Refine
Year of publication
- 2014 (62) (remove)
Document Type
- Report (62) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (62)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (62) (remove)
Keywords
- USA (14)
- Russland (10)
- Ukraine (10)
- Krim (9)
- Putin (8)
- NSA (5)
- Cyber Security (4)
- Deutschland (4)
- EU (4)
- Europa (4)
Institute
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (62) (remove)
Nach dem umstrittenen Referendum in derOstukraine wird wieder über schärfereWirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland gestritten. ImZentrum der Auseinandersetzung zwischenBefürwortern und Kritikern von Wirtschaftssanktionen steht die Frage: Wieerfolgversprechend sind Sanktionen, das Verhalten Russlands zu ändern?Aber das ist die falsche Frage! Ihr liegt das Missverständnis zugrunde, dassSanktionen in erster Linie den Zweck haben, einen Übeltäter zu bestrafenund ihn dazu zu zwingen, von seinem Tun abzulassen. Zwei Dinge werdenhier verwechselt: Sanktionen und Zwangsdiplomatie...
Freiburg School of Law and Economics, Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition and the Genesis of Norms
(2014)
The paper analyzes the parallels and differences between the Freiburg School of Law and Economics represented by the works of Eucken (and Röpke) and the Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition represented by the works of Hayek and Vanberg. The parallels are illustrated by making use of the constitutional economics concepts Ordnungspolitik (i.e., order of rules/choices over rules) as well as freedom of privileges and discrimination. The differences, which have received surprisingly little attention, include the following aspects: 1. philosophy of science and epistemology, 2. genesis of norms, and 3. political philosophy. The paper tackles these issues in three steps. The second chapter presents Vanberg’s constitutional economics theory with special emphasis on the concepts of citizen sovereignty and normative individualism. The third chapter reviews the ordoliberal concepts of science and the state which are – to a certain degree – elitist and expertocratic, that is, they rely to a considerable degree on intellectual experts (in particular, scientists) being part of the societal elite. The fourth chapter differentiates two kinds of genesis of norms: an evolutionary one and an elitist-expertocratic one allowing for a differentiation between Eucken’s and Röpke’s Ordoliberalism on the on the hand and Vanberg’s Hayekian -- and Buchanan-style constitutional economics approach on the other hand. The paper ends with a summary of the main findings.