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A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
This paper starts out by pointing out the challenges and weaknesses which the German banking systems faces according to the prevailing views among national and international observers. These challenges include a generalproblem of profitability and, possibly as its main reason, the strong role of public banks. These concerns raise the questions whether the facts support this assessment of a general profitability problem and whether there are reasons to expect a fundamental or structural transformation of the German banking system. The paper contains four sections. The first one presents the evidence concerning the profitability problem in a comparative, international perspective. The second section presents information about the so-called three-pillar system of German banking. What might be surprising in this context is that the group of pub lic banks is not only the largest segment of the German banking system, but that the primary savings banks also are its financially most successful part. The German banking system is highly fragmented. This fact suggests to discuss past, present and possible future consolidations in the banking system in the third section. The authors provide evidence to the effect that within- group consolidation has been going on at a rapid pace in the public and the cooperative banking groups in recent years and that this development has not yet come to an end, while within-group consolidation among the large private banks, consolidation across group boundaries at a national level and cross-border or international consolidation has so far only happened at a limited scale, and do not appear to gain momentum in the near future. In the last section, the authors develop their explanation for the fact that large-scale and cross border consolidation has so far not materialized to any great extent. Drawing on the concept of complementarity, they argue that it would be difficult to expect these kinds of mergers and acquisitions happening within a financial system which is itself surprisingly stable, or, as one cal also call it, resistant to change.
„Bedeutende Finanzplätze“ oder Finanzzentren sind eng abgegrenzte Orte mit einer beträchtlichen Konzentration wichtiger professioneller Aktivitäten aus dem Finanzdienstleistungsbereich und der entsprechenden Institutionen. Allerdings: „Finance is a footloose industry“: Die Finanzbranche kann abwandern, ein Finanzzentrum kann sich verlagern, möglicherweise auch einfach auflösen. Die Möglichkeit der Auflösung und der Abwanderung stellt eine Bedrohung dar, die in der Zeit der Globalisierung und der rasanten Fortschritte der Transport- und der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik ausgeprägter sein dürfte, als sie je war. Frankfurt ist zweifellos ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“, und manchen gilt er auch als bedroht. Allein deshalb ist unser Thema wichtig; und auch wenn die Einschätzungen von Bedeutung und Bedrohtheit keineswegs neu sind, ist es doch aktuell. Der Aspekt der Bedrohtheit prägt, wie wir die Frage im Titel verstehen und diskutieren möchten. Was ist ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“? Selbst wenn man das Attribut „bedeutend“ erst einmal beiseite lässt, ist die Frage keineswegs trivial. Sie zielt ja nicht nur auf eine Begriffsklärung, eine Sprachregelung ab. Hinter dem Begriff steht oft auch eine Vorstellung vom „Wesen“ dessen, was ein Begriff bezeichnet. Also: Was macht einen Finanzplatz aus? Und weiter: Warum gibt es überhaupt Finanzplätze als beträchtliche Konzentrationen von bestimmten wichtigen Aktivitäten und Institutionen? Welche Kräfte führen - oder zumindest führten - zu der räumlichen Konzentration der Aktivitäten und Institutionen, wie wirken diese Kräfte, und wie ändern sie sich gegebenenfalls? Diesen Fragen ist dieser Beitrag im Wesentlichen gewidmet, und sie prägen seinen Aufbau. Im Abschnitt II wird diskutiert, was ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“ ist oder woran man ihn erkennt und „was er braucht“. Im Abschnitt III gehen wir zuerst auf die Frage nach der in letzter Zeit unter dem Stichwort „the end of geography“ heftig diskutierten Vorstellung einer Auflösung oder Virtualisierung der Finanzplätze ein – nicht weil dies die wichtigere Bedrohung wäre, sondern weil es die grundlegendere Frage darstellt. Dann diskutieren wir den Wettbewerb von Finanzplätzen in Europa. Den Abschluss bilden Überlegungen zu den Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Frankfurt und der möglichen Förderung seiner Entwicklung.
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk. The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid convergence to the best system. In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence which supports the socio-biological argument. The dynamic properties of systems composed of complementary elements are such that a rapid convergence towards a universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen. We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, "inefficient convergence" of corporate governance systems is a possible future course of events. First version December 1998, this version March 2000.
