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Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumer characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. Nevertheless, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In a secondbest efficient Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence (MWS) framework, we allow consumers to reveal their risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as social welfare. We find that information disclosure can substitute deductibles for consumers whose transparency aversion is sufficiently low. This can lead to a Pareto improvement of social welfare. Yet, if all consumers are offered cross-subsidizing contracts, the introduction of a screening contract decreases or even eliminates cross-subsidies. Given the prior existence of a cross-subsidizing MWS equilibrium, utility is shifted from individuals who do not reveal their private information to those who choose to reveal. Our analysis informs the discussion on consumer protection in the context of digitalization. It shows that new technologies challenge cross-subsidization in insurance markets, and it stresses the negative externalities that digitalization has on consumers who are unwilling to take part in this
development
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection in the sense of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), and Spence (1978) when the distribution of unobservable risk types is continuous. Our proof leverages the finite-type proof in Spence (1978) and a limiting argument akin to Hellwig (2007)’s study of optimal taxation.
Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.
Exploiting the natural experiment of the German reunification, we examine how consumers adapt to a new environment in their macroeconomic forecasting. We document that East Germans expect higher in inflation and make larger forecast errors than West
Germans even decades after reunification. Differences in consumption baskets, financial literacy, risk aversion or trust in the central bank cannot fully account for these patterns. We find most support for the explanation that East Germans, who were used to a strong norm of zero inflation, persistently overadjusted the level of their expectations in the face of the initial inflation shock in reunified Germany. Our findings suggest that large changes in the economic environment can permanently impede people's ability to form accurate macroeconomic expectations, with an important role for the interaction of old norms and new experiences around the event.
Policymakers attach an important role to the macroeconomic outlook of households. Using a representative online panel form the U.S., the authors examine how individuals' macroeconomic expectations causally affect their personal economic prospects and their behavior and provide them with different professional forecasts about the likelihood of a recession. The authors find that groups with the largest exposure to aggregate risk, such as individuals working in cyclical industries, are most likely to respond to an improved macroeconomic outlook, while a large fraction of the population is unlikely to react.
This paper uses unique administrative data and a quasi-field experiment of exogenous allocation in Sweden to estimate medium- and longer-run effects on financial behavior from exposure to financially literate neighbors. It contributes evidence of causal impact of exposure and of a social multiplier of financial knowledge, but also of unfavorable distributional aspects of externalities. Exposure promotes saving in private retirement accounts and stockholding, especially when neighbors have economics or business education, but only for educated households and when interaction possibilities are substantial. Findings point to transfer of knowledge rather than mere imitation or effects through labor, education, or mobility channels.
The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone was characterized by a monetary policy, which has been constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, and several countries, which faced high risk spreads on their sovereign bonds. How is the government spending multiplier affected by such an economic environment?While prominent results in the academic literature point to high government spending multipliers at the ZLB, higher public indebtedness is often associated with small government spending multipliers. I develop a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks that captures both features of this economic environment, the ZLB and fiscal stress. In this model, I analyze the effects of government spending shocks. I find that not only are multipliers large at the ZLB, the presence of fiscal stress can even increase their size. For longer durations of the ZLB,multipliers in this model can be considerably larger than one.
JEL Classification: E32, E 44, E62
Higher capital ratios are believed to improve system-wide financial stability through three main channels: (i) higher loss-absorption capacity, (ii) lower moral hazard, (iii) stabilization of the financial cycle if capital ratios are increased during good times. We examine these mechanisms in a laboratory asset market experiment with indebted participants. We find support for the loss-absorption channel: higher capital ratios reduce the bankruptcy rate. However, we do not find support for the moral hazard channel. Higher capital ratios (insignificantly) increase asset price bubbles, an aggregate measure of excessive risk-taking. Additional evidence suggests that bankruptcy aversion explains this surprising result. Finally, the evidence supports the idea that higher capital ratios in good times stabilize the financial cycle.
Distributed ledger technologies rely on consensus protocols confronting traders with random waiting times until the transfer of ownership is accomplished. This time consuming settlement process exposes arbitrageurs to price risk and imposes limits to arbitrage. We derive theoretical arbitrage boundaries under general assumptions and show that they increase with expected latency, latency uncertainty, spot volatility, and risk aversion. Using high-frequency data from the Bitcoin network, we estimate arbitrage boundaries due to settlement latency of on average 124 basis points, covering 88% of the observed cross-exchange price differences. Settlement through decentralized systems thus induces non-trivial frictions affecting market efficiency and price formation.
Much ado about nothing : a study of differential pricing and liquidity of short and long term bonds
(2018)
Are yields of long-maturity bonds distorted by demand pressure of clientele investors, regulatory effects, or default, flight-to-safety or liquidity premiums? Using data on German nominal bonds between 2005 and 2015, we study the differential pricing and liquidity of short and long maturity bonds. We find statistically significant, but economically negligible segmentation in yields and some degree of liquidity segmentation of short-term versus long-term bonds. These results have important policy implications for the e17.5 trillion European pension and insurance industries: long maturity bond yields seem appropriate for the valuation of long-term liabilities.