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Search costs for lenders when evaluating potential borrowers are driven by the quality of the underwriting model and by access to data. Both have undergone radical change over the last years, due to the advent of big data and machine learning. For some, this holds the promise of inclusion and better access to finance. Invisible prime applicants perform better under AI than under traditional metrics. Broader data and more refined models help to detect them without triggering prohibitive costs. However, not all applicants profit to the same extent. Historic training data shape algorithms, biases distort results, and data as well as model quality are not always assured. Against this background, an intense debate over algorithmic discrimination has developed. This paper takes a first step towards developing principles of fair lending in the age of AI. It submits that there are fundamental difficulties in fitting algorithmic discrimination into the traditional regime of anti-discrimination laws. Received doctrine with its focus on causation is in many cases ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic decision-making under both, disparate treatment, and disparate impact doctrine. The paper concludes with a suggestion to reorient the discussion and with the attempt to outline contours of fair lending law in the age of AI.
We investigate the impact of uneven transparency regulation across countries and industries on the location of economic activity. Using two distinct sources of regulatory variation—the varying extent of financial-reporting requirements and the staggered introduction of electronic business registers in Europe—, we consistently document that direct exposure to transparency regulation is negatively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity in terms of inputs (e.g., employment) and outputs (e.g., production). By contrast, we find that indirect exposure to supplier and customer industries’ transparency regulation is positively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity. Our evidence suggests uneven transparency regulation can reallocate economic activity from regulated toward unregulated countries and industries, distorting the location of economic activity.
Der Beitrag stellt dar, wie Online-Plattformen in den Bereichen Urheberrecht, Hassrede und Desinformation in der EU reguliert wurden. Die Analyse ergibt einen Regulierungskreislauf, der in vier Phasen ablief. Bis zum Jahrtausendwechsel war es die Legislative, die einen allgemeinen gesetzlichen Rahmen für die Online-Kommunikation in Gestalt von Äußerungsverboten und Haftungsprivilegierungen definierte. Dieser Rahmen wurde im folgenden Jahrzehnt von den Betreibern der neu entstehenden Plattformen unter Ausnutzung ihres privatautonomen Gestaltungsspielraums implementiert. In der dritten Phase ab ca. 2010 verschärften die Judikative und die Exekutive die sich aus dem allgemeinen gesetzlichen Rahmen ergebenden Mindestanforderungen an die Bekämpfung von Urheberrechtsverletzungen, Hassrede und Desinformation. In der vorläufig letzten Phase des Regulierungskreislaufs ab 2017/2018 ergriff wieder der Gesetzgeber die Initiative, indem die Standards, die in den Phasen zwei und drei entwickelt worden waren, kodifiziert und teilweise nochmals angehoben wurden. Damit ist der Kreislauf der unionalen Plattformregulierung allerdings nicht zu seinem Ende gekommen. Vielmehr ist bereits erkennbar, dass sich nun wieder eine eher experimentell-tastende Phase privatautonomer Implementierung und ko-regulativer Fortentwicklung des neuen gesetzlichen Rahmens anschließt. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer kurzen Bewertung dieser Entwicklung hin zu mehr hoheitlicher Kommunikationskontrolle.
In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten sind Anmeldungen von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums (intellectual property, IP) bzw. Verletzungsklagen wiederholt an der unzureichenden Bestimmtheit des exklusiv beanspruchten Gegenstands gescheitert. Ihren Ausgang nahm diese Entwicklung im Markenrecht mit Entscheidungen des EuGH (Stichworte: Sieckmann, Heidelberger Bauchemie, Dyson, IP Translator, Oy Hartwall) und später auch des BGH (Stichwort: UHU). Die markenrechtlichen Grundsätze strahlten auf das Designrecht (Stichworte: Sporthelm, Mast-Jägermeister) und zuletzt auch auf das Urheberrecht (Stichwort: Levola) aus. Im Folgenden werden die maßgeblichen Urteile zur Schutzfähigkeit von Zeichen, Designs und Werken zusammengetragen und systematisiert. Dabei treten zwei Aspekte eines Bestimmtheitsgebots zu Tage, die, wie abschließend zu zeigen sein wird, auch im Patentrecht gelten
Common ownership and the (non-)transparency of institutional shareholdings: an EU-US comparison
(2022)
This paper compares the extent of common ownership in the US and the EU stock markets, with a particular focus on differences in the ap- plicable ownership transparency requirements. Most empirical research on common ownership to date has focused on US issuers, largely relying on ownership data obtained from institutional investors’ 13F filings. This type of data is generally not available for EU issuers. Absent 13F filings, researchers have to use ownership records sourced from mutual funds’ periodic reports and blockholder disclosures. Constructing a “reduced dataset” that seeks to capture only ownership information available for both EU and US issuers, I demonstrate that the “extra” ownership information introduced by 13F filings is substantial. However, even when taking differences in the transparency situation into due account, common ownership among listed EU firms is much less pronounced than among listed US firms by any measure. This is true even if the analysis is limited to non-controlled firms.
