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We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
This paper documents that resource reallocation across firms is an important mechanism through which creditor rights affect real outcomes. I exploit the staggered adoption of an international convention that provides globally consistent strong creditor protection for aircraft finance. After this reform, country-level productivity in the aviation sector increases by 12%, driven mostly by across-firm reallocation. Productive airlines borrow more, expand, and adopt new technology at the expense of unproductive ones. Such reallocation is facilitated by (i) easier and quicker asset redeployment; and (ii) the influx of foreign financiers offering innovative financial products to improve credit allocative efficiency. I further document an increase in competition and an improvement in the breadth and the quality of products available to consumers.
In times of crisis, governments have strong incentives to influence banks’ credit allocation because the survival of the economy depends on it. How do governments make banks “play along”? This paper focuses on the state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) that have been implemented in Europe to help firms survive the COVID 19 crisis. Governments’ capacity to save the economy depends on banks’ capacity to grant credit to struggling firms (which they would not be inclined to do spontaneously in the context of a global pandemic). All governments thus face the same challenge: How do they make sure that state guaranteed loans reach their desired target and on what terms? Based on a comparative analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper shows that historically-rooted institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of the SGCPs in these two countries.
An important question in banking is how strict supervision affects bank lending and in turn local business activity. Supervisors forcing banks to recognize losses could choke off lending and amplify local economic woes. But stricter supervision could also change how banks assess and manage loans. Estimating such effects is challenging. We exploit the extinction of the thrift regulator (OTS) to analyze economic links between strict supervision, bank lending and business activity. We first show that the OTS replacement indeed resulted in stricter supervision of former OTS banks. Next, we analyze the ensuing lending effects. We show that former OTS banks increase small business lending by roughly 10 percent. This increase is concentrated in well-capitalized banks, those more affected by the new regime, and cannot be fully explained by a reallocation from mortgage to small business lending after the crisis. These findings suggest that stricter supervision operates not only through capital but can also correct deficiencies in bank management and lending practices, leading to more lending and a reallocation of loans.
n today’s world, the transfer of laws and regulations between different legal systems is commonplace. The global spread of stewardship codes in recent years presents a promising, but yet untested, terrain to explore the diffusion of such norms. This paper aims to fill this gap. Employing the method of content analysis and using information from 41 stewardship codes enacted between 1991 and 2019, we systematically examine the formal diffusion of these stewardship codes. While we find support for the diffusion story of the UK as a stewardship norm exporter, especially in former British colonies in Asia, we also find evidence of diffusion from transnational initiatives, such as the EFAMA and ICGN codes, as well as regional clusters. We also show that the UK Stewardship Code of 2020 now deviates from these current models; thus, it remains to be seen how far a second round of exportation of the revised UK model into the transnational arena will follow.
When parties present divergent econometric evidence, the court may view such evidence as contradictory and thus ignore it completely, without conducting closer analysis. We develop a simple method for distinguishing between actual and merely apparent contradiction based on the statistical concept of the “severity” of the furnished evidence. Again using “severity”, we also propose a method for reconciling divergent findings in instances of mere seeming contradiction. Our chosen application is that of damage estimation in follow-on cases.
This paper contributes to the debate on the adequate regulatory treatment of non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI). It proposes an avenue for regulators to keep regulatory arbitrage under control and preserve sufficient space for efficient financial innovation at the same time. We argue for a normative approach to supervision that can overcome the proverbial race between hare and hedgehog in financial regulation and demonstrate how such an approach can be implemented in practice. We first show that regulators should primarily analyse the allocation of tail risk inherent in NBFI. Our paper proposes to apply regulatory burdens equivalent to prudential banking regulation if the respective transactional structures become only viable through indirect or direct access to (ad hoc) public backstops. Second, we use insights from the scholarship on regulatory networks as communities of interpretation to demonstrate how regulators can retrieve the information on transactional innovations and their risk-allocating characteristics that they need to make the pivotal determination. We suggest in particular how supervisors should structure their relationships with semi-public gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors and consultants to keep abreast of the risk-allocating features of evolving transactional structures. Finally, this paper uses the example of credit funds as non-bank entities economically engaged in credit intermediation to illustrate the merits of the proposed normative framework and to highlight that multipolar regulatory dialogues are needed to shed light on the specific risk-allocating characteristics of recent contractual innovations.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2020)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying
trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections
This article has two aims: it discusses the use and function of a very specific contract clause in Hellenistic time and explores the possibilities and limits to use databases and their automated searches and visualisations as heuristic tools. It is argued, that praxis … kata to diagramma is mainly a regional variety of an executionclause and not connected to the Greek type lawcourts as supposed by Mitteis and Wolff. Graph-databases can help to see different possible decisive features at the same time and show, which connections are more intensive than others, but automated analysis is slowed down and blurred by the lack of categorizing specific to the questions of legal history
This article has two aims: it discusses the use and function of a very specific contract clause in Hellenistic time and explores the possibilities and limits to use databases and their automated searches and visualisations as heuristic tools. It is argued, that praxis … kata to diagramma is mainly a regional variety of an executionclause and not connected to the Greek type lawcourts as supposed by Mitteis and Wolff. Graph-databases can help to see different possible decisive features at the same time and show, which connections are more intensive than others, but automated analysis is slowed down and blurred by the lack of categorizing specific to the questions of legal history
This article documents and classifies instances of transnational intellectual property (IP) enforcement and licensing on the Internet with a particular focus on the territorial reach of the respective regimes. Regarding IP enforcement, I show that the bulk of transnational or even global measures is adopted in the context of “voluntary” self-regulation by various intermediaries, namely domain name registrars, access and host providers, search engines, and advertising and payment services. Global IP licensing is, in contrast, less prevalent than one might expect. It is practically limited to freely accessible Open Content, whereas markets for fee-based services remain territorially fragmented. Overall, three layers of IP governance on the Internet can be distinguished. Based on global licenses, Open Content is freely accessible everywhere. Plain IP infringements are equally combatted on a worldwide scale. Territorial fragmentation persists, instead, in the market segment of fee-based services and in hard cases of conflicts of IP laws/rights. All three universal norms (global accessibility, global illegality, global fragmentation) are supported by a quite solid, “rough” global consensus.
Die Zukunft der Freiheit
(2020)
Im Zentrum des Beitrags steht die Frage, ob und wie sich Freiheit verändert, wenn wir uns in Echo-Räumen bewegen, also in digitalen sozialen Netzwerken und in digitalen Welten, die aus den Vorhersagedaten des eigenen Verhaltens zusammengesetzt sind. Beide Varianten digitaler Welten werden als Bestätigungswelten charakterisiert, in denen der Nutzer sich in relevanten Aspekten seines Selbst nicht nur spiegelt, sondern immer wieder bestätigt und anerkannt sieht und auch andere bestätigt und anerkennt. Der Aufsatz verdeutlicht, dass es für die Frage der Freiheit in solchen Bestätigungswelten nicht nur darauf ankommt, ob wir nach den jeweils eigenen Gründen handeln oder nach Regeln, die wir gemeinsam mit anderen akzeptieren können. Denn solche Ansätze beruhen auf der unausgesprochenen Prämisse eines statischen Selbst, eine so verstandene Freiheit wäre eine statische Freiheit. Dem wird ein Verständnis von Freiheit als dynamischer Prozess gegenübergestellt, zu dem es gehört, die eigenen Gründe zu ändern. Dazu muss sich das Selbst von diesen Gründen aber erst einmal distanzieren und sich zu sich selbst verhalten können, was die Erfahrung von Widerspruch und Widerstand voraussetzt. Komplementär zu diesem Widerspruch ist es zudem auf Vertrauen angewiesen, um die Herausforderungen der Freiheit anzunehmen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sich beide Aspekte, die Freiheit als Risiko des Widerspruchs und das für die Freiheit notwendige komplementäre Vertrauen, in den digitalen Bestätigungswelten verflüchtigen.
Die zunehmende Durchdringung nahezu aller Lebensbereiche der Gesellschaft mit neuen digitalen Technologien, insbesondere mit künstlicher Intelligenz, hat zur Entstehung von smarten Ordnungen geführt. Darunter werden Ordnungen verstanden, die darauf ausgerichtet sind, durch intelligentes Design und mit Hilfe algorithmischer Operationen Abweichungen von ihren Normen zu minimieren oder ganz unmöglich zu machen. Der Beitrag erläutert einige Beispiele smarter Ordnungen und zeigt auf, dass zumindest im Grundsatz zwischen einer algorithmisch optimierten, normadressatenorientierten Prävention und einer adressatensubstituierenden Präemption abweichenden Verhaltens durch digitale Technologien unterschieden werden kann. Den Schwerpunkt des Beitrags bildet sodann die Frage ob und, gegebenenfalls, in welchem Sinne, smarte Ordnungen überhaupt noch normative Ordnungen sind. Im Verlauf der Analyse zeigt sich, dass Rechtsordnungen und andere normative Ordnungen zwar das Ziel einer effektiven Durchsetzung ihrer Normen verfolgen, aber nicht das Ideal vollständiger Nicht-Abweichung. Es wird deutlich, dass es zu den wesentlichen Aspekten normativer Ordnungen gehört, dass sie an Personen adressiert sind, die sie sich als autonome und zugleich fehlbare Personen zu eigen machen müssen und dabei unvermeidlich über die faktische Freiheit zur Normabweichung verfügen. Smarte Ordnungen hingegen erfüllen diese Kriterien nicht oder nur in geringem Maße. Letztlich sind sie nur in einem schwachen Sinne normativ, soweit die in technischen Prozessen implementierte Normativität für die Betroffenen noch präsent ist. In dem Maße jedoch, wie Normativität und ihre technische Realisation sich vermischen, bis ihre erfahrbare Präsenz abnimmt, verlieren sie ihren normativen Charakter.