Aus dem weiten Spektrum ökonomisch relevanter Fragen, die die europäische Integration und das Gesellschaftsrecht verbinden, soll hier diejenige herausgegriffen werden, ob sich die nationalen Corporate-Governance-Systeme in den großen europäischen Volkswirtschaften Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Integration bereits aneinander angeglichen haben und ob es demnächst zu einer solchen Angleichung kommen wird. Unser Thema deckt nur einen Teil des Gesellschaftsrechts ab und geht zugleich hinsichtlich der angesprochenen rechtlichen Materie über das Gesellschaftsrecht hinaus, denn die Corporate Governance fügt sich nicht einfach in herkömmliche juristische Klassifikationen ein. Unser Vorhaben unterscheidet sich aber vor allem dadurch von einer juristischen Behandlung des Themas, daß primär ökonomische Mechanismen und Zusammenhänge angesprochen werden. Ökonomen betrachten die Corporate Governance im weiteren Kontext des Finanzsystems, denn das Corporate-Governance-System ist ein Teil des Finanzsystems eines Landes. Die Fragen, wie unterschiedlich die nationalen Systeme der Corporate Governance waren, ehe zu Beginn der 80er Jahre der Prozeß der Angleichung in Europa einsetzte, wie unterschiedlich sie heute noch sind, wie sehr sie sich somit bereits angeglichen haben und wie ein möglicher Angleichungsprozeß weitergehen könnte, sind deshalb ein Teil der weiteren Frage nach der Angleichung der Finanzsysteme in Europa. In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns aber nur auf Entwicklungen der 90er Jahre.
Die Empfehlung, das Shareholder-Value-Konzept zur Grundlage der Unternehmenspolitik zu machen, erscheint um so überzeugender und wird vermutlich um so eher akzeptiert, (1) je lohnender die Shareholder-Value-Orientierung für die Aktionäre ist, (2) je eindeutiger es ist, wie die Empfehlung umgesetzt werden kann und soll, und (3) je problemloser sie aus theoretischen und wohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht ist. Der Beitrag diskutiert die in Wissenschaft und Praxis verbreiteten Positionen zu diesen drei Aspekten und erläutert, warum sie bzw. die emprischen, praktischen und theoretischen Argumente, durch die sie gestützt werden sollen, auf Mißverständnissen beruhen.
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United Kingdom is already a part of EMU. Employing a comprehensive concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary policy. In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their national business sector. In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is good news for the advocates of a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to determining the strength of its monetary policy measures.
Paper Presented at the Conference on Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives held in Paris, March 17-19, 1997 To appear in: A. Pezard/J.-M. Thiveaud: Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives, Montchrestien, Paris 1997. The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present shareholders would make it difficult for the firm to establish long-term relationships as the potential partners would have to fear that, at a later stage of the co-operation, the shareholders or a management acting only on their behalf could exploit them because of the inevitable incompleteness of long-term contracts. One way of mitigating these problems is to put in place a corporate governance system which gives some active role to the other stakeholders or constituencies, or which makes their interests a well-defined element of the objective function of the firm. A commitment not to follow a policy of strict shareholder value maximization ex post can be efficient ex ante. Such a system would clearly differ from what is advocated by proponents of a "stakeholder approach", as it would limit the rights of the other constituencies to those which would have been agreed upon in a constitutional contract concluded between them and the founder of the firm at the time when long-term contracts are first established.
