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The European low-carbon transition began in the last few decades and is accelerating to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. This paper examines how climate-related transition indicators of a large European corporate firm relate to its CDS-implied credit risk across various time horizons. Findings show that firms with higher GHG emissions have higher CDS spreads at all tenors, including the 30-year horizon, particularly after the 2015 Paris Agreement, and in prominent industries such as Electricity, Gas, and Mining. Results suggest that the European CDS market is currently pricing, to some extent, albeit small, the exposure to transition risk for a firm across different time horizons. However, it fails to account for a company’s efforts to manage transition risks and its exposure to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. CDS market participants seem to find challenging to risk-differentiate ETS-participating firms from other firms.
An unfamiliar term in the not-too-distant past, “net zero” has become a headline-maker in the business and financial world with the growing importance of climate change. Succumbing to increasing pressure, companies and financial institutions around the world have come to adopt net-zero transition plans and targets, pledging to hit certain emission-reduction targets in a long-term period. Moreover, regulators around the world have started to require the disclosure or adoption of net-zero transition plans and targets.
However, an unintended consequence of net-zero transition commitments has been the increased popularity of divestments. That is, many firms seeking to fulfill a net-zero plan are passing on carbon-intensive assets (i.e., oil, gas, and coal assets) to other firms that are likely to be non-committal to environmental goals or that operate under less pressure from investors, stakeholders, and regulators. Such divestments, technically mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions, present an ideal opportunity to improve a divesting firm’s environmental record and reach ambitious net-zero goals, creating the impression that an emission reduction has occurred. However, the key is how acquiring firms handle these assets. If they continue operating as before, there will not be an overall improvement for the global climate. Worse, such assets can be operated by new owners in a way that causes more emissions. In any case, such divestments undermine the credibility and value of net-zero ambitions by allowing firms to reach targets by simply divesting assets.
This article explores the reasons and motivations for divestments or, more broadly M&As of carbon-intensive assets and explains why the increased role of net-zero commitments can be undermined by those transactions. We provide some evidence to illustrate the landscape of such transactions and the concerns they give rise to. Lastly, we explore several policy options to address the problem.
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
Unconventional green
(2023)
We analyze the effects of the PEPP (Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme), the temporary quantitative easing implemented by the ECB immediately after the burst of the Covid-19 pandemic. We show that the differences in aim, size and flexibility with respect to the traditional Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) were able to significantly involve, in addition to the directly targeted bonds, also the green bond segment. Via a standard difference- in-differences model we estimate that the yield on green bonds declined by more than 20 basis points after the PEPP. In order to take into account also the differences attributable to the eligibility to the programme, we employ a triple difference estimator. Bonds that at the same time were green and eligible benefitted of an additional premium of 39 basis points.
Digital platforms have become an important part of the digital economy by facilitating transactions between large numbers of users and by fostering innovation on collaborative platforms. In combination with technical platform services, some platform operators have managed to create powerful ecosystems that create network externalities and benefit from economies of scale and economies of scope. It is striking that, due to the specific economic drivers of the digital infrastructure, platform-based or platform-related services are dominated by a select number of global players. Most of the global platform operators are headquartered in the US, including Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta and Microsoft, also known as the “Big 5”. Some are located in Asia (e.g. Alibaba, Tencent). In Europe there are only a limited number of platform operators with a small market share.
Much research has been conducted on the emergence and characteristics of platforms, network externalities and platform competition. However, there has been very little research on whether or not one can idķentify common features that might explain the success of Big Tech. The following article focuses on an analysis of the Big 5 based on their strategies and development paths. The comparison reveals certain commonalities, from which several conclusions can be drawn regarding the success factors of the Big 5. These insights could be helpful for business decision-makers when shaping digital strategies. But also policy makers, especially in Europe, could benefit from these lessons learned to improve the European technology ecosystem.
I have assessed changes in the monetary policy stance in the euro area since its inception by applying a Bayesian time-varying parameter framework in conjunction with the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithm. I find that the estimated policy response has varied considerably over time. Most of the results suggest that the response weakened after the onset of the financial crisis and while quantitative measures were still in place, although there are also indications that the weakening of the response to the expected inflation gap may have been less pronounced. I also find that the policy response has become more forceful over the course of the recent sharp rise in inflation. Furthermore, it is essential to model the stochastic volatility relating to deviations from the policy rule as it materially influences the results.
