Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
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88
Savings accounts are owned by most households, but little is known about the performance of households’ investments. We create a unique dataset by matching information on individual savings accounts from the DNB Household Survey with market data on account-specific interest rates and characteristics. We document considerable heterogeneity in returns across households, which can be partly explained by financial sophistication. A one-standard deviation increase in financial literacy is associated with a 13% increase compared to the median interest rate. We isolate the usage of modern technology (online accounts) as one channel through which financial literacy has a positive association with returns.
87
A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation
(2015)
We offer a theory of the "boundary of the
rm" that is tailored to banking, as it builds on a single ine¢ ciency arising from risk-shifting and as it takes into account both interbank lending as an alternative to integration and the role of possibly insured deposit funding. Amongst others, it explains both why deeper economic integration should cause also greater financial integration through both bank mergers and interbank lending, albeit this typically remains ine¢ ciently incomplete, and why economic disintegration (or "desychronization"), as currently witnessed in the European Union, should cause less interbank exposure. It also suggests that recent policy measures such as the preferential treatment of retail deposits, the extension of deposit insurance, or penalties on "connectedness" could all lead to substantial welfare losses.
86
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.