CFS working paper series
https://gfk-cfs.de/working-papers/
Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (15)
Language
- English (15)
Has Fulltext
- yes (15)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (15)
Keywords
- limited attention (3)
- advertising (2)
- bank lending (2)
- credit risk (2)
- euro (2)
- financial crisis (2)
- limits to arbitrage (2)
- price discovery (2)
- sovereign exposures (2)
- COVID-19 pandemic (1)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (15) (remove)
481
Has economic research been helpful in dealing with the financial crises of the early 2000s? On the whole, the answer is negative, although there are bright spots. Economists have largely failed to predict both crises, largely because most of them were not analytically equipped to understand them, in spite of their recurrence in the last 25 years. In the pre-crisis period, however, there have been important exceptions – theoretical and empirical strands of research that largely laid out the basis for our current thinking about financial crises. Since 2008, a flurry of new studies offered several different interpretations of the US crisis: to some extent, they point to potentially complementary factors, but disagree on their relative importance, and therefore on policy recommendations. Research on the euro debt crisis has so far been much more limited: even Europe-based researchers – including CEPR ones – have often directed their attention more to the US crisis than to that occurring on their doorstep. In terms of impact on policy and regulatory reform, the record is uneven. On the one hand, the swift and massive liquidity provision by central banks in the wake of both crises is, at least partly, to be credited to previous research on the role of central banks as lenders of last resort in crises and on the real effects of bank lending and monetary policy. On the other hand, economists have had limited impact on the reform of prudential and security market regulation. In part, this is due to their neglect of important regulatory choices, which policy-makers are therefore left to take without the guidance of academic research-based analysis.
482
Advertising arbitrage
(2014)
Speculators often advertise arbitrage opportunities in order to persuade other investors and thus accelerate the correction of mispricing. We show that in order to minimize the risk and the cost of arbitrage an investor who identifies several mispriced assets optimally advertises only one of them, and overweights it in his portfolio; a risk-neutral arbitrageur invests only in this asset. The choice of the asset to be advertised depends not only on mispricing but also on its "advertisability" and accuracy of future news about it. When several arbitrageurs identify the same arbitrage opportunities, their decisions are strategic complements: they invest in the same asset and advertise it. Then, multiple equilibria may arise, some of which inefficient: arbitrageurs may correct small mispricings while failing to eliminate large ones. Finally, prices react more strongly to the ads of arbitrageurs with a successful track record, and reputation-building induces high-skill arbitrageurs to advertise more than others.
485
We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators' trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.
486
his paper distils three lessons for bank regulation from the experience of the 2009-12 euro-area financial crisis. First, it highlights the key role that sovereign debt exposures of banks have played in the feedback loop between bank and fiscal distress, and inquires how the regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures in the euro area should be changed to mitigate this feedback loop in the future. Second, it explores the relationship between the forbearance of non-performing loans by European banks and the tendency of EU regulators to rescue rather than resolving distressed banks, and asks to what extent the new regulatory framework of the euro-area “banking union” can be expected to mitigate excessive forbearance and facilitate resolution of insolvent banks. Finally, the paper highlights that capital requirements based on the ratio of Tier-1 capital to banks’ risk-weighted assets were massively gamed by large banks, which engaged in various forms of regulatory arbitrage to minimize their capital charges while expanding leverage. This argues in favor of relying on a set of simpler and more robust indicators to determine banks’ capital shortfall, such as book and market leverage ratios.
517
We investigate the determinants of firms’ implicit insurance to employees, using a difference-in-difference approach: we rely on differences between family and non-family firms to identify the supply of insurance, and exploit variation in unemployment insurance across and within countries to gauge workers’ demand for insurance. Using a firm-level panel from 41 countries, we find that family firms feature more stable employment, greater wage flexibility and lower labor cost than non-family ones. Employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries with more generous public unemployment insurance: private and public provision of employment insurance are substitutes.
537
The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies — diversification and seniority — can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
539
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of changes in banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects during and after the crisis. First, public, bailed out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sovereign stress by purchasing domestic public debt more than other banks, with public banks’ purchases growing especially in coincidence with the largest ECB liquidity injections. Second, bank exposures significantly amplified the transmission of risk from the sovereign and its impact on lending. This amplification of the impact on lending does not appear to arise from spurious correlation or reverse causality.