This paper presents and compares Bernoulli iterative approaches for solving linear DSGE models. The methods are compared using nearly 100 different models from the Macroeconomic Model Data Base (MMB) and different parameterizations of the monetary policy rule in the medium-scale New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007) iteratively. I find that Bernoulli methods compare favorably in solving DSGE models to the QZ, providing similar accuracy as measured by the forward error of the solution at a comparable computation burden. The method can guarantee convergence to a particular, e.g., unique stable, solution and can be combined with other iterative methods, such as the Newton method, lending themselves especially to refining solutions.
My aim in this paper is to make the debates about epistemic injustice fruitful for an analysis of trust in the knowledge of others. Epistemic trust is understood here in a broad sense: not only as trust in scientific knowledge or expert knowledge, but also as trust in implicit, positioned and experience-based knowledge. Using insights from discussions of epistemic injustice, I argue for three interrelated theses:
1. Questions of epistemic trust and trustworthiness cannot be answered with reference to individual virtue alone; rather, they have a structural component.
2. The rationality of epistemic trust must be analyzed against the background of social structures and social relations of domination.
3. Epistemic trust is (also) a political phenomenon and epistemically just relations depend on political transformation processes that promote equality.
Can right‐wing terrorism increase support for far‐right populist parties and if so, why? Exploiting quasi‐random variation between successful and failed attacks across German municipalities, we find that successful attacks lead to significant increases in the vote share for the right‐wing, populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in state elections. Investigating channels, we find that successful attacks lead to differential increases in turnout which are mainly captured by the AfD. Using the German SOEP, a longitudinal panel of individuals, we investigate terror’s impact on individual political attitudes. We first document that people residing in municipalities that experience successful or failed attacks are indistinguishable. We then show that successful terror leads individuals to prefer the AfD, adopt more populist attitudes and report significantly greater political participation at the local level. Terror also leads voters to migrate away from (some) mainstream parties to the AfD. We also find differential media reporting: successful attacks receive more media coverage among local and regional publishers, coverage which makes significantly more use of words related to Islam and terror. Our results hold despite the fact that most attacks are motivated by right‐wing causes and targeted against migrants. Moreover, successful attacks that receive the most media coverage have nearly double the effect on the AfD vote share in state elections and they also increase the AfD vote share in Federal elections, highlighting media salience as a driver of our overall results.
The resurgence of populism and the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic have consolidated an appeal to the language of trust and distrust in the political arena, but any reference to these notions has often turned into an ideological and polarized debate. As a result, the possibility of developing an appropriate picture of the conditions for trust in politics has been undermined. To navigate the different demands for trust raised in the political arena, a notion of political trust must cover two partially unfulfilled tasks. One is to clarify what trust means when referring specifically to the political context. The other is to connect political trust to other notions that populate the debate on trustworthiness in the political arena - those of rational, moral, epistemic, and procedural trust. I will show how the political categories I use to define the scope of a political notion of trust function as normative leverages to develop politics-compatible versions of rational, moral, procedural, and epistemic trust.
Over the last three decades, countries across the Andean region have moved toward legal recognition of indigenous justice systems. This turn toward legal pluralism, however, has been and continues to be heavily contested. The working paper explores a theoretical perspective that aims at analyzing and making sense of this contentious process by assessing the interplay between conflict and (mis)trust. Based on a review of the existing scholarship on legal pluralism and indigenous justice in the Andean region, with a particular focus on the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, it is argued that manifest conflict over the contested recognition of indigenous justice can be considered as helpful and even necessary for the deconstruction of mistrust of indigenous justice. Still, such conflict can also help reproduce and even reinforce mistrust, depending on the ways in which conflict is dealt with politically and socially. The exploratory paper suggests four proposition that specify the complex and contingent relationship between conflict and (mis)trust in the contested negotiation of pluralist justice systems in the Andean region.
The article studies civil wars and trust dynamics from two perspectives. It looks, first, at rebel governance during ongoing armed conflict and, second, at mass mobilisation against the regime in post-conflict societies. Both contexts are marked by extraordinarily high degrees of uncertainty given continued, or collective memory of, violence and repression.
