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A memory checker for a data structure provides a method to check that the output of the data structure operations is consistent with the input even if the data is stored on some insecure medium. In [8] we present a general solution for all data structures that are based on insert(i,v) and delete(j) commands. In particular this includes stacks, queues, deques (double-ended queues) and lists. Here, we describe more time and space efficient solutions for stacks, queues and deques. Each algorithm takes only a single function evaluation of a pseudorandomlike function like DES or a collision-free hash function like MD5 or SHA for each push/pop resp. enqueue/dequeue command making our methods applicable to smart cards.
We present efficient non-malleable commitment schemes based on standard assumptions such as RSA and Discrete-Log, and under the condition that the network provides publicly available RSA or Discrete-Log parameters generated by a trusted party. Our protocols require only three rounds and a few modular exponentiations. We also discuss the difference between the notion of non-malleable commitment schemes used by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00] and the one given by Di Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [DIO98].
We address to the problem to factor a large composite number by lattice reduction algorithms. Schnorr has shown that under a reasonable number theoretic assumptions this problem can be reduced to a simultaneous diophantine approximation problem. The latter in turn can be solved by finding sufficiently many l_1--short vectors in a suitably defined lattice. Using lattice basis reduction algorithms Schnorr and Euchner applied Schnorrs reduction technique to 40--bit long integers. Their implementation needed several hours to compute a 5% fraction of the solution, i.e., 6 out of 125 congruences which are necessary to factorize the composite. In this report we describe a more efficient implementation using stronger lattice basis reduction techniques incorporating ideas of Schnorr, Hoerner and Ritter. For 60--bit long integers our algorithm yields a complete factorization in less than 3 hours.
Based on the quadratic residuosity assumption we present a non-interactive crypto-computing protocol for the greater-than function, i.e., a non-interactive procedure between two parties such that only the relation of the parties' inputs is revealed. In comparison to previous solutions our protocol reduces the number of modular multiplications significantly. We also discuss applications to conditional oblivious transfer, private bidding and the millionaires' problem.
We propose a new security measure for commitment protocols, called Universally Composable (UC) Commitment. The measure guarantees that commitment protocols behave like an \ideal commitment service," even when concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of protocols. This is a strong guarantee: it implies that security is maintained even when an unbounded number of copies of the scheme are running concurrently, it implies non-malleability (not only with respect to other copies of the same protocol but even with respect to other protocols), it provides resilience to selective decommitment, and more. Unfortunately two-party uc commitment protocols do not exist in the plain model. However, we construct two-party uc commitment protocols, based on general complexity assumptions, in the common reference string model where all parties have access to a common string taken from a predetermined distribution. The protocols are non-interactive, in the sense that both the commitment and the opening phases consist of a single message from the committer to the receiver.
We review the representation problem based on factoring and show that this problem gives rise to alternative solutions to a lot of cryptographic protocols in the literature. And, while the solutions so far usually either rely on the RSA problem or the intractability of factoring integers of a special form (e.g., Blum integers), the solutions here work with the most general factoring assumption. Protocols we discuss include identification schemes secure against parallel attacks, secure signatures, blind signatures and (non-malleable) commitments.
Die Arbeitsgruppe für Chemie und Physik der Atmosphäre am Institut für Meteorologie und Geophysik der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt befasst sich unter anderem mit der Entwicklung einer Continous Flow Diffusion Chamber zur Erfassung und Klassifikation von CCN und IN. Diese Partikel besitzen eine Größe im Mikrometerbereich und sind somit nicht leicht zu erfassen und zu unterscheiden. Bei vergleichbaren Versuchen beschränkte sich bisher die automatische Auswertung auf die Anzahl der Partikel. Es gibt noch kein Verfahren, welches eine Klassifikation in CCN und IN videobasiert vornehmen kann. Es lag ebenfalls kein reales Bildmaterial vor, welches zu Testzwecken für die Klassifikation geeignet gewesen wäre. Basierend auf den physikalischen und meteorologischen Grundlagen wurde mittels Raytracing ein künstlicher Bilddatensatz mit kleinen Eiskristallen und Wassertröpfchen unter verschiedenen Betrachtungsverhältnissen erstellt. Anhand dieses Bilddatensatzes wurde dann ein Verfahren zur Klassifikation entwickelt und prototypisch implementiert, welches dies mittels Methoden aus der graphischen Datenverarbeitung und durch Berechnung der Momente vornimmt. Es war notwendig, Verfahren aus der Kameratechnik zu betrachten, die später in der realen Anwendung mit sehr kurzzeitiger Belichtung, geeigneter Optik und hochauflösender CCD-Kamera detaillierte Bilder von Objekten in der Größe von einigen 10µm liefern können.
We show that non-interactive statistically-secret bit commitment cannot be constructed from arbitrary black-box one-to-one trapdoor functions and thus from general public-key cryptosystems. Reducing the problems of non-interactive crypto-computing, rerandomizable encryption, and non-interactive statistically-sender-private oblivious transfer and low-communication private information retrieval to such commitment schemes, it follows that these primitives are neither constructible from one-to-one trapdoor functions and public-key encryption in general. Furthermore, our separation sheds some light on statistical zeroknowledge proofs. There is an oracle relative to which one-to-one trapdoor functions and one-way permutations exist, while the class of promise problems with statistical zero-knowledge proofs collapses in P. This indicates that nontrivial problems with statistical zero-knowledge proofs require more than (trapdoor) one-wayness.
We show lower bounds for the signature size of incremental schemes which are secure against substitution attacks and support single block replacement. We prove that for documents of n blocks such schemes produce signatures of \Omega(n^(1/(2+c))) bits for any constant c>0. For schemes accessing only a single block resp. a constant number of blocks for each replacement this bound can be raised to \Omega(n) resp. \Omega(sqrt(n)). Additionally, we show that our technique yields a new lower bound for memory checkers.