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Large companies are increasingly on trial. Over the last decade, many of the world’s biggest firms have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption charges, financial fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues or sanction violations, ending in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines, well above the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalization, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome sea-change showing that multinational companies are no longer above the law. For legal experts, the trend is noteworthy because of the extraterritorial dimensions of law enforcement, as companies are increasingly held accountable for activities independent of their nationality or the place of the activities. Indeed, the global trend required understanding the evolution of corporate criminal law enforcement in the United States in particular, where authorities have skillfully expanded its effective jurisdiction beyond its territory. This paper traces the evolution of corporate prosecutions in the United States. Analyzing federal prosecution data, it then shows that foreign firms are more likely to pay a fine, which is on average 6,6 times larger.
Households regularly fail to make optimal financial decisions. But what are the underlying reasons for this? Using two conceptually distinct measures of time inconsistency based on bank account transaction data and behavioral measurement experiments, we show that the excessive use of bank account overdrafts is linked to time inconsistency. By contrast, there is no correlation between a survey-based measure of financial literacy and overdraft usage. Our results indicate that consumer education and information may not suffice to overcome mistakes in households’ financial decision-making. Rather, behaviorally motivated interventions targeting specific biases in decision-making should also be considered as effective policy tools.
This policy letter collects elementary economic statistics and provides a very basic look on Russian public finances (i) to inform the reader’s opinion on a possible planning process behind the war against Ukraine and (ii) to discuss prospects of an energy embargo and its capability to affect the stability of the Russian economy.
Agencies around the world are in the process of developing taxonomies and standards for sustainable (or ESG) investment products. A key assumption in our model is that of non-consequentialist private investors (households) who derive a "warm glow" decisional utility when purchasing an investment product that is labelled as sustainable. We ask when such labelling is socially beneficial even when the socialplanner can impose a minimum standard on investment and production. In a model of financial constraints (Holmström and Tirole 1997), which we close to include consumer surplus, we also determine the optimal labelling threshold and show how its stringency is affected by determinants such as the prevalence of warm-glow investor preferences, the presence of social network effects, or the relevance of financial constraints at the industry level.
This paper examines optimal enviromental policy when external financing is costly for firms. We introduce emission externalities and industry equilibrium in the Holmström and Tirole (1997) model of corporate finance. While a cap-and- trading system optimally governs both firms` abatement activities (internal emission margin) and industry size (external emission margin) when firms have sufficient internal funds, external financing constraints introduce a wedge between these two objectives. When a sector is financially constrained in the aggregate, the optimal cap is strictly above the Pigouvian benchmark and emission allowances should be allocated below market prices. When a sector is not financially constrained in the aggregate, a cap that is below the Pigiouvian benchmark optimally shifts market share to less polluting firms and, moreover, there should be no "grandfathering" of emission allowances. With financial constraints and heterogeneity across firms or sectors, a uniform policy, such as a single cap-and-trade system, is typically not optimal.
We study liquidity provision by competitive high-frequency trading firms (HFTs) in a dynamic trading model with private information. Liquidity providers face adverse selection risk from trading with privately informed investors and from trading with other HFTs that engage in latency arbitrage upon public information. The impact of the two different sources of risk depends on the details of the market design. We determine equilibrium transaction costs in continuous limit order book (CLOB) markets and under frequent batch auctions (FBA). In the absence of informed trading, FBA dominates CLOB just as in Budish et al. (2015). Surprisingly, this result does no longer hold with privately informed investors. We show that FBA allows liquidity providers to charge markups and earn profits – even under risk neutrality and perfect competition. A slight variation of the FBA design removes the inefficiency by allowing traders to submit orders conditional on auction excess demand.
While the COVID-19 pandemic had a large and asymmetric impact on firms, many countries quickly enacted massive business rescue programs which are specifically targeted to smaller firms. Little is known about the effects of such policies on business entry and exit, factor reallocation, and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper builds a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous and financially constrained firms in order to evaluate the short- and long-term consequences of small firm rescue programs in a pandemic recession. We calibrate the stationary equilibrium and the pandemic shock to the U.S. economy, taking into account the factual Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) as a specific grant policy. We find that the policy has only a small impact on aggregate employment because (i) jobs are saved predominately in less productive firms that account for a small share of employment and (ii) the grant induces a reallocation of resources away from larger and less impacted firms. Much of this reallocation happens in the aftermath of the pandemic episode. While a universal grant reduces the firm exit rate substantially, a targeted policy is not only more cost-effective, it also largely prevents the creation of “zombie firms" whose survival is socially inefficient.
