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In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit order book markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in limit order books based on a recent sample of thirty German DAX stocks. We find that Hasbrouck’s (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger-causes book liquidity, in particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news induced volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity. JEL Classification: G14 Keywords: Price Impact of Trades , Trading Intensity , Dynamic Duration Models, Spread Decomposition Models , Adverse Selection Risk
We revisit the role of time in measuring the price impact of trades using a new empirical method that combines spread decomposition and dynamic duration modeling. Previous studies which have addressed the issue in a vector-autoregressive framework conclude that times when markets are most active are times when there is an increased presence of informed trading. Our empirical analysis based on recent European and U.S. data offers challenging new evidence. We find that as trade intensity increases, the informativeness of trades tends to decrease. This result is consistent with the predictions of Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) rational expectations model, and also with models of dynamic trading like those proposed by Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999). Our results cast doubt on the common wisdom that fast markets bear particularly high adverse selection risks for uninformed market participants. JEL Classification: G10, C32 Keywords: Price Impact of Trades, Trading Intensity, Dynamic Duration Models, Spread Decomposition Models, Adverse Selection Risk