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U.S. investors hold much less international stock than is optimal according to mean–variance portfolio theory applied to historical data. We investigated whether this home bias can be explained by Bayesian approaches to international asset allocation. In comparison with mean–variance analysis, Bayesian approaches use different techniques for obtaining the set of expected returns by shrinking the sample means toward a reference point that is inferred from economic theory. Applying the Bayesian approaches to the field of international diversification, we found that a substantial home bias can be explained when a U.S. investor has a strong belief in the global mean–variance efficiency of the U.S. market portfolio, and in this article, we show how to quantify the strength of this belief. We also found that one of the Bayesian approaches leads to the same implications for asset allocation as the mean–variance/tracking-error criterion. In both cases, the optimal portfolio is a combination of the U.S. market portfolio and the mean–variance-efficient portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
This paper is focused on the coordination of order and production policy between buyers and suppliers in supply chains. When a buyer and a supplier of an item work independently, the buyer will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer s EOQ may not lead to an optimal policy for the supplier. It can be shown that a cooperative batching policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the more powerful position to enforce his EOQ on the supplier, then no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative batching policy. To provide an incentive to order in quantities suitable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a side payment. One critical assumption made throughout in the literature dealing with incentive schemes to influence buyer s ordering policy is that the supplier has complete information regarding buyer s cost structure. However, this assumption is far from realistic. As a consequence, the buyer has no incentive to report truthfully on his cost structure. Moreover there is an incentive to overstate the total relevant cost in order to obtain as high a side payment as possible. This paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the bargaining power to enforce his EOQ on the supplier in case of a break-down in negotiations. An algorithm for the determination of an optimal set of contracts which are specifically designed for different cost structures of the buyer, assumed by the supplier, will be presented. This algorithm was implemented in a software application, that supports the supplier in determining the optimal set of contracts.