Refine
Year of publication
- 2020 (157) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (82)
- Part of Periodical (45)
- Article (26)
- Book (2)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
- Preprint (1)
Language
- English (157) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (157) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (157)
Keywords
- ECB (15)
- Capital Markets Union (14)
- Financial Markets (14)
- Banking Regulation (7)
- Banking Union (7)
- Financial Institutions (7)
- coronavirus (7)
- Comments disabled (6)
- Coronavirus (6)
- ESMA (6)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (157) (remove)
Shares of open-end real estate funds are typically traded directly between the investor and the fund management company. However, we provide empirical evidence for the growth of secondary market activities, i.e., the trading of shares on stock exchanges. We find high trading levels in situations where the fund management company suspends the issue or redemption of shares. Shares trade at a discount when the fund management company suspends the redemption, whereas shares trade at a premium when the fund management company suspends the issue. We also find evidence that secondary market trading activity is increasing since German regulation introduced a minimum holding period and a mandatory notice period for open-end real estate funds.
For private investors it is imperative to a) understand and define their own, individual risk preferences, b) assess their financial and demographic circumstances to determine the individual risk-taking potential, and c) form and maintain a well-diversified risky portfolio. The three chapters of my thesis each match one of these three tasks. \\ \noindent The first chapter of my thesis presents novel experimental evidence to test the existence of a potential projection bias in loss aversion, a significant determinant of investor preferences, thus matching task a). The second chapter is devoted to the determination of private investors' risk-taking potential based on their financial and socio-demographic circumstances, matching task b): In a large portfolio experiment, we examine the ability and heterogeneity of lay and professional advisors in matching investor demographics, such as age and income, with risky asset portfolio shares. The third and final chapter addresses the question on how to reach and maintain an efficient risky portfolio, therefore matching task c): It analyzes a decision support system for private investors that allows its users to simulate any arbitrary set of securities, and by reporting aggregated expected return and risk, to optimize their current portfolio.
This article investigates the roles of psychological biases for deviations between subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) and objective survival probabilities. We model these deviations through age-dependent inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions. Our estimates suggest that implied measures for cognitive weakness increase and relative optimism decrease with age. Direct measures of cognitive weakness and optimism share these trends. Our regression analyses confirm that these factors play strong quantitative roles in the formation of SSBs. Our main finding is that cognitive weakness instead of optimism becomes with age an increasingly important contributor to the well-documented overestimation of survival chances in old age.
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.