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We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating on the rated firms. Apart from hinting at explanations for several hypotheses with regard to agencies' optimal rating assessments, our model suggests that the existence of rating agencies may decrease the incidence of multiple equilibria. If investors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information, we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collection are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure uniqueness of equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark off a virtuous circle that increases the efficiency of the market outcome.
Mobile telephony and mobile internet are driving a new application paradigm: location-based services (LBS). Based on a person’s location and context, personalized applications can be deployed. Thus, internet-based systems will continuously collect and process the location in relationship to a personal context of an identified customer. One of the challenges in designing LBS infrastructures is the concurrent design for economic infrastructures and the preservation of privacy of the subjects whose location is tracked. This presentation will explain typical LBS scenarios, the resulting new privacy challenges and user requirements and raises economic questions about privacy-design. The topics will be connected to “mobile identity” to derive what particular identity management issues can be found in LBS.
In this paper, I examine the potential of mobile alerting services empowering investors to react quickly to critical market events. Therefore, an analysis of short-term (intraday) price effects is performed. I find abnormal returns to company announcements which are completed within a timeframe of minutes. To make use of these findings, these price effects are predicted using pre-defined external metrics and different estimation methodologies. Compared to previous research, the results provide support that artificial neural networks and multiple linear regression are good estimation models for forecasting price effects also on an intraday basis. As most of the price effect magnitude and effect delay can be estimated correctly, it is demonstrated how a suitable mobile alerting service combining a low level of user-intrusiveness and timely information supply can be designed.
Die vorliegende Analyse untersucht die Beschäftigungseffekte von Vermittlungsgutscheinen und Personal-Service-Agenturen mit Hilfe einer makroökonometrischen Evaluation. Neben einer mikroökonometrischen Evaluation, welche die Wirkungen auf individueller Ebene untersucht, kann eine makroökonometrische Analyse Aussagen über die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekte der Maßnahmen machen. Die strukturellen Multiplikatorwirkungen im makroökonomischen Kreislaufzusammenhang werden jedoch nicht berücksichtigt. Das ökonometrische Modell zur Analyse der beiden Maßnahmen basiert auf einer Matching-Funktion, die den Suchprozess von Firmen und von Arbeitern nach einem Beschäftigungsverhältnis abbildet. Die empirischen Analysen werden getrennt für Ost- und Westdeutschland sowie für die Strategietypen der Bundesagentur für Arbeit durchgeführt. Sie zeigen, dass die Ausgabe von Vermittlungsgutscheinen nur in „großstädtisch geprägten Bezirken vorwiegend in Westdeutschland mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit“ (Strategietyp II) einen signifikant positiven Effekt auf den Suchprozess hat. Für die Personal-Service-Agenturen zeigen sich signifikant positive Effekte für Ost- als auch für Westdeutschland. Allerdings fehlt für eine abschließende Bewertung der Ergebnisse für die Personal- Service-Agenturen aufgrund der relativ geringen Teilnehmerzahl noch ein Vergleich mit mikroökonometrischen Analysen.
Serial correlation in dynamic panel data models with weakly exogenous regressor and fixed effects
(2005)
Our paper wants to present and compare two estimation methodologies for dynamic panel data models in the presence of serially correlated errors and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯rst is the ¯rst di®erence GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the second is the transformed Maximum Likelihood Estimator as proposed by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). Thereby, we consider the ¯xed e®ects case and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯nite sample properties of both estimation methodologies are analysed within a simulation experiment. Furthermore, we will present an empirical example to consider the performance of both estimators with real data. JEL Classification: C23, J64
In this paper we evaluate the employment effects of job creation schemes on the participating individuals in Germany. Job creation schemes are a major element of active labour market policy in Germany and are targeted at long-term unemployed and other hard-to-place individuals. Access to very informative administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency justifies the application of a matching estimator and allows to account for individual (group-specific) and regional effect heterogeneity. We extend previous studies in four directions. First, we are able to evaluate the effects on regular (unsubsidised) employment. Second, we observe the outcome of participants and non-participants for nearly three years after programme start and can therefore analyse mid- and long-term effects. Third, we test the sensitivity of the results with respect to various decisions which have to be made during implementation of the matching estimator, e.g. choosing the matching algorithm or estimating the propensity score. Finally, we check if a possible occurrence of 'unobserved heterogeneity' distorts our interpretation. The overall results are rather discouraging, since the employment effects are negative or insignificant for most of the analysed groups. One notable exception are long-term unemployed individuals who benefit from participation. Hence, one policy implication is to address programmes to this problem group more tightly. JEL Classification: J68, H43, C13