The financial sector plays an important role in financing the green transformation of the European economy. A critical assessment of the current regulatory framework for sustainable finance in Europe leads to ambiguous results. Although the level of transparency on ESG aspects of financial products has been significantly improved, it is questionable whether the complex, mainly disclosure-oriented architecture is sufficient to mobilise more private capital into sustainable investments. It should be discussed whether a minimum Taxonomy ratio or Green Asset Ratio has to be fulfilled to market a financial product as “green”. Furthermore, because of the high complexity of the regulation, it could be helpful for the understanding of private investors to establish a simplified green rating, based on the Taxonomy ratio, to facilitate the selection of green financial products.
High-frequency changes in interest rates around FOMC announcements are an important tool for identifying the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and the macroeconomy. However, some recent studies have questioned both the exogeneity and the relevance of these monetary policy surprises as instruments, especially for estimating the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks. For example, monetary policy surprises are correlated with macroeconomic and financial data that is publicly available prior to the FOMC announcement. The authors address these concerns in two ways: First, they expand the set of monetary policy announcements to include speeches by the Fed Chair, which essentially doubles the number and importance of announcements in our dataset. Second, they explain the predictability of the monetary policy surprises in terms of the “Fed response to news” channel of Bauer and Swanson (2021) and account for it by orthogonalizing the surprises with respect to macroeconomic and financial data. Their subsequent reassessment of the effects of monetary policy yields two key results: First, estimates of the high-frequency effects on financial markets are largely unchanged. Second, estimates of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy are substantially larger and more significant than what most previous empirical studies have found.
Global consensus is growing on the contribution that corporations and finance must make towards the net-zero transition in line with the Paris Agreement goals. However, most efforts in legislative instruments as well as shareholder or stakeholder initiatives have ultimately focused on public companies: for example, most disclosure obligations result from the given company’s status of being listed on a stock exchange.
This article argues that such a focus falls short of providing a comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change. In doing so, it examines the contribution of private companies to climate change, the relevance of climate risks for them, as well as the phenomenon of brown-spinning. We show that one cannot afford to ignore private companies in the net-zero transition and climate change adaptation. Yet, private companies lack several disciplining mechanisms available to public companies such as institutional investor engagement, certain corporate governance arrangements, and transparency through regular disclosure obligations. At this stage, only some generic regulatory instruments such as carbon pricing and environmental regulation apply to them. The article closes with a discussion of the main policy implications. Primarily, we propose extending sustainability disclosure requirements to private companies.
Sustainability disclosures aim at promoting a transition to a greener economy, rather than (only) protecting investors by addressing information asymmetry. Therefore, these disclosures should encompass private companies that are of relevance for the net-zero transition. Such disclosures can be a powerful tool in shedding light on the polluting private companies that have so far been in the dark as well as serving as a disciplining mechanism.
Today in the United States, the notion that ‘the rise of the far right’ poses the greatest threat to democratic values, and by extension, to the nation itself, has slowly entered into common sense. The antecedent of this development is the object of our study. Explored through the prism of what we refer to as the domestication of the War on Terror, this publication adopts and updates the theoretical approach first forwarded in Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, the Law and Order (Hall et al. 1978). Drawing on this seminal work, a sequence of three disparate media events are explored as they unfold in the United States in mid-2015: the rise of the Trump campaign; the release of an op-ed in The New York Times warning of a rise in right-wing extremsim; and a mass shooting at a historic African American church in Charleston, South Carolina. By the end of 2015, as these disparate events converge into what we call the public face of the rise of the far right phenomenon, we subsequently turn our attention to its origins in policing and the law in the wake of the global War on Terror and the Great Recession. It is only from there, that we turn our attention to the poltical class struggle as expressed in the rise of 'populism' on the one hand, and the domestication of the War on Terror on the other, and in doing so, attempt to situate the role of the rise of the far right phenomenon within it.
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
Joint Institutional Frameworks in bilateral relations are circumscribed in policy scope, can lack adequate instruments for dynamic adaptation and provide limited access to decision-making processes internal to the contracting parties. Informal governance, the involvement of private actors as well as rules such as equivalence provide avenues to remedy these limits in bilateral relations in sectoral governance. Through bilateral agreements, the scope of territorially bound political authority is expanded. The formalised and institutionalised frameworks and bodies established are, however, frequently accompanied by mechanisms of informal cooperation and special rules either to cover policy fields where no contractual relation exists, to provide for flexible solutions where needed, or to involve both public and private actors that otherwise do not have access to formal decision-making bodies. This SAFE working paper conceptualises formal and informal modes of cooperation and varying actor constellations. It discusses their relevance for the case of bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) and Switzerland in sectoral governance. More specifically, it draws lessons from EU-Swiss sectoral governance of financial and electricity markets for the future relations of the EU with the United Kingdom (UK). The findings suggest that there are distinct governance arrangements across sectors, while the patterns of sectoral governance are expected to look very much alike in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in the years to come. The general takeaway is that Brexit will have repercussions for the EU’s external relations with other third countries, putting ever more emphasis on formal and rule-based approaches, while leaving a need for sector-specific cross border co-operation.
The lichenicolous fungus Sarcogyne bicolor H. Magn. was recovered as an Acarospora and is given the replacement name, Acarospora destructans. It is reported new from New Mexico. Two new species of Acarospora are described from New Mexico, Acarospora eganiana and A. worthingtoniana. A form or variety of A. glaucocarpa is treated as a species, Sarcogyne melaniza, an apparently rare taxa in Europe.
Based on recent records, 89 lichen species are reported as new to Brazil. For the genera Ancistrosporella, Jamesiella, Lambiella, Paulia, Polyblastia, Porocyphus, and Trimmatothele, it is the first time they are reported from Brazil. Many more, in total 523 species, are newly reported from individual states.
Three new species of Catillochroma are described, viz. C. danfordianum Kalb and C. mareebaense Kalb, both from Queensland, Australia, and C. phayapipakianum Kalb from Chiang Rai Province, Thailand. Eight species are transferred to Catillochroma, viz. C. alleniae, C. alligatorense, C. beechingii, C. bicoloratum, C. coralloideum, C. flavosorediatum, C. hainanese and C. yunnanense. Habit photographs of the new and some other species, mentioned in the text are provided.
New lichens from Africa
(2021)
The following species are described as new to science, mostly based on specimens collected by the first author: Candelariella flavosorediata from Réunion, Chiodecton leprarioides from Réunion, Lecanactis leprarica from Cameroon, Multisporidea nitida, which is a new species and a new, monotypic genus in the Malmideaceae from Réunion, Neoprotoparmelia fuscosorediata from Kenya, Pyrrhospora endaurantia from Kenya, and Tapellaria isidiata from Cameroon.
In a continuation of my investigation of tropical lichenized fungi, a treatment of new or otherwise interesting lichens mainly from Brazil and Venezuela is presented. A total of 34 species are reported here, most of them new discoveries for at least one the two countries or a new discovery for a state, including 11 species new to science. These are Malmidea albomarginata Kalb & Hernández from Venezuela, differing from M. granifera by the thin, white apothecial margins and a white to yellowish medulla, M. allobakeri Kalb & M. Cáceres from Brazil, differing from M. bakeri in lacking atranorin and in having smaller ascospores, M. allopapillosa Kalb from Venezuela, differing from M. papillosa in having atranorin as a major metabolite, M. atlanticoides Kalb & M. Cáceres from Brazil, differing from M. atlantica in containing atranorin and an unknown anthraquinone as major metabolites, M. hechicerae from Venezuela, differing from M. coralliformis by the K+ lemon-yellow medulla of the thallus, M. hernandeziana Kalb from Venezuela, differing from M. fellhaneroides in having a chocolate-brown hypothecium, larger apothecia and larger ascospores, M. isidiifera Kalb from Brazil and Venezuela, differing from M. piperis in having granular to coralloid isidia and atranorin as a major metabolite, M. leucopiperis Kalb from Brazil and Venezuela, differing from M. piperis in the pale-colored hypothecium, M. rhodopisoides Kalb from Brazil, differing from M. rhodopis in having granular isidia, M. subcinerea Kalb from Venezuela, differing from M. cinerea in producing no lichen substances, and M. volcaniana Kalb & Hernández from Venezuela and Brazil, differing from M. sulphureosorediata in having an alternative anthraquinone-chemistry. In addition, the