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We study the role of various trader types in providing liquidity in spot and futures markets based on complete order-book and transactions data as well as cross-market trader identifiers from the National Stock Exchange of India for a single large stock. During normal times, short-term traders who carry little inventory overnight are the primary intermediaries in both spot and futures markets, and changes in futures prices Granger-cause changes in spot prices. However, during two days of fast crashes, Granger-causality ran both ways. Both crashes were due to large-scale selling by foreign institutional investors in the spot market. Buying by short-term traders and cross-market traders was insufficient to stop the crashes. Mutual funds, patient traders with better trade-execution quality who were initially slow to move in, eventually bought sufficient quantities leading to price recovery in both markets. Our findings suggest that market stability requires the presence of well-capitalized standby liquidity providers.
An important assumption underlying the designation of some insurers as systemically important is that their overlapping portfolio holdings can result in common selling. We measure the overlap in holdings using cosine similarity, and show that insurers with more similar portfolios have larger subsequent common sales. This relationship can be magnified for some insurers when they are regulatory capital constrained or markets are under stress. When faced with an exogenous liquidity shock, insurers with greater portfolio similarity have even larger common sales that impact prices. Our measure can be used by regulators to predict which institutions may contribute most to financial instability through the asset liquidation channel of risk transmission.
This paper investigates inertia within and across banks in retail deposit markets using detailed panel data on consumer choices and account characteristics. In a structural choice model, I find that costs of inertia are around one third higher for switching accounts across compared to switching within banks. Observable proxies of bank-level switching costs (number and type of additional financial products) explain most of this cost premium, while online banking usage reduces inertia. Consistent with theory, I provide evidence that banks incorporate inertia in their pricing as older accounts pay lower rates than comparable newer accounts. Counterfactual policies reducing inertia shift market share to more competitive smaller banks, but only eliminating inertia within banks already results in high potential gains in consumer surplus. This suggests that facilitating bank switching alone might be insufficient to improve consumer choices.
In recent years European financial regulation has experienced a tremendous reorientation with respect to the shadow banking system, which manifested first and foremost in its reframing as market-based finance. Initially identified as a source of systemic risk certain initiatives did not only fall much behind the envisaged changes but all to the contrary have been substantially modified in a way that they now aim at revitalizing these activities. The reorientation of European regulatory agency on shadow banking post-crisis, from curtailing it to facilitating resilient market-based finance, has been a cause for irritation by academic observers, dismissed by some as mere rebranding or taken as a sign of regulatory capture. All to the contrary, this paper documents the central role of regulatory agency in shadow banking’s reconfiguration. It does so by analyzing the European initiatives concerning the regulation of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and another prime example of shadow banking, Money Market Mutual Funds (MMFs). Based on documentary analysis and expert interviews we trace the way the recently published EU frameworks for MMFs and ABCP have been designed (in particular the STS, CRR and MMF regulation in 2017). Furthermore, we show how they have been transformed in such a way that their final versions allow to re-establish the shadow banking chain linking MMFs, the ABCP market and arguably the regular banking system. This transformation is driven by a new form of pro-active European regulatory agency which aims at creating a regulatory infrastructure able to sustain the orderly flow of real economy debt. Far from being captured by the industry, they did so consciously and in cooperation with private actors in order to maintain a channel for credit creation outside of bank credit, a task made more complicated by the rushed politicized final negotiations coupled with technical complexity. This paper thereby contributes to a new strand of literature, seeing the creation and reconfiguration of the shadow banking system as characterized by the active and conscious role of state actors.
We propose a unified framework to measure the effects of different reforms of the pension system on retirement ages and macroeconomic indicators in the face of demographic change. A rich overlapping generations (OLG) model is built and endogenous retirement decisions are explicitly modeled within a public pension system. Heterogeneity with respect to consumption preferences, wage profiles, and survival rates is embedded in the model. Besides the expected direct effects of these reforms on the behavior of households, we observe that feedback effects do occur. Results suggest that individual retirement decisions are strongly influenced by numerous incentives produced by the pension system and macroeconomic variables, such as the statutory eligibility age, adjustment rates, the presence of a replacement rate, and interest rates. Those decisions, in turn, have several impacts on the macro-economy which can create feedback cycles working through equilibrium effects on interest rates and wages. Taken together, these reform scenarios have strong implications for the sustainability of pension systems. Because of the rich nature of our unified model framework, we are able to rank the reform proposals according to several individual and macroeconomic measures, thereby providing important support for policy recommendations on pension systems.
The paper investigates the determinants of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle by allowing linkages across asset returns. The first contribution of the paper is to show that portfolios sorted by increasing indegree computed on the network based on Granger causality test have lower expected returns, not related to idiosyncratic volatility. Secondly, empirical evidence indicates that stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility have the lower exposition on the indegree risk factor.
We examine how a firms' investment behavior affects the investment of a neighboring firm. Economic theory yields ambiguous predictions regarding the direction of firm peer effects and consistent with earlier work, we find that firms display similar investment behavior within an area using OLS analysis. Exploiting time-variation in the rise of U.S. states' corporate income taxes and utilizing heterogeneity in firms' exposure to increases in corporate income tax rates, we identify the causal impact of local firms' investments. Using this as an instrumental variable in a 2SLS estimation, we find that an increases in local firms' investment reduces the investment of a local peer firm. This effect is more pronounced if local competition among firms is stronger and supports theories that firm investments are strategic substitutes due to competition.
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to study how active client involvement affects advisor recommendations and portfolio outcomes. We find that advisors confronted with acquiescent clients stick to their standards and recommend expensive but well diversified mutual fund portfolios. However, if clients take an active role in the meetings, advisors deviate markedly from their standards, resulting in poorer portfolio diversification and lower Sharpe ratios. Our findings that advisors cater to client requests parallel the phenomenon of doctors prescribing antibiotics to insistent patients even if inappropriate, and imply that pandering diminishes the quality of advice.
This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent's action has persistent effects. We model general information environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. The martingale property of this performance metric captures the information benefit of deferral. Costs of deferral may result from both the agent's relative impatience as well as her consumption smoothing needs. If the relatively impatient agent is risk neutral, optimal contracts take a simple form in that they only reward maximal performance for at most two payout dates. If the agent is additionally risk-averse, optimal contracts stipulate rewards for a larger selection of dates and performance states: The performance hurdle to obtain the same level of compensation is increasing over time whereas the pay-performance sensitivity is declining.
SAFE Newsletter : 2018, Q3
(2018)