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The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
Regulating IP exclusion/inclusion on a global scale: the example of copyright vs. AI training
(2024)
This article builds upon the literature on inclusion/inclusivity in IP law by applying these concepts to the example of the scraping and mining of copyright-protected content for the purpose of training an artificial intelligence (AI) system or model. Which mode of operation dominates in this technological area: exclusion, inclusion or even inclusivity? The features of AI training appear to call for universal and sustainable “inclusivity” instead of a mere voluntary “inclusion” of AI provider bots by copyright holders. As the overview on the copyright status of AI training activities in different jurisdictions and emerging laws on AI safety (such as the EU AI Act) demonstrates, the global regulatory landscape is, however, much too fragmented and dynamic to immediately jump to an inclusive global AI regime. For the time being, legally secure global AI training requires the voluntary cooperation between AI providers and copyright holders, and innovative techno-legal reasoning is needed on how to effectuate this inclusion.
The EU Commission proposed a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI) on 21 April 2021, which categorizes the use of AI in “social credit” as a prohibited application. This paper examines the definition and structure of the Social Credit System in China, which comprises various systems operating at different levels and sectors. The analysis focuses on two main subsystems: the database and one-stop inquiry platform for financial credit records, and the social governance tool designed to facilitate legal and political compliance. The development of the commercial customer credit reference is also explored. This paper further discusses the impacts and concerns associated with the implementation of the Chinese social credit system to raise awareness. The objective is to offer insights from the existing system and contribute to the ongoing discussion on regulating AI applications in social credit within the EU.
The Åland Islands archipelago enjoys a special international status sui generis, which essentially encompasses demilitarisation, neutralisation, and autonomy. This status is guaranteed under international law by the agreements of 1921, 1940, and 1947, which are still in force. Furthermore, there are convincing reasons to assume that the Åland Islands regime has grown into European customary law. By virtue of her international (treaty) obligations, Finland cannot unilaterally change this status under the present conditions, irrespective of domestic (constitutional) decisions. While integration into NATO’s collective defence system and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy structures is compatible with the special status of the Åland Islands, care must be taken by Finland and her partners to ensure that the obligations arising from these developments are fulfilled in accordance with the demilitarised and neutralised status of the archipelago. This includes that the use by Finnish troops for preventive defence, beyond the exceptions laid down in the 1921 Åland Agreement, is only permitted in the case (of threat) of an immediate and clearly identifiable attack.
The autonomous character of the Åland Islands was established under a League of Nations dispute settlement and implemented, inter alia, in Finnish legislation. Its essence even grew into customary law. The arrangements of 1921, however, do not constitute a bilateral treaty between Finland and Sweden. The UN assumes that the international mechanism to protect Åland’s autonomy did not become obsolete with the demise of the League of Nations, but was only “suspended until such time as an express decision has been taken by the United Nations to put it back into force”. A corresponding proposal could be submitted, in any case, both by Finland and/or Sweden or possibly even by any other UN member state, for discussion in the Sixth Committee. However, the final decision to re-activate this special mechanism would have to be adopted by the UN General Assembly.
EU Law applies to the Åland Islands in principle; however, Finland’s Accession Treaty to the EU to which Protocol No. 2 on the Åland Islands was annexed, established a number of specific rules which are still in force today. This, most notably, results in the limited application of value added tax and excise duties in the Åland Islands. Therefore, the rules on customs procedures apply with respect to the movement of goods to and from the Åland Islands. In addition, other provisions of Union law, in particular those relating to fundamental freedoms and European state aid law, may be relevant in view of the special fiscal status of the Åland Islands. However, assessing individual cases would require further information and in-depth studies. Irrespective of the requirements set out in the said Protocol, the EU is obliged to respect the national identity of Member States pursuant to Article 4 para. 2 TEU; this obligation includes respect for the special status of the Åland Islands under both international and Finnish constitutional law.
Eine finalisierte Fassung des Beitrags wird 2024 in einem von Burchard/Schmitt-Leonardy/Singelnstein/Zabel herausgegebenen Sammelband („Alternativen zum Strafrecht“) erscheinen.
Im Zentrum des Beitrags steht jedoch nicht der Versuch, positiv Alternativen zum oder im Strafrecht zu formulieren. Vielmehr ist der Begriff der Alternativlosigkeit erkenntnisleitend, konkret die Identifizierung gesellschaftlich-politischer Wirkmächte und innerstrafrechtlicher Deutungsmuster, die eine (auch) strafrechtliche Bewältigung der durch den menschengemachten Klimawandel aufgeworfenen Konflikte alternativlos erscheinen lassen können.
Dazu wird die jüngst aufgekommene Debatte um ein Klimaschutzstrafrecht aus einer zukunftssoziologischen und strafrechtswissenschaftlichen Perspektive analysiert. Im Zentrum des Beitrags steht die These, dass sich gerade die Verbindung von katastrophischen Zukunftsvorstellungen – hier erschlossen über den zukunftssoziologischen Schlüsselbegriff der Imagination und deskriptiv-analytisch als „Klimakatastrophismus“ bezeichnet – und Exzeptionalisierungen des Strafrechts als Treiber in die imaginative Sackgasse der Alternativlosigkeit erweist.
Die verdichtete Imagination, das die Zukunfts eine Katastrophe sei („Klimakatastrophismus“), befördert als ein an Boden gewinnendes kollektives Deutungsmuster eine intensivierte Sozialkontrolle und Punitivität.