new combination Stigmatochroma glaucothecum (Fée) Kalb is proposed. New reports for Venezuela include Bacidiopsora microphylla Kalb, B. silvicola (Malme) Kalb (new also for Guatemala), Buellia albula (Nyl.) Müll. Arg., Coenogonium pyrophthalmum (Mont.) Lücking, Aptroot & Sipman, Dirinaria rhodocladonica Kalb, Schumm & Elix, Malmidea badimioides (M. Cáceres & Lücking) M. Cáceres & Kalb (new also for Mexico), M. leptoloma (Müll. Arg.) Kalb & Lücking, M. nigromarginata (Malme) Lücking & Breuss, M. perplexa Kalb, M. polycampia (Tuck.) Kalb & Lücking, M. rhodopis (Tuck.) Kalb, Rivas Plata & Lumbsch, M. sulphureosorediata M. Cáceres, D. A. Mota & Aptroot, M. vinosa (Eschw.) Kalb, Rivas Plata & Lumbsch, Psilolechia lucida (Ach.) Choisy, Rhizocarpon sipmanianum Kalb & Aptroot, Sipmaniella sulfureofusca (Fée) Kalb, Stigmatochroma glaucothecum (Fée) Kalb and Vainionora aemulans (Vain.) Kalb. A collection of Pyxine caesiopruinosa (Nyl.) Imsh. from Venezuela is mentioned and its differentiation from P. albovirens (G. Mey.) Aptroot is discussed. New reports for Brazil include Malmidea atlantica (M. Cáceres & Lücking) M. Cáceres & Kalb (for Bahia state) and M. sulphureosorediata (for São Paulo state). A morphological, anatomical and chemical comparison of type material of Malmidea polycampia (Tuck.) Kalb & Lücking and M. flavopustulosa (M. Cáceres & Lücking) M. Cáceres & Kalb revealed that both names are synonym, the first one having priority. For many species revised descriptions and revised chemistry are presented based on South American material. To facilitate the identification of anthraquinones occurring in Malmidea species a table of relative Rfvalues in solvents A, B' and C is presented.
The species, Bactrospora lamprospora (Nyl.) Lendemer is treated as a synonym of B. metabola (Nyl.) Egea & Torrente. The comparission of characters of all accessible materials and type specimens confirmed that B. lamprospora is conspecific with B. metabola. The distinguishing characters of B. metabola from other species in this group are initially a Homalotropa-type ascospores becomes muriform at maturity, with up to 24–30 transverse septa and ascospore size of 48–105 × 7–14 μm.
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
There have been numerous attempts to reform the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) after the Great Recession, however the reform success varies greatly among sub-fields. Additionally, the political science research community has engaged a diverse set of theory- driven explanations, causal mechanisms, and variables to explain respective reform success. This article takes stock of reform policies in the EMU from two angles. First, it outlines distinct theoretical approaches that seek to explain success and failure of reform proposals and second, it surveys how they explain policy output and policy outcome in four policy subfields: financial stabilization, economic governance, financial solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Finally, the article develops a set of explanatory factors from the existing literature that will be used for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).
With Big Data, decisions made by machine learning algorithms depend on training data generated by many individuals. In an experiment, we identify the effect of varying individual responsibility for the moral choices of an artificially intelligent algorithm. Across treatments, we manipulated the sources of training data and thus the impact of each individual’s decisions on the algorithm. Diffusing such individual pivotality for algorithmic choices increased the share of selfish decisions and weakened revealed prosocial preferences. This does not result from a change in the structure of incentives. Rather, our results show that Big Data offers an excuse for selfish behavior through lower responsibility for one’s and others’ fate.
Prospective welfare analysis - extending willingness-to-pay assessment to embrace sustainability
(2022)
In this paper we outline how a future change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in antitrust. Key to our solution is the prediction of preferences of new consumers and changing preferences of existing consumers in the future. The dimension of time is inextricably linked with that of sustainability. Taking into account the welfare of future cohorts of consumers, concerns for sustainability can therefore be integrated into the consumer welfare paradigm to a greater extent. As we argue in this paper, it is expedient to consider changes in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, in particular if society undergoes profound changes in such preferences, e.g., caused by an increase in generally available information on environmental effects of consumption, and a rising societal awareness about how consumption can have irreversible impacts on the environment. We offer suggestions on how to conceptionalize and operationalize the projection of such consumers’ changing preferences in a “prospective welfare analysis”. This increases the scope of the consumer welfare paradigm and can help to solve conceptual issues regarding the integration of sustainability into antitrust enforcement while keeping consumer surplus as a quantitative gauge.