602
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
603
In talent-intensive jobs, workers’ quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. Firms cannot insure workers against this risk if they compete fiercely for talent. In this case, the more risk-averse workers will choose less quality-revealing jobs. This lowers expected productivity and salaries. Public unemployment insurance corrects this inefficiency, enhancing employment in talent-sensitive industries, consistently with international evidence. Unemployment insurance dominates legal restrictions on firms’ dismissals, which penalize more talent-sensitive firms and thus depress expected productivity. Finally, unemployment insurance fosters education, by encouraging investment in risky human capital that enhances talent discovery.
632
Local crowding out in China
(2019)
In China, between 2006 and 2013, local public debt crowded out the investment of private firms by tightening their funding constraints, while leaving state-owned firms’ investment unaffected. We establish this result using a purpose-built dataset for Chinese local public debt. Private firms invest less in cities with more public debt, the reduction in investment being larger for firms located farther from banks in other cities or more dependent on external funding. Moreover, in cities where public debt is high, private firms’ investment is more sensitive to internal cash flow, also when cash-flow sensitivity is estimated jointly with the probability of being credit-constrained.
641
Advertising arbitrage
(2020)
Arbitrageurs with a short investment horizon gain from accelerating price discovery by advertising their private information. However, advertising many assets may overload investors' attention, reducing the number of informed traders per asset and slowing price discovery. So arbitrageurs optimally concentrate advertising on just a few assets, which they overweight in their portfolios. Unlike classic insiders, advertisers prefer assets with the least noise trading. If several arbitrageurs share information about the same assets, inefficient equilibria can arise, where investors' attention is overloaded and substantial mispricing persists. When they do not share, the overloading of investors' attention is maximal.
671
Retail investors pay over twice as much attention to local companies than non-local ones, based on Google searches. News volume and volatility amplify this attention gap. Attention appears causally related to perceived proximity: first, acquisition by a nonlocal company is associated with less attention by locals, and more by nonlocals close to the acquirer; second, COVID-19 travel restrictions correlate with a drop in relative attention to nonlocal companies, especially in locations with fewer fights after the outbreak. Finally, local attention predicts volatility, bid-ask spreads and nonlocal attention, not viceversa. These findings are consistent with local investors having an information-processing advantage.
672
We investigate whether government credit guarantee schemes, extensively used at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, led to substitution of non-guaranteed with guaranteed credit rather than fully adding to the supply of lending. We study this issue using a unique euro-area credit register data, matched with supervisory bank data, and establish two main findings. First, guaranteed loans were mostly extended to small but comparatively creditworthy firms in sectors severely affected by the pandemic, borrowing from large, liquid and well-capitalized banks. Second, guaranteed loans partially substitute pre-existing non-guaranteed debt. For firms borrowing from multiple banks, the substitution mainly arises from the lending behavior of the bank extending guaranteed loans. Substitution was highest for funding granted to riskier and smaller firms in sectors more affected by the pandemic, and borrowing from larger and stronger banks. Overall, the evidence indicates that government guarantees contributed to the continued extension of credit to relatively creditworthy firms hit by the pandemic, but also benefited banks’ balance sheets to some extent.
673
Using the pandemic as a laboratory, we show that asset markets assign a time- varying price to firms' disaster risk exposure. In 2020 the cross-section of realized and expected stock returns reflected firms' different exposure to the pandemic, as measured by their vulnerability to social distancing. Realized and expected return differentials initially widened and then narrowed, but disaster exposure still commanded a risk premium in December 2020. When inferred from market outcomes, resilience correlates not only with social distancing, but also with cash and environmental ratings. However, vulnerability to social distancing is the only characteristic that identifies persistently scarred firms.
674
Careers in finance
(2021)
The finance wage premium since the 1990s has arguably lured talent away from other industries. However, the allocation of talent is likely to respond to differences in career paths, not in wages at a given date. We use resume data to reconstruct the careers of 11,255 professionals in finance, high-tech and services from 1980 to 2017, and find that careers mostly develop within sectors. Careers in asset management feature higher and steeper pay profiles than those of employees in banking, insurance and non-finance, yet this career premium cannot be explained by higher risk. Labor market entry responds positively to career premia in asset management and high-tech, and these sectors are regarded as substitutes by potential entrants, consistently with high-tech competing with asset management in attracting talent.