Der kriminalpolitisch expansive Kurs einer mit radikalisierten Selbsterhaltungsfragen konfrontierten Gesellschaft scheint in gesellschaftlich wie dogmatisch tief verankerten Exzeptionalisierungen des Strafrechts – wie der Zuschreibung, (nur) strafwürdige Sozialschädlichkeit adressieren zu dürfen, dies aufgrund einer regulativen und expressiven Ausnahmestellung aber auch in besonderer Weise zu können (oder zu müssen) – durchaus Widerhall zu finden. Dadurch entsteht ein strafrechtsexpansives (weil rechtfertigendes) Momentum, das der ohnehin in der Herausbildung begriffenen Legalisierung eines Klimaschutzstrafrechts Vorschub leistet.
Es entspricht den vornehmen Aufgaben der Strafrechtswissenschaft, diesen Entwicklungen prospektiv vorauszugreifen, sie aufzuklären und kritisch zu wenden – gerade im Hinblick auf die Gegenläufigkeit und Brüchigkeit gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungen oder die Kontingenz eines als politisch gelesenen Strafrechts. Eine kritische Strafrechtswissenschaft darf sich dabei nicht allein, allemal nicht unreflektiert auf tradierte Formen der Strafrechtsbegrenzung zurückziehen.
Der deutsche und der europäische Gesetzgeber kodifizierten 2013 bzw. 2019 verwandte Schutzrechte zugunsten von Presseverlegern. 2021 und 2023 erließen Australien und Kanada Sondergesetze zum Schutz der Presse im Internet. In den USA und der Schweiz sind entsprechende Legislativvorhaben anhängig. Ultimatives Ziel all dieser Interventionen ist es, ein tragfähiges digitales Pressewesen zu
gewährleisten. Presseverlegern soll zu Einnahmen verholfen werden, die von Betreibern von Suchmaschinen, News-Aggregatoren, Medienbeobachtungsdiensten und sozialen Netzwerken bezahlt werden sollen. Der Beitrag unterscheidet in rechtsvergleichender Betrachtung zunächst zwei Typen der Presseförderung im Internetzeitalter, nämlich einen klassisch-eigentumsmäßigen Ansatz – paradigmatisch realisiert im deutschen Recht – und einen systemisch-marktregulativen, von medienpolitischen Erwägungen geleiteten Ansatz – paradigmatisch verwirklicht im australischen und kanadischen Recht. Anschließend werden die sich spiegelbildlich verhaltenden Vor- und Nachteile dieser beiden Regulierungstypen benannt. Der folgende Abschnitt stellt hybride Lösungen im französischen, italienischen und schweizerischen Recht vor. Schlussbemerkungen führen zurück zur international-vergleichenden Perspektive und zur Frage, was ein wie auch immer gearteter Schutz der Presse in Anbetracht der tektonischen Verschiebungen, die die Online-Kommunikation mit sich bringt, zu bewirken vermag.
This article provides an overview of the current state of the regulation of disinformation in the EU. It shows that the concept of disinformation, the purpose of anti-disinformation measures and their content and enforcement can only be understood if a holistic view is taken of private, hybrid-co-regulatory and public-law norms. The delicate field of disinformation is to a large extent dealt with outside of statutory law. The questions raised thereby are largely unresolved.
This article provides an overview and critical assessment of WIPO ALERT. It locates this initiative in the broader context of transnational IP enforcement schemes on the Internet. These initiatives are classified into two categories according to their point of attachment and geographical effect. Whereas source-related measures (e.g. website takedowns) tend to have a transnational and possibly even a global effect, recipient-related measures (e.g. website and ad blockings) typically mirror the territorially fragmented IPR landscape. This fragmentation is where WIPO ALERT comes into play. It can be understood as a matching service which interconnects holders of information about copyright infringing websites (“Authorized Contributors”) and actors of the online ad industry who want to avoid these outlets (“Authorized Users”). The critical assessment of WIPO ALERT calls for more transparency and the establishment of uniform substantive and procedural standards that have to be met if a new “site of concern” is added to the global ad blacklist.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
Climate crimes – a critique
(2023)
This paper aims on taking a critical approach to the emerging debate on climate criminal justice, that is mostly about something labeled „climate criminal law“ („Klimastrafrecht“). The critique is directed at climate crimes intended to protect our habitable climate („Klimaschutzstrafrecht“) or to prevent climate change („Klimawandelpräventionsstrafrecht“) staged as transformational criminal law. “Fighting" climate change with climate crimes can lull us into deceptive certainties and by extension into perilous idleness; and it will do so if we think of climate protection essentially in terms of traditional criminal law. Climate crimes are based on the idea that we can counter climate change with the "sharpest sword" available to a polity (cf. the German and Continental European ultima-ratio principle) and that we can thereby also get hold of "the powerful". But these certainties rest on but normative (and at heart: liberal) doctrines, which are deceptive in having lost touch with the realities of the administration of criminal justice. They obscure that more effective measures are available to mitigate the climate crisis and that "the powerful" will likely be shielded with and by climate crimes. Therefore, the climate crimes approach to the climate crisis may just turn out to be (self-)appeasement. It obfuscates that more effective measures are likely necessary to avert impending crises. Our critique is therefore not "only" directed at the symbolic, but the dysfunctional and "dark side" of climate crimes.