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1999, 02
In this speech (given at the CFSresearch conference on the Implementation of Price Stability held at the Bundesbank Frankfurt am Main, 10. - 12. Sept 1998), John Vickers discusses theoretical and practical issues relating to inflation targeting as used in the United Kingdom doing the past six years. After outlining the role of the Bank s Monetary Policy Committee, he considers the Committee s task from a theoretical perspective, beforediscussing the concept and measurement of domestically generated inflation.
1999, 03
From the mid-seventies on, the central banks of most major industrial countries switched to monetary targeting. The Bundesbank was the first central bank to take this step, making the switch at the end of 1974. This changeover to monetary targeting was due to the difficulties which the Bundesbank - like other central banks - was facing in pursuing its original strategy, and whichcame to a head in the early seventies, when inflation escalated. A second factor was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which created the necessary scope for national monetary targeting. Finally, the advance of monetarist ideas fostered the explicit turn towards monetary targets, although the Bundesbank did not implement these in a mechanistic way. Whereas the Bundesbank has adhered to its policy of monetary targeting up to the present, nowadays monetary targeting plays only a minor role worldwide. Many central banks have switched to the strategy of direct inflation targeting. Others favour a more discretionary approach or a policy which is geared to the exchange rate. In the academic debate, monetary targeting is often presented as an outdated approach which has long since lost its basis of stable money demand. These findings give riseto a number of questions: Has monetary targeting actually become outdated? Which role is played by the concrete design of this strategy, and, against this background, how easily can it be transferred to European monetary union? This paper aims to answer these questions, drawing on the particular experience which the Bundesbank has gained of monetary targeting. It seems appropriate to discuss monetary targeting by using a specific example, since this notion is not very precise. This applies, for example, to the money definition used, the way the target is derived, the stringency applied in pursuing the target and the monetary management procedure.
1999, 09
This paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions. It shows, in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector behavior, that such inertial behavior on the part of the central bank may indeed be optimal, in the sense of minimizing a loss function that penalizes inflation variations, deviations of output from potential, and interest-rate variability. Sluggish adjustment characterizes an optimal policy commitment, even though no such inertia would be present in the case of a reputationless (Markovian) equilibrium under discretion. Optimal interest-rate feedback rules are also characterized, and shown to involve substantial positive coefficients on lagged interest rates. This provides a theoretical explanation for the numerical results obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) in their quantitative model of the U.S. economy.
1999, 11
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
1999, 13
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
1999, 04
Since 1990, a number of countries have adopted inflation targeting as their declared monetary strategy. Interpretations of the significance of this movement, however, have differed widely. To some, inflation targeting mandates the single-minded, rule-like pursuit of price stability without regard for other policy objectives; to others, inflation targeting represents nothing more than the latest version of cheap talk by central banks unable to sustain monetary commitments. Advocates of inflation targeting, including the adopting central banks themselves, have expressed the view that the efforts at transparency and communication in the inflation targeting framework grant the central bank greater short-run flexibility in pursuit of its long-run inflation goal. This paper assesses whether the talk that inflation targeting central banks engage in matters to central bank behavior, and which interpretation of the strategy is consistent with that assessment. We identify five distinct interpretations of inflation targeting, consistent with various strands of the current literature, and identify those interpretations as movements between various strategies in a conventional model of time-inconsistency in monetary policy. The empirical implications of these interpretations are then compared to the response of central banks to movements in inflation of three countries that adopted inflation targets in the early 1990s: The United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. For all three, the evidence shows a break in the behavior of inflation consistent with a strengthened commitment to price stability. In no case, however, is there evidence that the strategy entails a single-minded pursuit of the inflation target. For the U.K., the results are consistent with the successful implementation the optimal state-contingent rule, thereby combining flexibility and credibility; similarly, New Zealand's improved inflation performance was achieved without a discernable increase in counter-inflationary conservatism. The results for Canada are less clear, perhaps reflecting the broader fiscal and international developments affecting the Canadian economy during this period.
1999, 06
As inflation rates in the United States decline, analysts are asking if there are economic reasons to hold the rates at levels above zero. Previous studies of whether inflation "greases the wheels" of the labor market ignore inflation's potential for disrupting wage patterns in the same market. This paper outlines an institutionally-based model of wage-setting that allows the benefits of inflation (downward wage flexibility) to be separated from disruptive uncertainty about inflation rate (undue variation in relative prices). Our estimates, using a unique 40-year panel of wage changes made by large mid-western employers, suggest that low rates of inflation do help the economy to adjust to changes in labor supply and demand. However, when inflation's disruptive effects are balanced against this benefit the labor market justification for pursuing a positive long-term inflation goal effectively disappears.
1999, 01
Credit Unions are cooperative financial institutions specializing in the basic financial needs of certain groups of consumers. A distinguishing feature of credit unions is the legal requirement that members share a common bond. This organizing principle recently became the focus of national attention as the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress took opposite sides in a controversy regarding the number of common bonds that could co-exist within the membership of a single credit union. Despite its importance, little research has been done into how common bonds affect how credit unions actually operate. We frame the issues with a simple theoretical model of credit-union formation and consolidation. To provide intuition into the flexibility of multiple-group credit unions in serving members, we simulate the model and present some comparative-static results. We then apply a semi-parametric empirical model to a large dataset drawn from federally chartered occupational credit unions in 1996 to investigate the effects of common bonds. Our results suggest that credit unions with multiple common bonds have higher participation rates than credit unions that are otherwise similar but whose membership shares a single common bond.
1999, 17
This paper presents evidence that spillovers through shifts in bank lending can help explain the pattern of contagion. To test the role of bank lending in transmitting currency crises we examine a panel of data on capital flows to 30 emerging markets disaggregated by 11 banking centers. In addition we study a cross-section of emerging markets for which we construct a number of measures of competition for bank funds. For the Mexican and Asian crises, we find that the degree to which countries compete for funds from common bank lenders is a fairly robust predictor of both disaggregated bank flows and the incidence of a currency crisis. In the Russian crisis, the common bank lender helps to predict the incidence of contagion but there is also evidence of a generalized outflow from all emerging markets. We test extensively for robustness to sample, specification and definition of the common bank lender effect. Overall our findings suggest that spillovers through banking centers may be more important in explaining contagion than similarities in macro-economic fundamentals and even than trade linkage.
1999, 16
For some time now the buzzword 'transparency' has been bandied about in the media almost daily. For example, calls were made for greater transparency in the financial system in connection with developments in the Asian financial markets. But the call for greater transparency goes far beyond the financial markets. It is now regarded as a necessary part of "good governance" demanded of all economic policy makers. As the World Bank's chief economist Joseph Stiglitz put it: 'No one would dare say that they were against transparency (....): It would be like saying you were against motherhood or apple pie.' This paper focuses on transparency in monetary policy, in particular with respect to the European System of Central Bank.