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Institute
103
A safe core mandate
(2023)
Central banks have vastly expanded their footprint on capital markets. At a time of extraordinary pressure by many sides, a simple benchmark for the scale and scope of their core mandate of price and financial stability may be useful.
We make a case for a narrow mandate to maintain and safeguard the border between safe and quasi safe assets. This ex-ante definition minimizes ambiguity and discourages risk creation and limit panic runs, primarily by separating market demand for reliable liquidity from risk-intolerant, price-insensitive demand for a safe store of value. The central bank may be occasionally forced to intervene beyond the safe core but should not be bound by any such ex-ante mandate, unless directed to specific goals set by legislation with explicit fiscal support.
We review distinct features of liquidity and safety demand, seeking a definition of the safety border, and discuss LOLR support for borderline safe assets such as MMF or uninsured deposits.
A safe core formulation is close to the historical focus on regulated entities, collateralized lending and attention to the public debt market, but its specific framing offers some context on controversial issues such as the extent of LOLR responsibilities. It also justifies a persistently large scale for central bank liabilities (Greenwood, Hansom and Stein 2016), as safety demand is related to financial wealth rather than GDP. Finally, it is consistent with an active central bank role in supporting liquidity in government debt markets trading and clearing (Duffie 2020, 2021).
102
This Policy Letter presents two event studies based on the pre-war data that foreshadows the remarkable way in which Russian economy was able to withstand the pressure from unprecedented package of international sanctions. First, it shows that a sudden stop of one of the two domestic producers of zinc in 2018 did not lead to a slowdown in the steel industry, which heavily relied on this input. Second, it demonstrates that a huge increase in cost of fuel called mazut in 2020 had virtually no impact on firms that used it, even in the regions where it was hard to substitute it for alternative fuels. This Policy Letter argues that such stability in production can be explained by the fact that Russian economy is heavily oriented toward commodities. It is much easier to replace a commodity supplier than a supplier of manufacturing goods, and many commodity producers operate at high profit margins that allow them to continue to operate even after big increases in their costs. Thus, sanctions had a much smaller impact on Russia than they would have on an economy with larger manufacturing sector, where inputs are less substitutable and profit margins are smaller.
101
Um eine grüne Transformation der Volkswirtschaft zu erreichen, werden Finanzmärkte und die mit ihnen verbundenen Banken eine wichtige Rolle einnehmen müssen. Aber allein vermögen Banken und Kapitalmärkte wenig, wenn sie nicht im Kontext einer klugen, politischen Rahmensetzung und einer transparenten Erfassung der verursachten Schäden auf Unternehmensebene gesehen werden. Diese drei Pfeiler stellen bildlich den tragenden Unterbau für eine Brücke hin zu einer klimaneutralen Wirt-schaftsverfassung dar. Ihr Zusammenwirken ist eine Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Finanzwirtschaft die benötigten Finanzmittel für die grüne Transformation bereitstellen kann.
100
Climate risk has become a major concern for financial institutions and financial markets. Yet, climate policy is still in its infancy and contributes to increased uncertainty. For example, the lack of a sufficiently high carbon price and the variety of definitions for green activities lower the value of existing and new capital, and complicate risk management. This column argues that it would be welfare-enhancing if policy changes were to follow a predictable longer-term path. Accordingly, the authors suggest a role for financial regulation in the transition.
99
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
98
The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
97
Large technology firms («BigTechs») increasingly extend their influence in finance, primarily taking over market shares in payment services. A further expansion of their businesses into the territory of cryptocurrencies could entail new and unprecedented risks for the future, namely for financial stability, competition in the private sector and monetary policy. When creating a regulatory toolbox to address these risks, financial regulatory, antitrust, and platform-specific solutions should be closely intertwined in order to fully absorb all the potential threats and to take account of the complex risks these platform companies bear. This policy letter evaluates the solutions lately proposed by the European Commission, with specific focus on the upcoming regulation of Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), but also the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital services act (DSA), against the background of cryptocurrencies issued by BigTechs and sheds light on financial regulatory, competition and monetary law issues coming along with the possible designs of these cryptocurrencies.
96
This policy letter collects elementary economic statistics and provides a very basic look on Russian public finances (i) to inform the reader’s opinion on a possible planning process behind the war against Ukraine and (ii) to discuss prospects of an energy embargo and its capability to affect the stability of the Russian economy.