Using granular supervisory data from Germany, we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies via central banks’ purchase of corporate bonds. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policy makers, we document two unintended side effects. First, banks that are more exposed to borrowers benefiting from the bond purchases now lend more to high-risk firms with no access to bond markets. Since more loan write-offs arise from these firms and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates, we document a drop in bank profitability. Second, the policy impacts the allocation of loans among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment grade firms active on bond markets to mainly real estate firms without investment grade rating. Overall, our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing via the corporate bond markets has the potential to contribute to both banking sector instability and real estate bubbles.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, European largest banks’ size and business models have largely remained unchallenged. Is that because of banks’ continued structural power over States? This paper challenges the view that States are sheer hostages of banks’ capacity to provide credit to the real economy – which is the conventional definition of structural power. Instead, it sheds light on the geo-economic dimension of banks’ power: key public officials conceive the position of “their own” market-based banks in global financial markets as a crucial dimension of State power. State priority towards banking thus result from political choices over what structurally matters the most for the State. Based on a discourse analysis of parliamentary debates in France, Germany and Spain between 2010 and 2020 as well as on a comparative analysis of the implementation of a special tax on banks in the early 2010s, this paper shows that State’s Finance ministries tend to prioritize geo-economic considerations over credit to firms. By contrast, Parliaments tend to prioritize investment. Power dynamics within the State thus largely shape political priorities towards banking at the domestic and international levels.
Are we in a new “Polanyian moment”? If we are, it is essential to examine how “spontaneous” and punctual expressions of discontent at the individual level may give rise to collective discourses driving social and political change. It is also important to examine whether and how the framing of these discourses may vary across political economies. This paper contributes to this endeavor with the analysis of anti-finance discourses on Twitter in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2019 and 2020. This paper presents three main findings. First, the analysis shows that, more than ten years after the financial crisis, finance is still a strong catalyzer of political discontent. Second, it shows that there are important variations in the dominant framing of public anti-finance discourses on social media across European political economies. If the antagonistic “us versus them” is prominent in all the cases, the identification of who “us” and “them” are, vary significantly. Third, it shows that the presence of far-right tropes in the critique of finance varies greatly from virtually inexistent to a solid minority of statements.
In times of increased political polarization, the continuing existence of a deliberative arena where people with antagonistic views may engage with each other in non-violent ways is critical for democracy to live on. Social media are usually not conceived as such arenas. On the contrary, there has been widespread worry about their role in increasing polarization and political violence. This paper suggests a more positive impact of social media on democracy. Our analysis focuses on the subreddit “r/WallStreetBets” (r/WSB) - a finance-related forum that came under the spotlight when its users coordinated a financial attack on hedge funds during the Gamestop saga in early 2021. Based on an original method attributing partisanship scores to users, we present a network analysis of interactions between users at the opposite sides of the political spectrum on r/WSB. We then develop a content analysis of politically relevant threads in which polarized users participate. Our analyses show that r/WSB provides a rare space where users with antagonistic political leanings engage with each other, debate, and even cooperate.
In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.
Debt levels in the eurozone have reached new record highs. The member countries have tried to cushion the economic consequences of the corona pandemic with a massive increase in government spending. End of 2021 public debt in relation to GDP will approach 100% on average. There are various calls to abolish or soften the Maastricht rules of limiting sovereign debt. We see the risk of a new sovereign debt crisis in this decade if it is not possible to bring public debt down to an acceptable level. Our new fiscal rule would be suitable and appropriate for this purpose, because obviously the Maastricht criteria have failed. In contrast to the rigid 3% Maastricht-criterion, our rule is flexible and it addresses the main problem: excessively high public debt ratios. And it lowers the existing incentives for highly indebted governments to exert expansionary pressure on monetary policy. If obeyed strictly, our rule reinforces the snowball effect and reduces the excessively high debt ratios within a manageable period, even if nominal growth is weak. This is confirmed by simulations with different scenarios as well as with the hypothetical application of the new fiscal rule to eurozone economies from 2022 to 2026. Finally, we take up the recent proposal by ESM economists to increase the permissible debt ratio from 60 to 100% of GDP in the eurozone.
