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Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg lecture has been exposed by some learned voices of 'the Muslim world' as alluding, by the means of one particular quotation, to age-old stereotypes about Islam being an essentially violent creed in which moderation through reason has no legitimate place, and of representing Muhammadas an evil and inhuman man who preached that Islam should be spread by the sword. While none of these presumably 'Muslim' voices deny that the Pope has the right to express his opinions, even when they are plainly wrong in the face of historic facts that show how Islam and Christianity were spread (or were made to spread) across the world, he is criticised for a host of omissions in terms of intellectual honesty and factual accuracy. These omissions, it is argued here, cast an unfortunate light on the compatibility of scientific and religious rationality much advocated by the Pope in his 12 September 2006 lecture. This flagrant 'performative contradiction' (Habermas) leaves room for speculation about the true aim of the speech. Is Benedict XVI's appeal to theology as a legitimate academic discipline a credible attempt to explicate Roman Catholicism's rightful place in a modern world governed by liberal democracy and ethical-political pluralism, or is it a reflection of a move to restore the age-old, intolerant, anti-scientific, and anti-democratic legacy of the pre-Vatican II Catholic Church?
In this essay, one of the most serious problems highlighted with respect to contemporary Iranians, who are mostly known as Shi‘ite-Perso (Shi‘ite-Persian) citizens of Iran, and what their view toward abusing wine and opium is. On one hand, the wealthy Persian literature is full of poems, narrations and notes with reference to wine and opium, while on the other hand, many parts of Shi‘ite-Islamic thought deem wine unclean and illegal, and abusing opium is forbidden except under certain [hard-fulfilling] conditions. Hereby, in this essay the aim is to express why the question “are drinking wine and abusing opium known as addiction or literal culture?” is suspended throughout the young Iranian generation. In this regard, the standpoints of Persian poets and Iranian religious figures towards wine and opium will be considered.
Die Dissertation stellt das Machtgeflecht in der Islamischen Stadt Marawi City (Mindanao, Philippinen) dar, in die die dortigen Gender-Debatten involviert sind. In einer Umgebung, die als Konsequenz des Mindanao Konfliktes als “no war, no peace”-Umgebung definiert werden kann, gibt es drei Hauptdarsteller: die nationale Regierung des mehrheitlich christlichen Staates der Philippinen (GRP), die Autonome Regierung im Muslimischen Mindanao (ARMM), zu der auch Marawi City zählt, und die islamische Rebellengruppe Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), die einen islamischen (unter-)Staat fordert. Die GRP unterstützt Re-Islamisierungs- und Re-Traditionalisierungsbewegungen in der ARMM, um die Opposition zur MILF zu stärken. Die Konsequenz ist jedoch keine Kollaboration zwischen der GRP und der ARMM. Stattdessen nutzen Politiker ihre Privilegien aus, um ihren eigenen Absichten zu folgen. Sei dies, um politische Gegner auszuspielen oder das traditionelle Sultanatssystem zu fördern. Für Gender-Debatten gibt es in diesem Kontext der ungelösten nationalen Frage kaum Spielraum außerhalb einer Islamischen Narrative; dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Gender nicht debattiert wird, sondern, dass die Debatten inner-Islamisch sind, hauptsächlich zwischen Repräsentanten des traditionell synkretistischen Islam und Vertretern Islamischer Revitalisierungsbewegungen. Speziell erstere erscheinen sehr einflussreich bezüglich Gender Strategien in der Region. Dies ist nur teilweise auf die Unterstützung der nationalen Regierung zurückzuführen, sondern ist vor allem eine Frage von Identität. Diese wiederum wird nicht vorranging über Religion, sondern nach ethnischen Maßstäben und im Speziellen im Rahmen von Clanstrukturen definiert.
From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.