On the basis of the economic theory of network effects, this article provides a novel explanation of the so-called patent paradox, i.e. the question why the propensity to patent is so strong when the expected average value of most patents is low. It demonstrates that the patent system of a country resembles a telephone network or a social media platform. Patents are perceived as nodes in a virtual network that, as a whole, exhibits network effects. It is explained why patents are not independent of other patents but that they complement each other in several ways both within and beyond markets and fields of technology, and that patents thus create synchronization value over and above individual interests of patent holders in exclusivity. As a consequence, the more patents there are, the more valuable it is to also seek patents, and vice versa. Since patents thus display increasing returns to adoption, the willingness to pay for the next patent slopes upwards. This explains why, after a phase of early instability and a certain tipping point, many countries’ patent systems expanded quickly and eventually became a rigid standard (“lock-in”). The concluding section raises the question what regulatory measures are suitable to effectively address the ensuing anticommons effects.
The long-standing battle between economic nationalism and globalism has again taken center stage in geopolitics. This article applies this dichotomy to the law and policy of international intellectual property (IP). Most commentators see IP as a prime example of globalization. The article challenges this view on several levels. In a nutshell, it claims that economic nationalist concerns about domestic industries and economic development lie at the heart of the global IP system. To support this argument, the article summarizes and categorizes IP policies adopted by selected European countries, the European Union, and the U.S. Section I presents three types of inbound IP policies that aim to foster local economic development and innovation. Section II adds three versions of outbound IP policies that, in contrast, target foreign countries and markets. Concluding section III traces a dialectic virtuous circle of economic nationalist motives leading to global legal structures and identifies the function and legal structure of IP as the reason for the resilience and even dominance of economic nationalist motives in international IP politics. IP concerns exclusive private rights that are territorially limited creatures of (supra-)national statutes. These legal structures make up the economic nationalist DNA of IP.
Der Beitrag erläutert aus rechtswissenschaftlicher Sicht, welche Begriffe, Perspektiven und Methoden zur Beantwortung folgender Frage geeignet sind: Wie lässt sich erklären, dass das gerade einmal ca. 200 Jahre alte Rechtsgebiet des „geistigen Eigentums“, dessen Legitimität stets heftig umstritten war, praktisch weltweite Anerkennung in nationalen, supranationalen und völkerrechtlichen Rechtsquellen finden konnte und die globalen Handels- und Kommunikationsströme auch tatsächlich wirksam reguliert? Oder anders gewendet: Wie kann ein schwacher Geltungsanspruch eine faktisch wirkmächtige Ordnung hervorbringen? Nach kritisch-diskurstheoretischen Ansätzen bildet der Streit um Rechtfertigungen den zentralen Treiber normativer Ordnungen. Der Aufsatz zeigt jedoch, dass im Hinblick auf das „geistige Eigentum“ normexterne Bedingungen wie technischer Fortschritt und der Wandel der allgemeinen Wirtschaftsordnung von entscheidender Bedeutung waren und der Frage nach den Gründen z.T. logisch vorausliegen. Schließlich wird gezeigt, dass sozialontologische Analysen besonders gut geeignet erscheinen, strukturelle Normativität/Macht zu adressieren, die unterhalb expliziter Rechtfertigungen bzw. im „Hintergrund“ angesiedelt ist, so wie Sprache generell die logische Voraussetzung für ein rechtfertigendes Rede-und-Antwort-Stehen bildet.