In a parsimonious regime switching model, we find strong evidence that expected consumption growth varies over time. Adding inflation as a second variable, we uncover two states in which expected consumption growth is low, one with high and one with negative expected inflation. Embedded in a general equilibrium asset pricing model with learning, these dynamics replicate the observed time variation in stock return volatilities and stock- bond return correlations. They also provide an alternative derivation for a measure of time-varying disaster risk suggested by Wachter (2013), implying that both the disaster and the long-run risk paradigm can be extended towards explaining movements in the stock-bond correlation.
This article compares the three initial safety nets spanned by the European Union in response to the Covid-19 crisis: SURE, the Pandemic Crisis Support, and the European Guarantee Fund. It compares their design regarding scope, generosity, target groups, implementation, the types of solidarity and conditionality, and asks how they reflect on core-periphery relations in the EU. The article finds that the most important factor in all three instruments is risk-sharing between member states, even though SURE and the EGF display elements of fiscal solidarity. Finally, the article shows that Euro crisis countries from the South are the main recipients of financial aid, while Central and East European countries receive significantly less assistance and core countries in the North and West have no need for them.
We examine how often and why some audit partners rotate off client engagements before the end of the maximum five-year cycle period. Specifically, we investigate whether audit quality issues play a role for engagement partners and clients to separate prematurely. For a sample of about 4,000 within-audit firm partner rotations for Big 6 clients over the 2008 to 2014 period, we find that client characteristics such as financial leverage or performance have little explanatory power. In contrast, severe audit quality issues such as financial restatements or PCAOB inspection findings are associated with early partner rotations. These associations are more pronounced for early rotations that are not explained by scheduled retirements, promotions, or temporary leaves as well as for large clients and when partners are less experienced. We also find that female partners have a higher likelihood of early rotation for audit quality reasons. Early rotations have career consequences. Partners are assigned to fewer SEC issuer clients, manage fewer audit hours, receive lower partner ratings, and are more likely to be internally inspected after being rotated early. Our results suggest that audit quality concerns are an important factor for early partner rotations with ensuing negative career consequences for partners’ client assignments and management responsibilities.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
This paper studies the consumption response to an increase in the domestic value of foreign currency household debt during a large depreciation. We use detailed consumption survey data that follows households for four years around Hungary’s 2008 currency crisis. We find that, relative to similar local currency debtors, foreign currency debtors reduce consumption approximately one-for-one with increased debt service, suggesting a role for liquidity constraints. We document a variety of margins of adjustment to the shock. Foreign currency debtors reduce both the quantity and quality of expenditures, consistent with nonhomothetic preferences and “flight from quality.” We find no effect on overall household labor supply, consistent with a weak wealth effect on labor supply. However, a small subset of households adjusts labor supply toward foreign income streams. Affected households also boost home pro- duction, suggesting a shift in consumption from money-intensive to time-intensive goods.
As 2021 draws to a close, Covid-19 continues to prevail worldwide. With the proverbial return to normalcy still appearing distant, there is now a tacit acceptance globally that at least for the foreseeable future, we must live with Covid-19. Given that Covid-19 is an infectious disease—which by definition is transmitted from person to person—the continued prevalence of Covid-19 has implications for how local authorities, communities, and individuals around the world will approach public spaces. While it may be premature to assume a so-called coronacene (see Higgins et al. 2020), going into the future our use of public spaces will be overshadowed by the possibility, even if remote, of illness or death by virtue of close proximity to other individuals.
Along with parks and squares, streets and avenues, bazaars constitute ubiquitous public spaces, including in countries of the developing world, such as Armenia and Georgia, our countries of discussion here. Although there is not a clear bifurcation between bazaars and other types of marketplaces, bazaars will usually be comprised of a multitude of nonfranchised, self-owned, small businesses that are variously family-run or rely on family labor. They are usually perceived as chaotic places that lack hygiene (the purportedly unhygienic character of the bazaar was brought to the forefront with the pandemic, given how Covid-19’s origin is widely assumed to be a Wuhan wet market).
In Armenia and Georgia, and indeed, across the former Soviet Union, bazaars are a source of employment for the urban and peri-urban population; they also offer goods at price points attractive to a wide demographic. This working paper builds on the premise that the bazaar is an informal institution. Bazaar traders will typically assemble networks by themselves (with manufacturers and wholesalers, buyers and transporters). These networks will usually vary from one business to another. Also, ownership and rent structures are frequently opaque, and the majority of commercial transactions are in cash, which does not appear in state records. As a consequence, for the state, many small businesses do not exist (Fehlings and Karrar 2016, 2020).
