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Helmut Schlesinger: Wegbereiter und Garant der deutschen Geld- und Stabilitätspolitik wird 100
(2024)
Am 4. September 2024 vollendet Professor Dr. Helmut Schlesinger sein 100. Lebensjahr. Von 1991 bis 1993 bekleidete er das Amt des Präsidenten der Deutschen Bundesbank. Zuvor war er in verschiedenen Positionen für die Bank tätig, unter anderem als langjähriger Vizepräsident (von 1980 bis 1991) sowie als Leiter der Hauptabteilung Volkswirtschaft und Statistik. Das Jubiläum bietet Anlass, sein Lebenswerk zu beschreiben und zu würdigen. Für ehemalige Mitarbeiter war Helmut Schlesinger ein großes Vorbild und eine Quelle des Ansporns in vielerlei Hinsicht. Insbesondere vier Bereiche seiner Tätigkeiten haben die Arbeit seiner Mitarbeiter maßgeblich geprägt: Erstens seine Fähigkeit, ökonomisches Denken als eine Synthese aus Analyse und Statistik zu begreifen, zu vermitteln und zu organisieren, zweitens sein Verdienst, eine Stabilitätskultur in leitenden Positionen mitgeschaffen und bewahrt zu haben, drittens sein ordnungspolitisches Credo zur Preisstabilität und zur Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank sowie viertens seine klaren Vorstellungen zu den Bedingungen einer erfolgreichen Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion.
Im Folgenden soll ein Überblick über diese vier Schwerpunkte seiner Schaffensbilanz gegeben werden. In diesem Kontext ist insbesondere Schlesingers entscheidende Rolle bei der Schaffung der deutsch-deutschen Währungsunion 1990 sowie beim langjährigen Entstehungsprozess des Eurosystems und der Europäischen Zentralbank hervorzuheben. In der deutschen Bevölkerung, aber auch international hoch geachtet, wurde Helmut Schlesinger oft als die "Seele der Bundesbank" bezeichnet.Die Anforderungen, die er an jeden Einzelnen stellte, waren hoch. Er wurde von den Mitarbeitern sehr geschätzt, nicht zuletzt aufgrund seines großen Arbeitsethos und seiner unermüdlichen Schaffenskraft, die von Beständigkeit, Gradlinigkeit und Prinzipientreue geprägt waren.
I provide a solution method in the frequency domain for multivariate linear rational expectations models. The method works with the generalized Schur decomposition, providing a numerical implementation of the underlying analytic function solution methods suitable for standard DSGE estimation and analysis procedures. This approach generalizes the time-domain restriction of autoregressive-moving average exogenous driving forces to arbitrary covariance stationary processes. Applied to the standard New Keynesian model, I find that a Bayesian analysis favors a single parameter log harmonic function of the lag operator over the usual AR(1) assumption as it generates humped shaped autocorrelation patterns more consistent with the data.
The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
Cross-predictability denotes the fact that some assets can predict other assets' returns. I propose a novel performance-based measure that disentangles the economic value of cross-predictability into two components: the predictive power of one asset's signal for other assets' returns (cross-predictive signals) and the amount of an asset's return explained by other assets' signals (cross-predicted returns). Empirically, the latter component dominates the former in the overall cross-prediction effects. In the crosssection, cross-predictability gravitates towards small firms that are strongly mispriced and difficult to arbitrage, while it becomes more difficult to cross-predict returns when market capitalization and book-to-market ratio rise.
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between firm leverage and risktaking. We embed the traditional agency problem of asset substitution within a multi-period model, revealing a U-shaped relationship between leverage and risktaking, evident in data from both the U.S. and Europe. Firms with medium leverage avoid risk to preserve the option of issuing safe debt in the future. This option is valuable because safe debt does not incur the expected cost of bankruptcy, anticipated by debt-holders due to future risk-taking incentives. Our model offers new insights on the interaction between companies' debt financing and their risk profiles.
We use a structural VAR model to study the German natural gas market and investigate the impact of the 2022 Russian supply stop on the German economy. Combining conventional and narrative sign restrictions, we find that gas supply and demand shocks have large and persistent price effects, while output effects tend to be moderate. The 2022 natural gas price spike was driven by adverse supply
shocks and positive storage demand shocks, as Germany filled its inventories before the winter. Counterfactual simulations of an embargo on natural gas imports from Russia indicate similar positive price and negative output effects compared to what we observe in the data.
Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects perceive the same game. Moreover, game perceptions depend not only on the game itself but also on the order of games (i.e., the broader experimental context in which the game is embedded) and the subject herself. This highlights that the control of experiments does not necessarily extend to game perceptions. The paper also demonstrates that perceptions are correlated with game behavior and moderate the relationship between game behavior and field behavior, thereby underscoring the importance and relevance of game perceptions for economic research.
This paper shows that support for climate action is high across survey participants from all EU countries in three dimensions: (1) Participants are willing to contribute personally to combating climate change, (2) they approve of pro-climate social norms, and (3) they demand government action. In addition, there is a significant perception gap where individuals underestimate others' willingness to contribute to climate action by over 10 percentage points, influencing their own willingness to act. Policymakers should recognize the broad support for climate action among European citizens and communicate this effectively to counteract the vocal minority opposed to it.
In recent decades, biodiversity has declined significantly, threatening ecosystem services that are vital to society and the economy. Despite the growing recognition of biodiversity risks, the private sector response remains limited, leaving a significant financing gap. The paper therefore describes market-based solutions to bridge the financing gap, which can follow a risk assessment approach and an impact-oriented perspective. Key obstacles to mobilising private capital for biodiversity conservation are related to pricing biodiversity due to its local dimension, the lack of standardized metrics for valuation and still insufficient data reporting by companies hindering informed investment decisions. Financing biodiversity projects poses another challenge, mainly due to a mismatch between investor needs and available projects, for example in terms of project timeframes and their additionality.