Der Beitrag stellt zunächst dar, dass und warum dem geltenden UWG ein schlüssiger innerer Zusammenhang fehlt, und zwar sowohl im Hinblick auf den Prüfungsaufbau für Ansprüche als auch im Hinblick auf die im Gesetz zum Tragen kommenden materiellen Systematisierungskriterien. Sodann wird ein Vorschlag für einen alternativen Gesetzesaufbau unterbreitet, der am unverändert richtigen Gedanken festhält, wonach Wettbewerbsverhalten in seinen komplexen Auswirkungen auf sämtliche Marktteilnehmer ganzheitlich zu erfassen und zu regulieren ist, während die Orientierung an Gruppen von Marktteilnehmern zwangsläufig zu Abgrenzungsproblemen führt. Folglich bilden im unterbreiteten Vorschlag nicht die Schutzsubjekte des UWG, sondern der Unwertgehalt der geschäftlichen Handlung (Irreführung, Aggressivität, sonstige Wettbewerbsverfälschung) das primäre Systematisierungskriterium. Übergeordnetes Ziel des Vorschlags ist es, die methodengerechte Anwendung des geschriebenen Rechts zu erleichtern und auf diese Weise gesetzesferne Eigenrationalitäten der Praxis einzuhegen.
Der Beitrag nimmt zu den Entscheidungen des BGH v. 21.2.2019 in Sachen HHole (for Mannheim) u.a., wonach die Vernichtung eines urheberrechtlich geschützten Werks eine „andere Beeinträchtigung“ im Sinne des § 14 UrhG darstellt, kritisch Stellung. Hinterfragt wird insbesondere, worauf sich Entstellungen oder Beeinträchtigungen gem. § 14 UrhG beziehen, was also unter einem „Werk“ gem. § 14 UrhG zu verstehen ist.
Die rechtshistorische Forschung konzentriert sich auf die Herausbildung spezifisch juristischer Figuren wie das frühneuzeitliche Privileg oder das spätere „geistige Eigentum“. Die Geschichte des urheberrechtlichen Werkbegriffs – immerhin der Gegenstand der „Werkherrschaft“ des Urhebers – hat demgegenüber verhältnismäßig wenig Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Dabei ist letztlich unstreitig, dass auch die Vorstellung eines von seinen Verkörperungen unabhängigen und daher abstrakt-immateriellen, eigentumsfähigen Werks keine gegebene Wirklichkeit darstellt, sondern erst seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts etabliert ist. Der Beitrag historisiert das Urheberrecht ausgehend von seiner – so die Hypothese – vorgestellten Wirklichkeit. Betrachtet werden drei Vorbedingungen, die das juristische Reden und Denken in Kategorien eines abstrakt-unkörperlichen, eigentumsfähigen Werks und damit zugleich das „geistige Eigentum“ an diesem Werk möglich gemacht haben: Reproduktionstechnologien, das Ideal des genialen Werks und die dezentral-anonyme Marktwirtschaft.
Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG) ist einseitig auf die Löschung rechtswidriger Inhalte ausgerichtet. Vorzugswürdig erscheint demgegenüber ein ganzheitlicher Regulierungsansatz, der darauf abzielt, dass Anbieter großer Universalplattformen gleichermaßen rechtswidrige Inhalte löschen und rechtmäßige Kommunikation nicht willkürlich beeinträchtigen. Dazu wird hier ein konkreter Entwurf zur Änderung des NetzDG nebst Begründung vorgelegt.
Die durch das Zweite Corona-Steuerhilfegesetz erfolgte Ausweitung des Verlustrücktrags ist dem Grunde nach ein hochgradig geeignetes und insbesondere breitenwirksames Mittel zur Stützung der Konjunktur. Das vorliegende Policy White Paper legt dar, dass allerdings Art und Umfang der gewählten Ausweitung unzureichend sind. Hierzu analysieren die Verfasser, wie sich die Ausweitung auf Unternehmen unterschiedlicher Größe und Rechtsform auswirkt. Auf Basis dieser Analyse zei-gen sie sodann, dass gemessen an den verfolgten konjunkturpolitischen Zielen es geboten gewesen wäre und weiterhin geboten ist, den Verlustrücktrag auf die Gewerbesteuer zu erstrecken.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
Do current levels of bank capital in Europe suffice to support a swift recovery from the COVID-19 crisis? Recent research shows that a well-capitalized banking sector is a major factor driving the speed and breadth of recoveries from economic downturns. In particular, loan supply is negatively affected by low levels of capital. We estimate a capital shortfall in European banks of up to 600 billion euro in a severe scenario, and around 143 billion euro in a moderate scenario. We propose a precautionary recapitalization on the European level that puts the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) center stage. This proposal would cut through the sovereign-bank nexus, safeguard financial stability, and position the Eurozone for a quick recovery from the pandemic.