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O artigo investiga a formação, a carreira e os trabalhos de Max Weber como jurista, assim como delineia as linhas gerais do impacto e das influências de sua formação jurídica na sua obra em geral. Especial atenção merece sua tese de doutorado sobre as sociedades comerciais na Idade Média, que é apresentada em sua problematização geral e em suas principais ideias. Com isso, procura-se indicar como os problemas tratados por Weber em sua tese de doutorado - sua principal obra jurídica - antecipam temas e problemas que serão desenvolvidos na obra posterior de modo ampliado e aprofundado.
Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves. Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus.
The increase in the volume of litigation verified since the 1990’s, having the Brazilian society as context, made the judiciary open itself to new technologies which facilitate the access to justice, as well as to a faster resolution of the demands. However, the intense insertion of technical rationalization in the process and decision operations by the judiciary, during the last years, led to a legalization supported by presuppositions of technical-instrumental regulation. According to the goal policy established by the CNJ, the annoyance of the instrumental rationality is present “with respect to purposes”, which demands, more and more, a mere fulfillment of previously instituted goals from the law operators. The matter is to know if the implementation of new technologies to solve the growing litigation coming from the complexity of societies is enough to adjust the Law to a post-conventional platform. If the social complexity implies resources coming from new technologies, it’s not certain that such technologies, on their own, satisfactorily answer a judicial model which, seen under the eyes of the post- conventional legitimacy and regulation, is adequate to complex societies. This illustrates that a judicial model, able to deal with the social plurality, must take into account not only the rules of instrumental rationality, but also the fundamental issues of communicative rationality. This current work intends to evaluate if the applicability of the instrumental rationality in the judiciary equally allows the law to extent the useful conditions of the communicative rationality to the consensual formation of will and opinion in the Democratic State of Law.
The author will deal with the relationship between law and technology from the viewpoint of technology security standard. One of the relationships can be found in that law has been providing a security level of technology. They have been saying that law would often follow technology. Law is too slow to adapt the changing technology through the advancement of technology. Above all, information technology has an electronic rapidity and a legislation technology has a paper one. There might be a big estrangement between law and technology. However, law must provide a security standard of technology. The standard must be based on a relative security level. The relative level would premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. Most technology has been opened to the public without any technology impact assessment. Technology would have some defect, which the producers have overlooked. As a result, the users might often meet with the accidents caused on the defects.
Then law should provide a technology security standard to exclude the defects from the users’ viewpoint as secure as possible. The security standard must be reflected on the architecture standard of technology. The architecture standard may be a yardstick whether the creators can evade the responsibility for the accidents.
The standard would also premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. The ordinary use means that the users should use normally technology within the extent of the architecture standard. The ethical use means that the users should use technology being conscious of the defects in order to avoid accidents.
The relative security level may be the sum of the architecture standard and the ethical use of technology.
In information society, legal norm communications have been never established in certain fields for a long time. That is, a few legal norms have never obeyed in the fields. Above all, legal norms which relate to data protection, information contents and information security, would often infringed. Most violation would be conducted by using information technologies. Information technologies would often be used in these infringing incidents. It can be said that these infringing incidents would have never been conducted without information technology. These infringing incidents include hacking actions, personal data abuse, personal information disclosure, unauthorized access, infringing copyrights, infringing privacy rights, and so on. A way of preventing those infringements is to raise the level of punishment against the violators. But, it will prove to be disappointing. Furthermore, it would be an ex post facto measure to the last. It would be needed to invent an ex ante measure, if it is possible. As the ex ante measure, the author proposes a fusion of law and information technology. An information technology will lead people to a lawful deed when they conduct actions in using computers and networks. They say that information technology cures information technology. After all, the fusion will aim at realizing laws, and it will contribute to recover a social justice.
Communist regimes in general and especially the one in Albania destroyed almost every aspect of political, social, cultural and economic life, including the notion of pluralism and intellectual elite of the country. In Albania, the transition into democracy in 90’ was done through extrication which means that the authoritarian government was weakened, but not as thoroughly as in a transition by defeat. As a consequence, the former Communist elite was able to negotiate crucial features of the transition and was very quickly transformed into the new pluralist political class. This position enabled the communist elite to be rehabilitated and together with the new emerged communist elite to remain a strong influential actor in new emerged democracy and de facto to run in continuance the country. The purpose of the new emerged communist elite to maintain control was favored inter alia by the absence of a new strong intellectual elite and was done merely by sharing the power among its members divided into different political parties and also by using the ‘pluralist’ law as a tool for social control over new emerging intellectual elites. The use of law as a tool for social control by the political class has severely damaged people's understanding and expectations on the law, its relations with the state as well as international community. Indeed, such experience of the use of law by the political class for its own narrow interests, has made people lose confidence in law and state as well as has severely weakened the law enforcement in the country. To conclude, the overall purpose of this paper would be the analysis of law in general and its understandings and development in a post-communist society such as Albania from different points of view.
The concept of biopolitics has its origin on the Michel Foucault works developped since 1975 to 1979. In this period, the author introduced the foundations for a new approach about the modern government, based in both crescent enpowerment on individuals and the control of populations. The theme has attracted the attentions of some critical political studies, with many practical uses. However, I believe there is not enough consolidation about biopolitics as a concept and a comprehensive theory of the new political mechanisms. This uncertainness is more evident when the very role of Law is questioned in a biopolitical model, due to the archaic nature that Foucault gives to it. So the aim of the paper is to identify the theorical comprehension of biopolitics in a contemporary author as Giorgio Agamben to demonstrate his oppositions and proximities from the original idea of Michel Foucault. I propose that Agamben has the same difficulties of Foucault to deal with legal theory and Law inside biopolitics. Nevertheless, after a critical review on the works of this two authors, my conclusion is that a settlement of the concepts of Law and biopolitics depends of the surpassing of the Foucaldian version of Law as sovereignity, a clear delimitation of a common core between the authors and their differences and the research and affirmation of the concept of Law in Agamben, more well-refined than Foucault's one.