Cryptocurrencies provide a unique opportunity to identify how derivatives impact spot markets. They are fully fungible, trade across multiple spot exchanges at different prices, and futures contracts were selectively introduced on bitcoin (BTC) exchange rates against the USD in December 2017. Following the futures introduction, we find a significantly greater increase in cross-exchange price synchronicity for BTC--USD relative to other exchange rate pairs, as demonstrated by an increase in price correlations and a reduction in arbitrage opportunities and volatility. We also find support for an increase in price efficiency, market quality, and liquidity. The evidence suggests that futures contracts allowed investors to circumvent trading frictions associated with short sale constraints, arbitrage risk associated with block confirmation time, and market segmentation. Overall, our analysis supports the view that the introduction of BTC--USD futures was beneficial to the bitcoin spot market by making the underlying prices more informative.
he ECB is independent, but it is also accountable to the European parliament (EP). Yet, how the EP has held the ECB accountable has largely been overlooked. This paper starts addressing this gap by providing descriptive statistics of three accountability modalities. The paper highlights three findings. First, topics of accountability have changed. Climate-related accountability has increased quickly and dramatically since 2017. Second, if the relationship between price stability and climate change remains an object of conflict among MEPs, a majority within the EP has emerged to put pressure for the ECB to take a more active stance against climate change, precisely on behalf of its price stability mandate. Third, MEPs engage with the climate topic in very specific ways. There is a gender divide between the climate and the price stability topics. Women engage more actively with climate-related topics. While the Greens heavily dominate the climate topic, parties from the Right dominate the topic of Price stability. Finally, MEPs adopt a more united strategy and a particularly low confrontational tone in their climate-related interventions.
Global consensus is growing on the contribution that corporations and finance must make towards the net-zero transition in line with the Paris Agreement goals. However, most efforts in legislative instruments as well as shareholder or stakeholder initiatives have ultimately focused on public companies.
This article argues that such a focus falls short of providing a comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change. In doing so, it examines the contribution of private companies to climate change, the relevance of climate risks for them, as well as the phenomenon of brown-spinning (ie, the practice of public companies selling their highly polluting assets to private companies). We show that one cannot afford to ignore private companies in the net-zero transition and climate change adaptation. Yet, private companies lack several disciplining mechanisms that are available to public companies, such as institutional investor engagement, certain corporate governance arrangements, and transparency through regular disclosure obligations. At this stage, only some generic regulatory instruments such as carbon pricing and environmental regulation apply to them.
The article closes with a discussion of the main policy implications. Primarily, we discuss and evaluate the recent push to extend climate-related disclosure requirements to private companies. These disclosures would not only help investors by addressing information asymmetry, but also serve a wide group of stakeholders and thus aim at promoting a transition to a greener economy.
Large companies are increasingly on trial. Over the last decade, many of the world’s biggest firms have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption charges, financial fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues or sanction violations, ending in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines, well above the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalization, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome sea-change showing that multinational companies are no longer above the law. For legal experts, the trend is noteworthy because of the extraterritorial dimensions of law enforcement, as companies are increasingly held accountable for activities independent of their nationality or the place of the activities. Indeed, the global trend required understanding the evolution of corporate criminal law enforcement in the United States in particular, where authorities have skillfully expanded its effective jurisdiction beyond its territory. This paper traces the evolution of corporate prosecutions in the United States. Analyzing federal prosecution data, it then shows that foreign firms are more likely to pay a fine, which is on average 6,6 times larger.
Der Beitrag nimmt kritisch zum gegenwärtig anhängigen EU-Gesetz über digitale Dienste (Digital Services Act, DSA) Stellung. Die Kernthese lautet: Big Tech muss reguliert werden, aber nicht wie im DSA vorgesehen. Zur Untermauerung dieser Position werden fünf grundlegend problematische Aspekte des DSA benannt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die derzeit verhandelten Fassungen des DSA (1) die Vertragsfreiheit nicht kommunikationsmächtiger Vermittlungsdienste missachten, (2) automatisiertes Overblocking begünstigen, (3) auch legale, aber in unspezifischer Weise „schädliche“ Äußerungen ins Visier nehmen, (4) einen vagen und für die Kommunikationsregulierung generell unpassenden Risikopräventionsansatz verfolgen und (5) eine Kommunikationsüberwachungsbürokratie errichten, die ihrerseits keinen zureichenden öffentlich-demokratischen Kontrollen unterliegt. Als Reaktion auf diese Befunde wird vorgeschlagen, (1) nur sehr großen Online-Plattformen inhaltliche Vorgaben im Hinblick auf ihre AGB zu machen, (2) die Verpflichtung/Berechtigung zum Einsatz automatischer Moderationssysteme auf offensichtlich rechtswidrige Inhalte zu beschränken, (3) im DSA auch keine indirekten Pflichten zur Unterdrückung legaler, aber „schädlicher“ Inhalte vorzusehen, (4) das systemische Risiko des Art. 26 Abs. 1 Buchst. c DSA ersatzlos zu streichen und (5) die DSA-Bürokratie staatsfern auszugestalten und einer parlamentarischen Kontrolle zu unterwerfen.