Asset-backed securitization (ABS) has become a viable and increasingly attractive risk management and refinancing method either as a standalone form of structured finance or as securitized debt in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). However, the absence of industry standardization has prevented rising investment demand from translating into market liquidity comparable to traditional fixed income instruments, in all but a few selected market segments. Particularly low financial transparency and complex security designs inhibits profound analysis of secondary market pricing and how it relates to established forms of external finance. This paper represents the first attempt to measure the intertemporal, bivariate causal relationship between matched price series of equity and ABS issued by the same entity. In a two-dimensional linear system of simultaneous equations we investigate the short-term dynamics and long-term consistency of daily secondary market data from the U.K. Sterling ABS/MBS market and exchange traded shares between 1998 and 2004 with and without the presence of cointegration. Our causality framework delivers compelling empirical support for a strong co-movement between matched price series of ABS-equity pairs, where ABS markets seem to contribute more to price discovery over the long run. Controlling for cointegration, risk-free interest and average market risk of corporate debt hardly alters our results. However, once we qualify the magnitude and direction of price discovery on various security characteristics, such as the ABS asset class, we find that ABS-equity pairs with large-scale CMBS/RMBS and credit card/student loan ABS reveal stronger lead-lag relationships and joint price dynamics than whole business ABS. JEL Classifications: G10, G12, G24
Im Rahmen wertorientierter Unternehmensführung gewinnen Erfolgsbeteiligungen immer größere Verbreitung. Besonders populär ist das EVA-Bonussystem, das auf dem Erfolgskonzept "Economic Value Added" von STERN STEWART & Co. beruht. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird gezeigt, daß dieses Bonussystem gegen die Bedingung der Anreizkompatibilität verstößt: Der Entscheidungsträger kann finanzielle Vorteile erzielen, indem er Investitionsentscheidungen trifft, die aus Sicht der Anteilseigner nachteilig sind. Insbesondere besteht die Tendenz zur Unterinvestition. Die Darstellungen beruhen auf der Annahme, daß nicht nur die Anteilseigner zukünftige Einkünfte (bzw. Überschüsse) mit einem risikoangepaßten Zinssatz diskontieren, sondern auch der Entscheidungsträger. Zunächst werden die theoretischen Grundlagen dargestellt. Wenn bei gegebener Risikoklasse der Entscheidungsträger erwartete Prämien mit dem Kalkulationszinsfuß k +D diskontiert und die Anteilseigner erwartete Überschüsse des Leistungsbereichs mit k diskontieren, besteht bei einem im Zeitablauf konstanten Prämiensatz f und Überschußbeteiligung nur dann Anreizkompatibilität, wenn D= 0 gilt. Für D> 0 besteht die Tendenz zur Unterinvestition. Sie ist um so größer, je höher D ist und je später die potentiellen Projektüberschüsse anfallen. Bei Beteiligung am Residualgewinn ergeben sich dieselben Anreizwirkungen wie bei Überschußbeteiligung, sofern die kalkulatorischen Zinsen mit dem risikolosen Zinssatz r ermittelt werden. Werden sie mit k ermittelt, so wird (für k>r ) im Vergleich zu einer Überschußbeteiligung die Tendenz zur Unterinvestition ausgelöst (sofern D= 0) oder verstärkt (sofern D> 0). Die Tendenz zur Unterinvestition ist jeweils um so gravierender, je später aktivierte Anschaffungsauszahlungen als Abschreibungen zu verrechnen sind und je höher der für die Ermittlung der kalkulatorischen Zinsen auf die (Rest-)Buchwerte maßgebliche Zinssatz k ist. Der Economic Value Added stellt eine Konkretisierung des Residualgewinns dar. Auch bei dem darauf aufbauenden (EVA-)Bonussystem besteht die Tendenz zu Fehlentscheidungen (insbesondere zur Unterinvestition). Sie resultiert vor allem aus der Ermittlung der kalkulatorischen Zinsen mit dem risikoangepaßten Zinssatz k, den geforderten "Bereinigungen" bei der Ermittlung des investierten Kapitals bzw. des Periodenerfolges und gegebenenfalls der Wahl der Erfolgsänderung gegenüber dem Vorjahr als Bemessungsgrundlage.
Vor dem Hintergrund allgemeiner Bedingungen der Anreizkompatibilität wird für verschiedenen Kapitalmarktmodelle untersucht, ob zwischen den Anteilseignern eines Unternehmens Einmütigkeit besteht und, wenn ja, mit welchem Unternehmensziel der finanzielle Nutzen der Anteilseigner maximiert wird. Von besonderer Bedeutung für die Anreizkompatibilität der üblichen linearen Erfolgsteilung ist die Bedingung pareto-effizienter Risikoteilung. Sind für den Erfolg des Unternehmens spezifische Störterme relevant und soll der Entscheidungsträger in relativ starkem Umfang am Erfolg beteiligt werden, ist die Risikoteilung zwischen ihm und den (anderen) Anteilseignern pareto-inferior. Anreizkompatible erfolgsorientierte Belohnungs- bzw. Prämienfunktionen für den Entscheidungsträger sind dann konvex und zustandsabhängig. Aktienoptionsprogramme können als Approximationen an solche Prämienfunktionen interpretiert werden.