For those of us researching bazaar trading, Covid-19 has given rise to a basic question: How have independent businesses been transformed by the pandemic? This working paper is an attempt to parse this question in light of developments in Armenia and Georgia. In this working paper, we suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic has deepened informality in the bazaar. That being said, we want to underscore that the present discussion is exploratory. Our ethnography remains limited, and we look forward to returning to the field as soon as it is safe to do so.
We show that the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a surge in the elasticity of non-financial corporate to sovereign credit default swaps in core EU countries, characterized by strong fiscal capacity. For peripheral countries with lower budgetary slackness, the pandemic had essentially no impact on such elasticity. This evidence is consistent with the disaster-induced repricing of government support, which we model through a rare-disaster asset pricing framework with bailout guarantees and defaultable public debt. The model implies that risk-adjusted guarantees in the core were 2.6 times those in the periphery, suggesting that fiscal capacity buffers provide relief to firms’ financing costs.
We analyze the impact of decreases in available lending resources on quantitative and qualita- tive dimensions of firms’ patenting activities. We thereby make use of the European Banking Authority?s capital exercise to carve out the causal effect of bank lending on firm innovation. In order to do so we combine various datasets to derive information on firms’ financials, their patenting behaviors, as well as their relationships with their lenders. Building on this self- generated dataset, we provide support for the “less finance, less innovation” view. At the same time, we show that lower available financial resources for firms lead to improvement in the qualitative dimensions of their patents. Hence, we carve out a “less finance, less but better innovation” pattern.
We investigate the differential effect of the COVID-19 shock to the stock market shock on the share prices of firms with different levels of ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) scores. Thereby, we analyse whether and to what extent better ESG ratings provided insurance for investors in the stocks of those firms during this shock. We focus our analysis on the European market in which ESG investment plays a particularly important role. Using a broad sample of listed firms we provide mixed evidence. On the one hand, we show that immediately after the start of the shock firms with a higher ESG score outperformed their peers. On the other hand, this effect faded less than six weeks later. Given the quick recovery of the market our finding supports the idea that ESG stocks provide limited insurance in severe crises.
Predictions of oil prices reaching $100 per barrel during the winter of 2021/22 have raised fears of persistently high inflation and rising inflation expectations for years to come. We show that these concerns have been overstated. A $100 oil scenario of the type discussed by many observers, would only briefly raise monthly headline inflation, before fading rather quickly. However, the short-run effects on headline inflation would be sizable. For example, on a yearover- year basis, headline PCE inflation would increase by 1.8 percentage points at the end of 2021 under this scenario, and by 0.4 percentage points at the end of 2022. In contrast, the impact on measures of core inflation such as trimmed mean PCE inflation is only 0.4 and 0.3 percentage points in 2021 and 2022, respectively. These estimates already account for any increases in inflation expectations under the scenario. The peak response of the 1-year household inflation expectation would be 1.2 percentage points, while that of the 5-year expectation would be 0.2 percentage points.
Retail investors pay over twice as much attention to local companies than non-local ones, based on Google searches. News volume and volatility amplify this attention gap. Attention appears causally related to perceived proximity: first, acquisition by a nonlocal company is associated with less attention by locals, and more by nonlocals close to the acquirer; second, COVID-19 travel restrictions correlate with a drop in relative attention to nonlocal companies, especially in locations with fewer fights after the outbreak. Finally, local attention predicts volatility, bid-ask spreads and nonlocal attention, not viceversa. These findings are consistent with local investors having an information-processing advantage.
Careers in finance
(2021)
The finance wage premium since the 1990s has arguably lured talent away from other industries. However, the allocation of talent is likely to respond to differences in career paths, not in wages at a given date. We use resume data to reconstruct the careers of 11,255 professionals in finance, high-tech and services from 1980 to 2017, and find that careers mostly develop within sectors. Careers in asset management feature higher and steeper pay profiles than those of employees in banking, insurance and non-finance, yet this career premium cannot be explained by higher risk. Labor market entry responds positively to career premia in asset management and high-tech, and these sectors are regarded as substitutes by potential entrants, consistently with high-tech competing with asset management in attracting talent.
