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Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
During the last years the relationship between financial development and economic growth has received widespread attention in the literature on growth and development. This paper summarises in its first part the results of this research, stressing the growth-enhancing effects of an increased interpersonal re-allocation of resources promoted by financial development. The second part of the paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial development based on Diamond's theory of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. The analysis shows that the quality of corporate governance of banks is the key factor in financial system development. Accordingly, financial sector reforms in developing countries will only succeed if they strengthen the corporate governance of financial institutions. In this area, financial institution building has an important contribution to make. Paper presented at the First Annual Seminar on New Development Finance held at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, September 22 - October 3, 1997
Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale Aspekte der Theorie und Empirie der Managementkontrolle bei asymmetrischer Information. Ziel ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der unlängst vorgetragenen These zu den Mythen der Unternehmenskontrolle (Martin Hellwig 1997). Der aktuelle Überblick wird entwickelt vor dem Hintergrund der Gutenberg’schen Position eines eigenständigen Unternehmensinteresses, losgelöst von den Interessen der shareholder oder anderer stakeholder. Diese Position von Gutenberg verbindet sich im dritten Band der „Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen“ von 1969 mit der Forderung nach Einhaltung eines sog. finanziellen Gleichgewichts. Erst in jüngster Zeit werden auch kapitalmarkttheoretisch fundierte Modelle entwickelt, die auch Raum bieten für eine Autonomie des Managements gegenüber dessen stakeholders.
Our study provides evidence on the share price reactions to the announcement of equity issues in Germany, where capital market is characterized by institutional features distinct from the U.S. market. German seasoned equity issues yield a positive market reaction which contrasts to the significant negative abnormal returns reported for the U.S. We provide evidence that these results are due to differences in both issuing characteristics and floatation methods, and in the corporate governance and ownership structures of the two countries. Our study explains much of the empirical puzzle of different market reactions to seemingly similar events across financial markets.
Untersuchungsgegenstand ist der empirische Gehalt der ökonomischen Theorie eines Hedgings auf Unternehmensebene. In den USA wurde die Hedging-Theorie in einer Reihe von empirischen Studien aufgegriffen. Die Befunde sind zumeist konsistent mit dem Erklärungsansatz von Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), wonach eine Verringerung der Cashflow-Volatilität – unter der Annahme steigender Außenfinanzierungskosten – zu einer Reduzierung von Unterinvestitionskosten führt. Bei deutschen Unternehmen besitzt dieser Ansatz bemerkenswerterweise jedoch nur einen geringen Erklärungsgehalt. Die Ergebnisunterschiede können auf unterschiedliche Kapitalmarktverhältnisse zurückgeführt werden: Die unterstellten steigenden Kosten der Außenfinanzierung besitzen für deutsche Unternehmen aufgrund der Dominanz des Bezugsrechtsverfahrens sowie der Rolle der Hausbank als Mechanismus zur Überwindung von Informationsproblemen eine vergleichsweise geringere Bedeutung. Die Managerinteressen erweisen sich bei deutschen Unternehmen als eine wesentliche Hedging-Determinante. Zwischen der Höhe des gebundenen Managervermögens und der Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht entsprechend der Hedging-Theorie ein signifikanter positiver Zusammenhang. Entgegen den amerikanischen Befunden kann jedoch eine disziplinierende Wirkung von Großaktionären auf die Hedging-Entscheidung nicht beobachtet werden. Zur Berücksichtigung der spezifischen deutschen Kapitalmarktverhältnisse wird der Einfluss von Bankenbeteiligungen und Familienunternehmen auf die Hedging-Entscheidung untersucht. Ein Bankeneinfluss auf die Derivateeinsatz-Entscheidung kann jedoch nicht festgestellt werden. Entgegen Diversifikations- und Kapitalmarktüberlegungen besteht bei Familienunternehmen interessanterweise eine signifikant geringere Hedging-Wahrscheinlichkeit.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
Wenn man untersuchen möchte, ob sich die Finanzsysteme verschiedener Länder im Verlauf der letzten Jahre aneinander angeglichen haben oder demnächst angleichen werden, braucht man ein Konzept zur Beschreibung von Finanzsystemen, durch das wesentliche Strukturen, deren Unterschiede und Veränderungen erkennbar werden, ohne dabei in "Systemgeschwafel" (D. Schneider) abzugleiten. Wir haben dafür das Konzept der Komplementarität als nützlich identifiziert. Der Beitrag stellt dieses Konzept vor und soll und seine Eignung belegen. Letztlich geht es dabei auch um die Frage, ob reale Finanzsysteme konsistente Systeme mit komplementären Elementen darstellen. Nach der Vorstellung der formalen Konzepte der Komplementarität und der Konsistenz wird "das Finanzsystem" auf seine Komple mentarität untersucht. Dazu wird ein Finanzsystem aus der Sicht von Unternehmen des nichtfinanziellen Sektors als ein System gekennzeichnet, das aus drei Teilsystemen besteht. Das erste Teilsystem ist das Finanzierungssystem einschließlich Finanzsektor und Mustern der Unternehmensfinanzierung, das zweite das Corporate Governance-System und das dritte das Unternehmens-Strategie-System. Für alle drei Teilsysteme wird – allgemein und mit Bezug auf die Finanzsysteme Deutschlands, Japans und der USA - gezeigt, inwieweit die Elemente der betreffenden Teilsysteme untereinander komplementär sind, und geprüft, ob sie in ihren Ausprägungen auch konsistent sind, d.h. wirklich "zueinander passen". Untersucht wird auch die Komplementarität und Konsistenz zwischen den Teilsystemen selbst. Der Beitrag endet mit Überlegungen über die Anwendung des Komplementaritätskonzepts. Dass ein Finanzsystem die Eigenschaft der Komplementarität aufweist, hat nicht nur weitreichende Implikationen für die Methodik der Analyse von Finanzsystemen, sondern auch für die Vorhersehbarkeit der Entwicklung von Finanzsystemen und damit für die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Konvergenz von Finanzsystemen, für deren Effizienzeigenschaften und für die Möglichkeiten, Finanzsysteme durch gestaltende Eingriffe zu verbessern.
Financial development and financial institution building are important prerequisites for economic growth. However, both the potential and the problems of institution building are still vastly underestimated by those who design and fund institution building projects. The paper first underlines the importance of financial development for economic growth, then describes the main elements of “serious” institution building: the lending technology, the methodological approaches, and the question of internal structure and corporate governance. Finally, it discusses three problems which institution building efforts have to cope with: inappropriate expectations on the part of donor and partner institutions regarding the problems and effects of institution building efforts, the lack of awareness of the importance of governance and ownership issues, and financial regulation that is too restrictive for microfinance operations. All three problems together explain why there are so few successful micro and small business institutions operating worldwide.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that therefore financial patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by Mayer et al. are due to a hidden assumption underlying their methodology. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way.
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.