Ziel dieser Präsentation (anlässlich des Seminars „Die Auswirkungen von Asset Securitisation auf die Stabilität des Finanzmarktes“ Österreichische Nationalbank (ÖNB), Wien 1. Oktober 2003) ist es, eine Verbindung zwischen Verbriefung und Finanzmarkstabilität unter Berücksichtigung veränderter Finanzintermediation herzustellen. In der folgenden Abhandlung soll nun zunächst auf die Natur der Verbriefung per se eingegangen werden, um sodann anhand theoretischer Überlegungen und empirischer Beobachtungen mögliche Quelle systemischen Risikos in der Kreditverbriefung aufzuzeigen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um die Informationsasymmetrien und die durch Handelbarkeit von Kreditrisiko bestimmte Transaktionsstruktur („security design“), die bei regulatorischer Nichtberücksichtigung eine destabilisierende Wirkung nicht nur im Bereich der Verbriefung, sondern auch hinsichtlich der gegenseitigen Zahlungsverpflichtungen von Finanzintermediären begründen könnte.
Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is an asset funding technique that involves the issuance of structured claims on the cash flow performance of a designated pool of underlying receivables. Efficient risk management and asset allocation in this growing segment of fixed income markets requires both investors and issuers to thoroughly understand the longitudinal properties of spread prices. We present a multi-factor GARCH process in order to model the heteroskedasticity of secondary market spreads for valuation and forecasting purposes. In particular, accounting for the variance of errors is instrumental in deriving more accurate estimators of time-varying forecast confidence intervals. On the basis of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief transactions as the most important asset classes of off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitisation in Europe we find that expected spread changes for these asset classes tends to be level stationary with model estimates indicating asymmetric mean reversion. Furthermore, spread volatility (conditional variance) is found to follow an asymmetric stochastic process contingent on the value of past residuals. This ABS spread behaviour implies negative investor sentiment during cyclical downturns, which is likely to escape stationary approximation the longer this market situation lasts.
Efficient systems for the securities transaction industry : a framework for the European Union
(2003)
This paper provides a framework for the securities transaction industry in the EU to understand the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the industry players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We evaluate the three functions and the strategic parameters - the boundary decision, the communication standard employed and the governance implemented - along the lines of three efficiency concepts. By structuring the main factors that influence these concepts and by describing the underlying trade-offs among them, we provide insight into a highly complex industry. Applying our framework, the paper describes and analyzes three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry. We point out that one of the systems, denoted as 'contestable monopolies', demonstrates a superior overall efficiency while it might be the most sensitive in terms of configuration accuracy and thus difficult to achieve and sustain.
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system for cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the 'best' system for the Single European Financial Market.
In recent years stock exchanges have been increasingly diversifying their operations into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services and software sales. This trend can be observed most notably among profit-oriented trading venues. While the pursuit for diversification is likely to be driven by the attractiveness of these investment opportunities, it is yet an open question whether certain integration activities are also efficient, both from a social welfare and from the exchanges' perspective. Academic contributions so far analyzed different business models primarily from the social welfare perspective, whereas there is only little literature considering their impact on the exchange itself. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the factor productivity of exchanges with different business models. Our findings suggest three conclusions: (1) Integration activity comes at the cost of increased operational complexity which in some cases outweigh the potential synergies between related activities and therefore leads to technical inefficiencies and lower productivity growth. (2) We find no evidence that vertical integration is more efficient and productive than other business models. This finding could contribute to the ongoing discussion about the merits of vertical integration from a social welfare perspective. (3) The existence of a strong in-house IT-competence seems to be beneficial to overcome.
Academic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have been predominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empirical literature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself. While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly driven by the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing business environment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affect stock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the best suited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. By employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchanges with differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first step individual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regress the derived values against variables that - amongst others - map the institutional arrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivity differences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges and (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We find evidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency than mutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth is concerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with a customer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership lie possibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneous members.
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.