Generalklausel, sondern soll lediglich die besonderen Ermittlungs- und Eingriffsbefugnisse der Behörde dort ergänzen, wo diese Befugnisse auch im Zusammenwirken mit anderen Rechtsfolgen von Pflichtverstößen nicht ausreichen, um die Regelungen des Gesetzes durchzusetzen und das Gesetz dieses Sanktionsdefizit auch nicht bewusst in Kauf nimmt. In den praktisch wichtigen Fällen der Erzwingung von Pflichtangeboten, der Änderung von Angeboten nach ihrer Veröffentlichung und des Einschreitens gegen unzulässige Abwehrmaßnahmen ist danach für den Rückgriff auf § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG kaum Raum. Beim Rechtsschutz Dritter gegenüber der BaFin verfolgt das Gesetz eine mittlere Linie: Amtshaftungsansprüche wegen fehlerhafter Aufsicht und Ansprüche auf Einschreiten der Behörde sind durch die Öffentlichkeitsklausel des § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG in verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklicher Weise ausgeschlossen. Dagegen besagt § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG nichts über die Schutzrichtung der Regelungen über das Angebotsverfahren. Die Vorschrift steht dementsprechend nicht einer Anfechtung begünstigender Verfügungen durch Dritte entgegen, soweit das Gesetz auch den Schutz ihrer Interessen bezweckt. Daher sind insbesondere Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft befugt, mit Widerspruch und Beschwerde gegen Befreiungen nach §§ 36 und 37 WpÜG vorzugehen, die in ihr Recht auf Abgabe eines Pflichtangebotes eingreifen.
11
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
91
70
I. Einführung Der Gesetzgeber hat mit dem am 1. 11. 2005 in Kraft getretenen „Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG)“ eine Reform der Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen im Aktienrecht eingeleitet. Diese Reform verfolgt im Wesentlichen folgende Ziele: Erstens, die beklagten Gesellschaften sollen leichter und schneller als bisher die Eintragung angefochtener Beschlüsse ins Handelsregister erwirken können, wenn dem keine schwerwiegenden Bedenken entgegenstehen. Zweitens, die funktionswidrige Verwendung der Anfechtungsklage und mißbräuchliche Klagen sollen weiter zurückgedrängt, und die nachteilige Entwicklung eines „Klagegewerbes“ soll eingedämmt werden. Drittens, Qualität und Geschwindigkeit landgerichtlicher Entscheidungen in Beschlußmängelprozessen sollen verbessert werden. Eine empirische Studie zu den Auswirkungen des UMAG in der Unternehmens- und Gerichtspraxis in diesem Bereich hat ergeben, daß der Gesetzgeber wichtige Schritte unternommen hat, daß aber nicht alle Ziele erreicht werden konnten, sondern weiterer dringlicher Reformbedarf besteht, der sich im Wesentlichen erst in jüngerer Zeit, nach dem Abschluß der Beratungen zum UMAG, entwickelt und gezeigt hat. Das Bundesministerium der Justiz hat inzwischen angekündigt, daß weitere gesetzliche Maßnahmen vor allem gegen die zunehmende Flut von Beschlußmängelklagen durch Berufskläger erwogen werden sollen. Die nachstehenden Überlegungen wollen zu dieser Diskussion beitragen. Dabei bleiben die – zwar in engem Zusammenhang hiermit stehenden, gleichwohl Spezialfragen betreffenden – Vorschläge des Handelsrechtsausschusses des DAV zur Ausweitung des Spruchverfahrens bei Umwandlung und Sachkapitalerhöhung hier ausgeklammert. ... VII. Zusammenfassung 1. Es sind weitere gesetzliche Maßnahmen gegen die zunehmende Anzahl von Beschlußmängelklagen durch Berufskläger erforderlich. 2. Gegen das Erfordernis eines pauschalen Mindestanteilsbesitzes als Voraussetzung der Anfechtungsklage bestehen rechtliche und praktische Bedenken. 3. Das Freigabeverfahren sollte umgestaltet werden: Bei den materiellen Freigabevoraussetzungen sollte die sog. Interessenabwägungsklausel im Gesetz entsprechend der Regierungsbegründung zum UMAG gefaßt werden, so daß im praktischen Ergebnis die Eintragung eines angefochtenen strukturändernden Beschlusses in aller Regel vorzunehmen ist, wenn nicht im Einzelfall die Schwere der mit der Klage geltend gemachten Rechtsverletzung dies ausschließt. Das Freigabeverfahren sollte ferner auf eine Instanz beschränkt werden; hierfür sollte die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit der Oberlandesgerichte vorgesehen werden. 4. Die Anreize für Aktionäre, Anfechtungsklagen zu erheben, um sich nicht den Nachteilen - insbesondere der überlangen Dauer - eines Spruchverfahrens aussetzen zu müssen, sollten beseitigt werden.
41
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the ‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.
72
Zum Ordnungswert des § 136 InsO „Reform besteht in der Entfernung des Überflüssigen“. Das ist der Wahlspruch des Entwurfes zum MoMiG. Unsere unzeitgemäße GmbH soll eine Neugestalt erhalten, damit sie den aufkommenden Wettbewerb mit ihren europäischen Verwandten aushalte. Die Ära regionaler Sonderwege habe zu enden und das ist ein Verdikt vor allem über das national-eigensinnige Eigenkapitalersatzrecht: Dieses soll, vereinfacht gesagt, in seiner Sanktionsschärfe gemäßigt, in die InsO überführt und von dem unsicheren Krisenbegriff befreit werden. Wer so großräumig denkt, verliert sich über dem scheinbar Kleinen. Niemand fragt nach der Zukunft des § 136 InsO. Es wäre Unrecht zu glauben, hier werde nur die Rückgewähr stiller Einlagen für anfechtbar erklärt und das stehe neben dem Reformthema. Der Beitrag wird zeigen: dass erstens auch § 136 InsO in Wahrheit die heute mit dem Wort „Eigenkapitalersatz“ bezeichnete Ordnungsaufgabe zu lösen sucht und zweitens mit dem neuen Recht scharfe Wertungswidersprüche entstehen; diese sind drittens nur auf einem Weg zu beheben: durch Streichung des § 136 InsO.