Using the pandemic as a laboratory, we show that asset markets assign a time- varying price to firms' disaster risk exposure. In 2020 the cross-section of realized and expected stock returns reflected firms' different exposure to the pandemic, as measured by their vulnerability to social distancing. Realized and expected return differentials initially widened and then narrowed, but disaster exposure still commanded a risk premium in December 2020. When inferred from market outcomes, resilience correlates not only with social distancing, but also with cash and environmental ratings. However, vulnerability to social distancing is the only characteristic that identifies persistently scarred firms.
We investigate whether government credit guarantee schemes, extensively used at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, led to substitution of non-guaranteed with guaranteed credit rather than fully adding to the supply of lending. We study this issue using a unique euro-area credit register data, matched with supervisory bank data, and establish two main findings. First, guaranteed loans were mostly extended to small but comparatively creditworthy firms in sectors severely affected by the pandemic, borrowing from large, liquid and well-capitalized banks. Second, guaranteed loans partially substitute pre-existing non-guaranteed debt. For firms borrowing from multiple banks, the substitution mainly arises from the lending behavior of the bank extending guaranteed loans. Substitution was highest for funding granted to riskier and smaller firms in sectors more affected by the pandemic, and borrowing from larger and stronger banks. Overall, the evidence indicates that government guarantees contributed to the continued extension of credit to relatively creditworthy firms hit by the pandemic, but also benefited banks’ balance sheets to some extent.
The US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) led to a drastic reduction in the corporate tax and improved the treatment of C corporations compared to S corporations. We study the differential effect of the TCJA on these types of corporations using key economic variables of US banks, such as the number of employees, average salaries and benefits, profit/loss before taxes, and net income. Our analysis suggests that the TCJA increased the net-of-tax profits of C corporation banks compared to S corporations and, to a lesser extent, their pre-tax profits. At the same time, the reform triggered no significantly differential effect on the employment and average wages.
Historically Central Bank Independence (CBI) was anything but the norm. CBI seems to contradict core principles of democracy. Most economists were also against CBI. After the Great Inflation of the 1970ies many empirical studies demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between the degree of CBI and the rate of inflation. In 1990 most major countries had endowed their central bank with the status of independence. Overburdening with elevated expectations and additional competences are threatening the reputation of central banks and undermining the case for CBI.
COVID-19 brought about a shift in entrepreneurial opportunities and in the United States. In this paper, we proxy entrepreneurial processes by examining housing prices in different regions of the United States. Housing prices capture the movement in people, tax dynamics, and behavioral preferences for equity ownership in different regions and over time, all of which were drastically impacted by COVID-19. We examine all U.S. equity crowdfunding offerings starting with the very first offerings in 2016 Q2 until 2021 Q1 based on data from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The data indicate that regional housing prices post-COVID-19 are a strong predictor of the number of equity crowdfunding campaigns and the amount of capital raised. The impact of housing price changes on crowdfunding is more pronounced among more prosperous regions. The housing price effect is robust to numerous controls and consideration of outliers.
Leveraging data from a leading FinTech peer-to-peer lending platform in the United States, allowing us to capture both individuals’ successful and unsuccessful loan applications, we test the effect of FinTech loans on subsequent employment choice and future financial performance of serial borrowers, those repeatedly soliciting loans on the platform. An analysis of 198,984 loan requests made by 92,382 individuals shows that a failed loan application increases the probability of switching employment status. Self-employed individuals are 22% more likely to switch to becoming an employee following an unsuccessful loan application. This probability increases to 31% for those in the lowest income decile and decreases to 13% for those in the highest income decile. We document an improvement in monthly income and credit access following a successful loan application. However, this enhancement is asymmetric. Monthly income enhancement is 3.11 times larger for self-employed individuals in the lowest income decile relative to individuals in the highest income decile. Access to credit enhancement is 1.85 times larger for self-employed individuals in the lowest credit access decile relative to individuals in the second highest credit access decile.
We consider whether traders are more likely to commit securities violations when trading at home, a new form of working induced by the Covid pandemic. We examine data pre- and post-Covid, during which some traders were unexpectedly forced to work at home. The data indicate the presence of both a treatment and a selection effect, where work at home exhibits fewer misconduct cases. Work at home is associated with fewer cases of trading misconduct, although no difference in communications misconduct. The economic significance of working from home on trading misconduct is large for both the treatment and selection effects.