95
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
94
Die notwendige ökologische Transformation aber auch darüberhinausgehend die zunehmenden Erwartungen, die Gesellschaft und Politik an die Wirtschaft stellen, erfordern eine Prüfung des Wettbewerbsrechts und seiner Durchsetzung, insbesondere auch der dabei verwendeten (ökonomischen) Konzepte und Methoden, dahingehend, ob die aktuelle Praxis nicht einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeitszielen in unbegründeter Weise im Wege steht. Auf europäischer Ebene hat der Diskurs darüber im Jahr 2021 erheblich an Fahrt gewonnen. Wir stellen wesentliche Initiativen dar. Dabei zeigt sich unseres Erachtens allerdings auch, dass für eine konstruktive Weiterentwicklung noch die nötigen konzeptionellen und methodischen Grundlagen fehlen.
93
Die BaFin hat im August 2021 eine Richtlinie für nachhaltige Investmentvermögen vorgelegt. Diese soll regeln, unter welchen Voraussetzungen ein Fonds als „nachhaltig“, „grün“ o.ä. bezeichnet und vermarktet werden darf. Zwar sind aufsichtsrechtliche Maßnahmen, die darauf abzielen, die Qualität von Informationen zu Nachhaltigkeitscharakteristika von Finanzprodukten zu erhöhen, grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Der Erlass der konsultierten Richtlinie ist jedoch nicht zu befürworten. Im Lichte der einschlägigen unionsrechtlichen Regelwerke und Initiativen ist unklar, welchen informationellen Mehrwert diese rein nationale Maßnahme schaffen soll. Ferner bleibt auf Grundlage des Entwurfs unklar, anhand welcher Maßstäbe die „Nachhaltigkeit“ eines Investmentvermögens beurteilt werden soll, sodass das primäre Regelungsziel einer verbesserten Anlegerinformation nicht erreicht würde.
92
Historically Central Bank Independence (CBI) was anything but the norm. CBI seems to contradict core principles of democracy. Most economists were also against CBI. After the Great Inflation of the 1970ies many empirical studies demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between the degree of CBI and the rate of inflation. In 1990 most major countries had endowed their central bank with the status of independence. Overburdening with elevated expectations and additional competences are threatening the reputation of central banks and undermining the case for CBI.
91
Nach der Bundestagswahl am 26. September 2021 wird sich die künftige Bundesregierung mit einer Reihe drängender Herausforderungen befassen müssen. Aus Sicht des Leibniz-Instituts für Finanzmarktforschung SAFE haben die folgenden, miteinander verbundenen Einzelpunkte dabei Priorität:
1. Schaffung eines ordnungspolitischen Pakets zur Sicherung globaler Gemeinschaftsgüter, wie etwa des Klimas
2. Initiative zum Aufbau notwendiger Datensätze und Standards für eine zielgenaue Nachhaltigkeitsgestaltung an den Finanzmärkten
3. regulatorischer Fahrplan zur Erfassung, Ermöglichung und Einhegung einer digitalen Transformation des Finanzsystems
4. Vollendung der Bankenunion, insbesondere durch einen „europäischen Schlussstein“: der Schaffung einer einheitlichen Aufsicht und Letztabsicherung
5. Durchbrechung des „Doom-Loop“ zwischen Staaten und Banken in Europa, insbesondere durch Begrenzung des Umfangs, in dem eigene Staatsanleihen im Portfolio von Banken liegen dürfen
6. ernsthafter Versuch zur Schaffung eines einheitlichen und integren europäischen Kapitalmarkts mit einer Aufsicht nach US-Vorbild
7. Banken- und Kapitalmarktunion als wesentliche Bausteine für eine grundlegende Reform der Altersversorgung mit mehr Teilhabe aller Bürger:innen an der Leistungsentwicklung der Volkswirtschaft
90
Dieser Artikel behandelt das Zusammenspiel von staatlich organisierten sozialen Sicherungssystemen und der privaten Eigenvorsorge durch Vermögensbildung als Grundpfeiler der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Deutschland. Die jährlichen Ausgaben der verschiedenen staatlichen Sicherungssysteme belaufen sich auf rund ein Drittel des erwirtschafteten Bruttosozialprodukts, wobei die umlagefinanzierten Alterssicherungssysteme für die Arbeitsnehmer den größten Anteil ausmachen. Sachvermögen in Form von selbst genutzten Wohnungen sowie Finanzvermögen in Form von Bankeinlagen und Ansprüche gegen private Versicherungen machen den größten Anteil der Eigenversorge aus. Aufgrund des niedrigen Zinsniveaus sowie des demografischen Wandels der Gesellschaft wird die Eigenvorsorge durch Anlagen an den internationalen Wertpapiermärkten sowohl für Selbständige als auch Arbeitsnehmer immer bedeutender.