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Der DSGV hat, mit Unterstützung weiterer Verbände, einen Vorstoß zur Deregulierung des Depotstimmrechts vorgelegt. Erteilt der Aktionär dem Depotinstitut keine Weisung, wie dieses in der HV abstimmen soll, dann soll es künftig verpflichtet sein, den Vorschlägen der Verwaltung (Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat) zu folgen, sofern ihm hierfür eine entsprechende Dauervollmacht des Aktionärs vorliegt. Dem Vorschlag sollte in seiner gegenwärtigen Form nicht gefolgt werden. Er würde voraussichtlich nicht zu einer maßgeblichen Erhöhung der Präsenzen führen. Rechtspolitisch bedenklich erscheint, daß die Depotinstitute sich verpflichten, auf der Basis einer Dauervollmacht mit einer u.U. in den Geschäftsbedingungen versteckten generellen Weisung unbesehen den Verwaltungsvorschlägen zu folgen. Richtig am Vorstoß der Verbände erscheint aber, daß künftig darauf verzichtet werden sollte, daß jedes Depotinstitut, das Stimmrechte von Aktionären vertreten will, entweder selbst Abstimmungsvorschläge erarbeiten oder die Vorschläge eines Zentralinstituts oder Stimmrechtsberaters kostenintensiv prüfen muß. Vielmehr sollte der Gesetzgeber den Depotinstituten ermöglichen, ohne eigene Prüfungspflicht im Vollmachtsformular neben den Vorschlägen der Verwaltung auf die Abstimmungsvorschläge einer anerkannten Aktionärsvereinigung oder eines unabhängigen Stimmrechtsberaters zu verweisen. Dies könnte den Wettbewerb um Aktionärsstimmen beleben und auch dazu beitragen, den Stimmen inländischer Privatanleger auf den Hauptversammlungen deutscher Aktiengesellschaften wieder stärker Gehör zu verschaffen. Eine solche Vorgabe wäre mit der demnächst umzusetzenden Aktionärsrichtlinie der EU vereinbar. Eine entsprechende Empfehlung, auf die Abstimmungsvorschläge einer anerkannten Aktionärsvereinigung oder eines unabhängigen Stimmrechtsberaters zu verweisen, sollte im Corporate Governance Kodex für Gesellschaften festgelegt werden, die den Aktionären einen Stimmrechtsvertreter benennen.
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Zur Offenlegung von Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen an ein ausgeschiedenes Vorstandsmitglied
(2008)
Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen gehören zu den besonders umstrittenen Bestandteilen der Vorstandsvergütung. Der deutsche Gesetzgeber ist mit dem Gesetz über die Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen (VorstOG) der internationalen Entwicklung gefolgt. Bereits Ziff. 4.2.4 DCGK a.F. hatte die individualisierte Offenlegung der Bezüge aktueller Vorstandsmitglieder empfohlen. In Frankreich wurde bereits 2001 die Pflicht zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsgehältern in den Art. L. 225-102-1 des Code de commerce aufgenommen. Aktuell beschäftigt sich das französische Parlament mit dem Gesetz „Croissance, emploi et pouvoir d’achat: modernisation de l’économie“, das bei Vereinbarungen von Abfindungen einen Hauptversammlungsbeschluss notwendig machen würde. In England sind die Bezüge der „Directors“ in einem Remuneration Report offenzulegen (Sec. 420 CA 2006). Vorreiter auf dem Gebiet der Offenlegungspflicht waren die Vereinigten Staaten, die seit 1992 eine individualisierte Offenlegung vorschreiben. Auch die Europäische Kommission hat sich für die Pflicht zur individualisierten Offenlegung ausgesprochen. Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion steht insbesondere die Frage der Offenlegung der Abfindungs- und Pensionszusagen. Scheidet ein Vorstandsmitglied vorzeitig aus, hat es grundsätzlich einen Vergütungsanspruch bis zur Beendigung seines Anstellungsvertrags, außer wenn der Aufsichtsrat ihm aus wichtigem Grund gekündigt hat. In der Regel werden aber mit dem Vorstandsmitglied Abfindungsvereinbarungen getroffen. Neben den Abfindungsvereinbarungen spielen auch die Pensions- und Versorgungszusagen in der Praxis eine wichtige Rolle. Mit Blick auf den Wortlaut des § 285 HGB stellt sich, auch zwei Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des VorstOG, immer noch die Frage, ob bei börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften die Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen individualisiert oder nur aggregiert offenzulegen sind. Fraglich ist zum einen, wie eine vereinbarte Abfindungszahlung im Lagebericht bei der Angabe der Vorstandsbezüge zu behandeln ist, wenn ein Vorstandsmitglied vorzeitig ausscheidet (III.). Zum anderen stellt sich die Frage, wie Pensionszusagen darzustellen sind (IV.). Bevor auf diese beiden Fragen eingegangen werden kann, soll kurz der gesetzliche Rahmen der Offenlegungspflicht skizziert werden (II.). ...