SAFE working paper
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101
Although banks are at the center of systemic risk, there are other institutions that contribute to it. With the publication of the leveraged lending guideline in March 2013, the U.S. regulators show that they are especially worried about the private equity firms with their high-risk deals. Given these risks and the interconnectedness of the banks through the LBO loan syndicates, I shed light on the impact of a bank’s LBO loan exposure on its systemic risk. By using 3,538 observations between 2000 and 2013 from 165 global banks, I show that banks with higher LBO exposure also have a higher level of systemic risk. Other loan purposes do not show this positive relationship. The main drivers influencing this relationship positively are the bank’s interconnectedness to other LBO financing banks and its size. Lending experience with a specific PE sponsor, experience with leading LBO syndicates or a bank’s credit rating, however, lead to a lower impact of the LBO loan exposure on systemic risk.
100
In the mid-1990s, institutional investors entered the syndicated loan market and started to serve borrowers as lead arrangers. Why are non-banks able to compete for this role against banks? How do the composition of syndicates and loan pricing differ among lead arrangers? By using a dataset of 12,847 leveraged loans between 1997 and 2012, I aim to answer these questions. Non-banks benefit from looser regulatory requirements, have industry expertise which helps them in the screening and monitoring of borrowers and focus on firms that ask for loans only instead of additional cross-selling of other services. I can show that non-banks specialize on more opaque and less experienced borrowers, are more likely than banks to choose participants that help to reduce potentially higher information asymmetries and earn 105 basis points more than banks.
99
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
98
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as a potential mechanism to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. We develop a stylized model with a direct financial connection between banking and insurance and study the effects of various types of bonds such as non-convertible bonds, write-down bonds and CoCos on banks' and insurers' risk situations. In addition, we compare insurers' capital requirements under the proposed Solvency II standard model as well as under an internal model that ex-ante anticipates additional risks due to possible conversion of the CoCo bond into bank shares. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we consider different CoCo designs (write-down factor, trigger value, holding time of bank shares) and compare the resulting capital requirements with those for holding non-convertible bonds. We identify situations in which insurers benefit from buying CoCo bonds due to lower capital requirements and higher coupon rates. Furthermore, our results highlight how the Solvency II standard model can mislead insurers in their CoCo investment decision due to economically irrational incentives.
97
I assess how Basel III, Solvency II and the low interest rate environment will affect the financial connection between the bank and insurance sector by changing the funding patterns of banks as well as the investment strategies of life insurance companies. Especially for life insurance companies, the current low interest rate environment poses a key risk since declining returns on investments jeopardize the guaranteed return on life insurance contracts, a core component of traditional life insurance contracts in several European countries. I consider a contingent claim framework with a direct financial connection between banks and life insurers via bank bonds. The results indicate that life insurers' demand for bank bonds increases over the mid-term but ultimately declines in the long-run. Since life insurers are the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe, banks could lose one of their main funding sources. In addition, I show that shareholder value driven life insurers' appetite for risk increases when the gap between asset return and liability growth diminishes. To check the robustness of the findings, I calibrate a prolonged low interest rate scenario. The results show that the insurer's risk appetite is even higher when interest rates remain persistently low. A sensitivity analysis regarding industry-specific regulatory safety levels reveals that contagion between bank and life insurer is driven by the insurers' demand for bank bonds which itself depends on the regulatory safety level of banks.
96
The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions’ organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could – and should – be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?
95
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between credit risk and liquidity in the sovereign bond market in the context of the European Central Bank (ECB) interventions. Using a comprehensive set of liquidity measures obtained from a detailed, quote-level dataset of the largest interdealer market for Italian government bonds, we show that changes in credit risk, as measured by the Italian sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread, generally drive the liquidity of the market: a 10% change in the CDS spread leads a 11% change in the bid-ask spread. This relationship is stronger, and the transmission is faster, when the CDS spread is above the 500 basis point threshold, estimated endogenously, and can be ascribed to changes in margins and collateral, as well as clientele effects. Moreover, we show that the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) intervention by the ECB weakened the sensitivity of the liquidity provision by the market makers to changes in the Italian government's credit risk. We also document the importance of market-wide and dealer-specific funding liquidity measures in determining the market liquidity for Italian government bonds.
94
This paper explores how banks adjust their risk-based capital ratios and asset allocations following an exogenous shock to their asset quality caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We find that independent banks based in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane, while those part of a bank holding company do not. The effect on independent banks mainly comes from the subgroup of high-capitalized banks. These banks increase their holdings in government securities and reduce loans to non-financial firms. Hence, banks that become more stable achieve this at the cost of reduced lending.
93
A number of recent studies regress a "narratively" identified measure of a macroeconomic shock directly on an outcome variable. In this note, we argue that this approach can be viewed as the reduced-form regression of an instrumental variable approach in which the narrative time series is used as an instrument for an endogenous series of interest. This motivates evaluating the validity of narrative measures through the lens of a randomized experiment. We apply our framework to four recently constructed narrative measures of tax shocks by Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2013), and Mertens and Ravn (2012). All of them turn out to be weak instruments for observable measures of taxes. After correcting for weak instruments, we find that using any of the considered narrative tax measures as an instrument for cyclically adjusted tax revenues yields tax multiplier estimates that are indistinguishable from zero. We conclude that the literature currently understates the uncertainty associated with quantifying the tax multiplier.
92
This paper studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model involving climate change. Our model allows for damages on economic growth resulting from global warming. In the calibration, we capture effects from climate change and feedback effects on the temperature dynamics. We solve for the optimal state-dependent abatement policy. In our simulations, the costs of this policy measured in terms of lost GDP growth are moderate. On the other hand, postponing abatement action could reduce the probability that the climate can be stabilized. For instance, waiting for 10 years reduces this probability from 60% to 30%. Waiting for another 10 years leads to a probability that is less than 10%. Finally, doing nothing opens the risk that temperatures might explode and economic growth decreases significantly.