89
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.
88
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
87
Angesichts des kürzlich von der Bundesregierung verabschiedeten Konjunkturpakets, stellen sich die Autoren des Policy Letters die Frage, ob und inwieweit die angekündigte Mehrwertsteuersenkung sowie der Kinderbonus zur substantiellen Ankurbelung des Binnenkonsums führt. Aus den für das Haushaltskrisenbarometer erhobenen Daten zu Einkommensänderungen sowie Einkommens- und Kündigungserwartungen, können die Ökonomen keine zu erwartende Schwächung der Binnennachfrage ableiten. Der überwiegende Teil der deutschen Wohnbevölkerung scheint kurzfristig nicht davon auszugehen, finanzielle Einbußen aufgrund der Pandemie zu erleiden. Die Erwartungen hinsichtlich der künftigen Einkommensentwicklung haben sich gar über die letzten vier Umfragewellen graduell verbessert. Ferner kann dargelegt werden, dass weder die Konsum- noch die Sparneigung durch die Corona-Krise zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt langfristig stark beeinflusst wird. So geben derzeit lediglich 10 Prozent der Befragten an, größere Anschaffungen angesichts der Pandemie vollständig gestrichen zu haben. Anfang April 2020 lag dieser Wert noch bei 16 Prozent. Die Befragten berichteten in 71 Prozent der Fälle ihre Konsumpläne und in 78 Prozent der Fälle ihre Sparverhalten nicht geändert zu haben. Im Lichte dieser Ergebnisse lassen sich Maßnahmen, die auf eine unspezifische Stimulierung der Binnennachfrage abzielen, nicht substantiell begründen und rechtfertigen.
86
This Policy Letter outlines a pandemic insurance solution through a pandemic-related “Insurance Linked Bond”. It would be originated by governments, with a principal amount to cover significant costs resulting from a pandemic. These bonds, which would be traded on a secondary market, generate a risk-adequate return for private and institutional investors that is financed through the insurance premiums paid by the public domain. In case of a pre-defined pandemic trigger event, the principal of the bond becomes available for the originating governments to cover pandemic-related costs. Through this approach, governments can insure themselves against future pandemic-related risks, while funding comes primarily from private and institutional investors.
85
The European Commission is trying to reboot the CMU project: The High-Level Forum on Capital Markets Union – a group of 28 selected experts from industry, academia and civil society – is expected to submit policy recommendations by the end of May 2020 which will feed into the Commission’s new CMU agenda. This contribution is largely based on a letter to the High-Level Forum that gives feedback on the Interim Report published in February. There, we introduce a comprehensive approach to distinguish, from a functional finance perspective, between the ‘game changers’ and what is nice to have. We highlight the importance of common and consistent supervisory practices across Member States and recommend building up a European Securities and Exchange Commission (E-SEC) according to the American model.
84
This Policy Letter presents a proposal for designing a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis in the European Union (EU). In our recent Policy Letter 81, we introduced a new, equity-type instrument, a cash-against-tax surcharge scheme, bundled across firms and countries in a European Pandemic Equity Fund (EPEF). The present Policy Letter 84 focuses on the principles and conditions relevant for the operationalization of a EPEF. Our proposal has several desirable features. It: a) offers better risk sharing opportunities, augmenting the resilience of businesses and EU economies; b) is need-based, thereby contributing to an effective use of resources; c) builds on conditions and credible controls, addressing adverse selection and moral hazard; d) is accessible to smaller and medium-sized firms, the backbone of Europe’s economy; e) applies Europe-wide uniform eligibility criteria, strengthening support among member states; f) is a scheme of limited duration, reducing (perceived) government interference in businesses; g) creates a template for a growth-oriented public policy, aligning public and private sector interests; and h) builds on the existing institutional infrastructure and requires minimal legislative adjustments.