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On the basis of the economic theory of network effects, this article provides a novel explanation of the so-called patent paradox, i.e. the question why the propensity to patent is so strong when the expected average value of most patents is low. It demonstrates that the patent system of a country resembles a telephone network or a social media platform. Patents are perceived as nodes in a virtual network that, as a whole, exhibits network effects. It is explained why patents are not independent of other patents but that they complement each other in several ways both within and beyond markets and fields of technology, and that patents thus create synchronization value over and above individual interests of patent holders in exclusivity. As a consequence, the more patents there are, the more valuable it is to also seek patents, and vice versa. Since patents thus display increasing returns to adoption, the willingness to pay for the next patent slopes upwards. This explains why, after a phase of early instability and a certain tipping point, many countries’ patent systems expanded quickly and eventually became a rigid standard (“lock-in”). The concluding section raises the question what regulatory measures are suitable to effectively address the ensuing anticommons effects.
The long-standing battle between economic nationalism and globalism has again taken center stage in geopolitics. This article applies this dichotomy to the law and policy of international intellectual property (IP). Most commentators see IP as a prime example of globalization. The article challenges this view on several levels. In a nutshell, it claims that economic nationalist concerns about domestic industries and economic development lie at the heart of the global IP system. To support this argument, the article summarizes and categorizes IP policies adopted by selected European countries, the European Union, and the U.S. Section I presents three types of inbound IP policies that aim to foster local economic development and innovation. Section II adds three versions of outbound IP policies that, in contrast, target foreign countries and markets. Concluding section III traces a dialectic virtuous circle of economic nationalist motives leading to global legal structures and identifies the function and legal structure of IP as the reason for the resilience and even dominance of economic nationalist motives in international IP politics. IP concerns exclusive private rights that are territorially limited creatures of (supra-)national statutes. These legal structures make up the economic nationalist DNA of IP.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
Do current levels of bank capital in Europe suffice to support a swift recovery from the COVID-19 crisis? Recent research shows that a well-capitalized banking sector is a major factor driving the speed and breadth of recoveries from economic downturns. In particular, loan supply is negatively affected by low levels of capital. We estimate a capital shortfall in European banks of up to 600 billion euro in a severe scenario, and around 143 billion euro in a moderate scenario. We propose a precautionary recapitalization on the European level that puts the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) center stage. This proposal would cut through the sovereign-bank nexus, safeguard financial stability, and position the Eurozone for a quick recovery from the pandemic.
The article is designed to introduce and analyze authoritarian constitutionalism as an important phenomenon in its own right, not merely a deficient or deviant version of liberal constitutionalism. Therefore it is not adequate to dismiss it as sham or window-dressing. Instead, its crucial features – participation as complicity, power as property and the cult of immediacy – are related to the basic assumption that authoritarian constitutions are texts with a purpose that warrant careful analysis of the domestic and transnational audience.
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
The EU Collective Redress Recommendation has invited Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms by 26 July 2015. The well-known reservations claim potentially abusive litigation and potential settlement of not well-founded claims resulting from controversial funding of cases by means of contingency fees and from ‘opt-out’ class action procedures. The paper posits that there may also be some fear that the European Commission may try to pursue the enforcement of its regulatory agenda in this way at the expense of individual claimants’ interests. Therefore a comparative analysis is carried out to see to what extent concerns about individual rights as opposed to regulatory goals are reflected in the different newly revised systems in place across Europe. As an iterim result the Dutch settlement procedure for mass damage claims, the English Group Litigation Order and the German test case procedure turn out to be relatively well-suited to deal with mass damage claims. At the same time, none of them can quite reach an optimal balance between individual rights and regulatory goals and therefore each of them is subject to criticism. That is why the further question is raised in how far these procedures could complement each other, thus contributing to the enforcement of individual rights without overregulating markets in Europe.
This paper reexamines the current legal landscape regarding the protection of trade marks and other industrial property rights in signs on the Internet. It is based on a comparative analysis of EU and national laws, in particular, German, U.S., and U.K. law. It starts with a short restatement of the principles governing trade mark conflicts that occur within a particular jurisdiction (part 2) and proceeds to the regulation of transnational disputes (part 3). This juxtaposition yields two basic approaches. Whereas trade mark conflicts within closed legal systems are generally adjudicated according to a binary either/or logic, transnational disputes are and should indeed be solved in a way that leads to a fair coexistence of conflicting trade mark laws and rights under multiple laws. This paper explains how geolocation technologies can alleviate the implementation of the principle of fair coexistence in concrete cases.
On 14 September 2016, the European Commission proposed a Directive on “copyright in the Digital Single Market”. This proposal includes an Article 11 on the “protection of press publications concerning digital uses”, according to which “Member States shall provide publishers of press publications with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC for the digital use of their press publications.” Relying on the experiences and debates surrounding the German and Spanish laws in this area, this study presents a legal analysis of the proposal for an EU related right for press publishers (RRPP). After a brief overview over the general limits of the EU competence to introduce such a new related right, the study critically examines the purpose of an RRPP. On this basis, the next section distinguishes three versions of an RRPP with regard to its subject-matter and scope, and considers the practical and legal implications of these alternatives, in particular having regard to fundamental rights.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Both are distinct sources of public international law (Art. 38(1)(b) and (c) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice). In a first step, I analyze the different meanings of principles as a “source” of international law. Second, I consider different approaches to principles as a norm type in legal theory. Third, I discuss attempts in international legal doctrine to facilitate conceptual issues by either unifying general principles as a source with the source of customary international law or by equating general principles as a source and as a norm type. Finally, I propose that the delimitation between customary international law and general principles of law as sources of international law should follow the distinction between situations dominated by factual reciprocity (which justify customary norms) and situations where such factual reciprocity is absent (which justify general principles). The jurisgenerative processes leading to the emergence of general principles of international law are processes of changing identities and argumentative self-entrapment.