Refine
Year of publication
- 2008 (4) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (4)
Language
- English (4)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4)
Keywords
- Liquidität (4) (remove)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (4) (remove)
This paper analyzes liquidity in an order driven market. We only investigate the best limits in the limit order book, but also take into account the book behind these inside prices. When subsequent prices are close to the best ones and depth at them is substantial, larger orders can be executed without an extensive price impact and without deterring liquidity. We develop and estimate several econometric models, based on depth and prices in the book, as well as on the slopes of the limit order book. The dynamics of different dimensions of liquidity are analyzed: prices, depth at and beyond the best prices, as well as resiliency, i.e. how fast the different liquidity measures recover after a liquidity shock. Our results show a somewhat less favorable image of liquidity than often found in the literature. After a liquidity shock (in the spread or depth or in the book beyond the best limits), several dimension of liquidity deteriorate at the same time. Not only does the inside spread increase, and depth at the best prices decrease, also the difference between subsequent bid and ask prices may become larger and depth provided at them decreases. The impacts are both econometrically and economically significant. Also, our findings point to an interaction between different measures of liquidity, between liquidity at the best prices and beyond in the book, and between ask and bid side of the market.
Previous evidence suggests that less liquid stocks entail higher average returns. Using NYSE data, we present evidence that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia have significantly declined over the past four decades to levels that we cannot statistically distinguish from zero. Furthermore, the profitability of trading strategies based on buying illiquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable. Our results are robust to several conventional liquidity measures related to volume. When using liquidity measure that is not related to volume, we find just weak evidence of a liquidity premium even in the early periods of our sample. The gradual introduction and proliferation of index funds and exchange traded funds is a possible explanation for these results.
We report evidence that the presence of hidden liquidity is associated with greater liquidity in the order books, greater trading volume, and smaller price impact. Limit and market order submission behavior changes when hidden liquidity is present consistent with at least some traders being able to detect hidden liquidity. We estimate a model of liquidity provision that allows us to measure variations in the marginal and total payoffs from liquidity provision in states with and without hidden liquidity. Our estimates of the expected surplus to providers of visible and hidden liquidity are positive and typically of the order of one-half to one basis points per trade. The positive liquidity provider surpluses combined with the increased trading volume when hidden liquidity is present are both consistent with liquidity externalities.
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy.