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It seems that the BVerfG has learned a lesson. Yesterday’s referral about the the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) sets a completely different tone. It reads like a modest and balanced plea for judicial dialogue, rather than an indictment. Fifty years after the original event, a new Summer of Love seems to thrive between the highest judicial bodies. It shows no traces of the aplomb with which Karlsruhe presented its stance to Luxembourg three years ago.
The pointed commentary published on Verfassungsblog over the last week—coming from different perspectives and informed from different experiences—shows the potential of such debates. In the case of Greece, they are an important addition to a discourse focusing too much on austerity or debt sustainability.
As the numbers of people moving internationally increased in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states tried more rigorously to regulate borders and counteract the problem of fugitives crossing international borders to evade arrest. This presented a legal challenge to domestic state power that increasingly defined its sovereignty on jurisdiction within borders. It is this issue and within this important era of globalization and law formation that Bradley Miller’s book examines how British North American colonies and post-Confederation Canada reacted to the problems posed by international fugitives through ideas and practices of extradition. His work goes beyond the traditional perspective of examining extradition treaties to view the practices of extradition in action, the everyday challenges states faced, and how the key concepts of sovereignty and international law were understood in relation to extradition. ...
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
According to international and national constitutional law, indigenous peoples in most Latin American countries have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions. As a consequence of this and of a long and ongoing process of political debate and recognition, ever more indigenous peoples are practicing their own laws, following their own cultural traditions and customs. In doing so, they often draw on history, recreating their identities and reconstructing their distinct legal pasts. At the same time, historical research has increasingly pointed out the intense interaction between indigenous peoples and European invaders during colonial period. It has become clear that it is difficult to draw a clear line between purely ‘indigenous’ and ‘colonial’ legal traditions due to the hybridisation of indigenous and colonial laws and legal practices. The aim of this paper is to introduce this historiography and its relevance to law and to present some methodological challenges in writing the history of indigenous rights in Latin America resulting from this shift in (legal) historiography.
The EU Collective Redress Recommendation has invited Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms by 26 July 2015. The well-known reservations claim potentially abusive litigation and potential settlement of not well-founded claims resulting from controversial funding of cases by means of contingency fees and from ‘opt-out’ class action procedures. The paper posits that there may also be some fear that the European Commission may try to pursue the enforcement of its regulatory agenda in this way at the expense of individual claimants’ interests. Therefore a comparative analysis is carried out to see to what extent concerns about individual rights as opposed to regulatory goals are reflected in the different newly revised systems in place across Europe. As an iterim result the Dutch settlement procedure for mass damage claims, the English Group Litigation Order and the German test case procedure turn out to be relatively well-suited to deal with mass damage claims. At the same time, none of them can quite reach an optimal balance between individual rights and regulatory goals and therefore each of them is subject to criticism. That is why the further question is raised in how far these procedures could complement each other, thus contributing to the enforcement of individual rights without overregulating markets in Europe.
The venture capital industry holds relevance for entrepreneurs looking for money to finance an innovative project, investors seeking to make money by investing in entrepreneurial firms and governments trying to promote innovation and entrepreneurship. Venture capital investment could facilitate innovation and thus a better economy.
Venture capital has enabled the U.S. to support its entrepreneurial talent by turning ideas into world-famous products and services, building companies from mere business plans to mature and powerful organizations. Three of the five largest U.S. public companies by market capitalization – Apple, Google and Microsoft – received most of their early external funding from venture capital. Having its ups and downs, venture capital investment in the U.S. expanded from virtually zero in the mid-1970s to $8 billion in 1995 and $49.3 billion in 2014. Venture backed companies have been a prime driver of economic growth in the U.S.Across the pacific, venture capital investment in China has grown out of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy over the past three decades, becoming an important pillar supporting China’s innovation system. In 2015, a total of 2,824 venture capital investment deals provided an aggregate investment of $36.9 billion. Venture capital has long been a hot topic in China’s capital market, particularly since the government decided to boost “mass entrepreneurship and innovation” in 2014.
In the U.S., most venture capital firms are organized as limited partnerships, with the venture capitalists being general partners and the investors limited partners. Studies have shown that investors choose to invest through venture funds as an intermediary rather than placing their investments directly with the entrepreneurs; because of the high risk nature of the entrepreneur’s business, it is hard for them to get bank loans or direct equity investments. Conflicts may also arise, however, between the venture capitalists acting as agents and the investors as principals.5 This agency problem maybe particularly severe, since venture capital provides money for businesses with high potential and high risk, although the limited partnership has certain merits and is still most commonly chosen as the business form for venture capital funds.6 At the same time, the fact that general partners have total control of the partnership business necessitates that the agency problem is addressed by legal rules, contracts and other mechanisms.
Meanwhile, despite the rapid growth of venture capital investments in China, little attention has been paid to the organizational form of venture capital funds. In contrast to the U.S., most Chinese venture funds have been structured as corporations. One may argue that it was due to legislative reasons: that the limited partnership was not recognized by Chinese law when venture capital first appeared in China. However, after adopted a chapter was adopted in the Partnership Enterprise Law (PEL) governing limited partnerships in 2007, most of the venture funds abided by their choice, while those opting for the limited partnership have encountered difficulties: the limited partners are having trouble trusting the general partners with their money and are therefore interfering with the operation of the partnership business, which may lead to dissolution of the partnership.
This thesis applies transaction cost theory to explain the benefits and costs of choosing the limited partnership as a business form in the special context of venture capital investments, showing that the potential agency conflict between the general partners and the limited partners have been mitigated by legal and other mechanismsin the United States, and that the U.S. investors could therefore exploit the merit of the limited partnership form in venture capital financing. In China, investors have different answers to the agency problem. Similarly to the situation in the U.S., Chinese partners also employ contract terms to deal with agency problems, and the legislators enact laws that aim at regulating the limited partnership form; some legislation was even transplanted from the U.S., such as that part of the PEL which governs limited partnerships. It seems, then, that similar mechanisms that deal with agency problems also exist in China. However, given the unique history of the development of China’s innovation system and venture capital market, the effectiveness of these constraints is questionable. Chinese venture capital investors have therefore characteristically behaved differently to U.S. investors. Rather than relying on these questionable mechanisms, Chinese investors as well as the Chinese government have developed different approaches to addressing these agency problems.
The mainstream law and economics approach has dominated positive analysis and normative design of economic regulations. This approach represents a form of applied neoclassical and new institutional economics. Neoclassical and/or new institutional economic theories, models, and analytical concepts are applied automatically to economic regulatory problems.
This automatic application of neoclassical economics to economic regulatory problems loses sight of the valid insights of non-neoclassical schools of economic thought and theories, which may illuminate important aspects of the regulatory problems. This thesis, therefore, advocates an integrated law and economics approach to economic regulations. This approach identifies the relevant insights of neoclassical and non-neoclassical schools of thought and theories and refines them through a process of cross-criticism. In this process, the insights of each school of thought are subjected to the critiques of other schools of thought. The resulting refined insights, which are more likely to be valid, are then integrated consistently through various techniques of integration.
Not only does neoclassical (micro and macro) law and economics overlook the valid insights of non-neoclassical schools of thought, it is also highly reductionist. It ignores the interdependencies of legal institutions, highlighted mainly by the comparative capitalism literature, and the structural interlinkages among socio-economic actors, highlighted by economic sociology and complexity economics. Rather, it takes rational individuals and their interactions subject to the constraint of isolated institution(s) as its unit of analysis. In place of this reductionist perspective, the thesis argues for a systemic approach to economic regulations. This systemic perspective replaces the reductionist unit of neoclassical regulatory analysis with a systemic unit of analysis that consists of the least non-decomposable actors’ network and its associated least non-decomposable institutional network. Then, the thesis develops an operationalized and replicable systemic framework for systemic analysis and design of institutional networks.
Both the systemic and integrated approaches are theoretically consistent and complementary. The systemic approach is in essence a way of thinking that requires a broad and rich informational basis that can be secured by using the integrated approach. Due to their complementarity, they give rise to what I call “the integrated and systemic law and economics approach.” The thesis operationalizes this approach by setting out well-defined replicable steps and applying them to concrete regulatory problems, namely, the choice of a corporate governance model for developing countries and the development of a normative theory of economic regulations. These concrete applications demonstrate the critical bite of the integrated and systemic approach, which reveals significant shortcomings of mainstream law and economics’ answers to these regulatory questions. They also show the constructive potential of the integrated and systemic approach in overcoming the critiques advanced to the neoclassical regulatory conclusions.
The operationalized integrated and systemic approach is both a law and economics as well as a law and development approach. It does not only provide an alternative to mainstream law and economics analysis and design of economic regulations. It also fills a significant analytical lacuna in the law and development literature that lacks an analytical framework for analysis and design of context-specific legal institutions that can promote economic development in developing economies.