But what happens to trust relations under conditions of extreme uncertainty? Intuitively, one would assume that trust is shaken or even substantially eroded in such moments, as political and social orders are questioned on a fundamental level and threaten to collapse. However, while it is true that some forms of trust are under assault in situations of civil war and mass protests, we find empirical evidence which suggests that these situations also give rise to the formation of other kinds of trust. We argue that, in order to detect and explain these trust dynamics in contexts of extreme uncertainty, there should be more systematic studies of: (a) synchronous dynamics between different actors and institutions which imply trust dynamics happening simultaneously, (b) diachronous dynamics and the sequencing of trust dynamics over several phases of violent conflict or episodes of contention, as well as long-term structural legacies of the past. In both dimensions, microlevel relations, as well as their embeddedness in larger structures, help explain how episodes of (non-)violent contention become a critical juncture for political and social trust.
Fabo, Janˇcokov ́a, Kempf, and P ́astor (2021) show that papers written by central bank researchers find quantitative easing (QE) to be more effective than papers written by academics. Weale and Wieladek (2022) show that a subset of these results lose statistical significance when OLS regressions are replaced by regressions that downweight outliers. We examine those outliers and find no reason to downweight them. Most of them represent estimates from influential central bank papers published in respectable academic journals. For example, among the five papers finding the largest peak effect of QE on output, all five are published in high-quality journals (Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and Applied Economics Letters), and their average number of citations is well over 200. Moreover, we show that these papers have supported policy communication by the world’s leading central banks and shaped the public perception of the effectiveness of QE. New evidence based on quantile regressions further supports the results in Fabo et al. (2021).
The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
Flows of funds run by banks or by firms that belong to the same financial group as a bank are less volatile and less sensitive to bad past performance. This enables bank-affiliated funds to better weather distress and to hold lower precautionary cash buffers in comparison with their unaffiliated peers. Banks provide liquidity support to distressed affiliated funds by buying shares of those funds that are experiencing large outflows. This, in turn, diminishes the severity of strategic complementarities in investors’ redemptions. Liquidity support and other benefits of bank affiliation are conditional on the financial health of the parent company. Distress in the banking system spills over to the mutual fund sector via ownership links. Our research high-lights substantial dependencies between the banking system and the asset management industry, and identifies an important channel via which financial stability risks depend on the organisational structure of the financial sector.
This article provides an overview and critical assessment of WIPO ALERT. It locates this initiative in the broader context of transnational IP enforcement schemes on the Internet. These initiatives are classified into two categories according to their point of attachment and geographical effect. Whereas source-related measures (e.g. website takedowns) tend to have a transnational and possibly even a global effect, recipient-related measures (e.g. website and ad blockings) typically mirror the territorially fragmented IPR landscape. This fragmentation is where WIPO ALERT comes into play. It can be understood as a matching service which interconnects holders of information about copyright infringing websites (“Authorized Contributors”) and actors of the online ad industry who want to avoid these outlets (“Authorized Users”). The critical assessment of WIPO ALERT calls for more transparency and the establishment of uniform substantive and procedural standards that have to be met if a new “site of concern” is added to the global ad blacklist.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
Art-related non-fungible tokens (NFTs) took the digital art space by storm in 2021, generating massive amounts of volume and attracting a large number of users to a previously obscure part of blockchain technology. Still, very little is known about the attributes that influence the price of these digital assets. This paper attempts to evaluate the level of speculation associated with art NFTs, comprehend the characteristics that confer value on them and design a profitable trading strategy based on our findings. We analyze 860,067 art NFTs that have been deployed on the Ethereum blockchain and have been involved in 317,950 sales using machine learning methods to forecast the probability of sale, the trade frequency and the average price. We find that NFTs are highly speculative assets and that their price and recurrence of sale are heavily determined by the floor and the last sale prices, independent of any fundamental value.
The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value. We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors. Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk- adjusted performance.
We analyze the performance of marketplace lending using loan cash flow data from the largest platform, Lending Club. We find substantial risk-adjusted performance of about 40 basis points per month for the entire loan portfolio. Other loan portfolios grouped by risk category have similar risk-adjusted performance. We show that characteristics of the local bank sector for each loan, such as concentration of deposits and the presence of national banks, are related to the performance of loans. Thus, marketplace lending has the potential to finance a growing share of the consumer credit market in the absence of a competitive response from the traditional incumbents.