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Der vorliegende Beitrag leitete das Programm des Workshops „Schlichten und Richten – Differenzierung und Hybridisierung” (Frankfurt/Main, 9./10. Februar 2012) ein. Mit diesem Workshop begann das Arbeitsprogramm des LOEWE–Schwerpunkts „Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung“, der am 1. Januar 2012 seine Tätigkeit aufgenommen hatte (siehe hierzu www.konfliktloesung.eu; eine leicht veränderte Fassung des Beitrags in englischer Sprache wird in Kürze abrufbar sein unter: http://www.ssrn.com/link/Max-Planck-Legal-History-RES.html ). Der Ausgangspunkt des Workshops ist eine deutsche Debattentradition, die die Alternativität von gerichtlichen und nichtgerichtlichen, kontradiktorischen oder konsensualen sowie mehr formalisierten und mehr informalisierten Konfliktlösungsformen unter dem Schlagwort „Schlichten oder Richten“ (auch „Schlichten statt Richten“ oder „Schlichten oder Richten“) thematisierte.
Der Beitrag problematisiert zunächst die bisherige mangelnde rechtshistorische Aufmerksamkeit, die Alternativen zur gerichtlichen Konfliktlösung zugewandt wurde. Er weist daraufhin, dass auch die heutige Diskussion über gelungenes Konfliktlösungsmanagement oft explizit oder implizit von – zuweilen nicht ausreichend reflektierten – historischen Vorannahmen geprägt ist und – damit verbunden – von Vorstellungen über rechtskulturelle Fremdheit und Nähe.
Im zweiten und dritten Abschnitt skizziert der Beitrag kurz den historischen Gang der deutschen Diskussion über „Schlichten und Richten“ seit dem Aufkommen auch rechtswissenschaftlich anerkannter Schlichtungsinstitutionen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Er versucht, deren wechselnde zeitgenössische Kontexte sichtbar zu machen und zeigt, wie sich in diesen Diskussionen (zuweilen utopisch scheinende) rechtspolitische Verheißungen ansiedeln konnten, welch fruchtbaren Boden diese Diskussionen aber auch für neue Kategorienbildungen und multidisziplinäre Zugänge bot.
Im vierten Abschnitt wird versucht, Verknüpfungen mit der gegenwärtigen ADR-Diskussionen herzustellen, während im fünften Abschnitt in analytischer Absicht Konfigurationen des Wortpaars „Schlichten“ und „Richten“ vorgestellt werden: „Schlichten“ und „Richten“ als Alternative, als Abhängigkeitsverhältnis und als Abfolge. Der fünfte Abschnitt schließlich fragt nach Funktionselementen und den Funktionsbedingungen von Schlichten und Richten, d.h.: Welche Leitrationalitäten, Partizipationsmechanismen, Legitimationsnarrative und Reflexionsformen lassen sich jeweils der einen oder anderen Form der Konfliktlösung zuordnen.
All diese Überlegungen sind eher tentativer Art und vermitteln nur erste umrisshafte Vorstellungen. Sie dienen in erster Linie dem Diskussionsanstoß und sollen erste Schneisen in dieses komplexe Forschungsfeld schlagen. Die Vortragsform ist beibehalten und der Fußnotenapparat ist auf das nötige Minimum reduziert.
From its early post-war catch-up phase, Germany’s formidable export engine has been its consistent driver of growth. But Germany has almost equally consistently run current account surpluses. Exports have powered the dynamic phases and helped emerge from stagnation. Volatile external demand, in turn, has elevated German GDP growth volatility by advanced countries’ standards, keeping domestic consumption growth at surprisingly low levels. As a consequence, despite the size of its economy and important labor market reforms, Germany’s ability to act as global locomotive has been limited. With increasing competition in its traditional areas of manufacturing, a more domestically-driven growth dynamic, especially in the production and delivery of services, will be good for Germany and for the global economy. Absent such an effort, German growth will remain constrained, and Germany will play only a modest role in spurring growth elsewhere.
In this paper we develop empirical measures for the strength of spillover effects. Modifying and extending the framework by Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), we quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. Spillovers are estimated recursively from a vector autoregressive model of daily CDS spread changes, with exogenous common factors. We account for interdependencies between sovereign and bank CDS spreads and we derive generalised impulse response functions. Specifically, we assess the systemic effect of an unexpected shock to the creditworthiness of a particular sovereign or country-specific bank index to other sovereign or bank CDSs between October 2009 and July 2012. Channels of transmission from or to sovereigns and banks are aggregated as a Contagion index (CI). This index is disentangled into four components, the average potential spillover: i) amongst sovereigns, ii) amongst banks, iii) from sovereigns to banks, and iv) vice-versa. We highlight the impact of policy-related events along the different components of the contagion index. The systemic contribution of each sovereign or banking group is quantified as the net spillover weight in the total net-spillover measure. Finally, the captured time-varying interdependence between banks and sovereigns emphasises the evolution of their strong nexus.
Law making becomes an increasingly important function of the higher courts in civil law matters. This observation leads to the question of whether the law making function is nevertheless carried out in a “classical” legal-principled way or whether the courts increasingly employ a political-formative style. To answer this question, one should not only focus on the content of the courts’ reasoning but also on their procedural-institutional framework. From that perspective, the processing of so-called legislative facts is a key issue in determining the role of courts between legal reasoning and social engineering. The paper shows that Germany, England and the United States pursue different lines in processing legislative facts. Notwithstanding these differences, it seems to be the case that the increasing importance of law making will also change the institutional framework of appellate courts towards a quasi-legislative forum.
We use a novel disaggregate sectoral euro area data set with a regional breakdown to investigate price changes and suggest a new method to extract factors from over-lapping data blocks. This allows us to separately estimate aggregate, sectoral, country-specific and regional components of price changes. We thereby provide an improved estimate of the sectoral factor in comparison with previous literature, which decomposes price changes into an aggregate and idiosyncratic component only, and interprets the latter as sectoral. We find that the sectoral component explains much less of the variation in sectoral regional inflation rates and exhibits much less volatility than previous findings for the US indicate. We further contribute to the literature on price setting by providing evidence that country- and region-specific factors play an important role in addition to the sector-specific factors, emphasising heterogeneity of inflation dynamics along different dimensions. We also conclude that sectoral price changes have a “geographical” dimension, that leads to new insights regarding the properties of sectoral price changes.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and great recession, many countries face substantial deficits and growing debts. In the United States, federal government outlays as a ratio to GDP rose substantially from about 19.5 percent before the crisis to over 24 percent after the crisis. In this paper we consider a fiscal consolidation strategy that brings the budget to balance by gradually reducing this spending ratio over time to the level that prevailed prior to the crisis. A crucial issue is the impact of such a consolidation strategy on the economy. We use structural macroeconomic models to estimate this impact focussing primarily on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with price and wage rigidities and adjustment costs. We separate out the impact of reductions in government purchases and transfers, and we allow for a reduction in both distortionary taxes and government debt relative to the baseline of no consolidation. According to the model simulations GDP rises in the short run upon announcement and implementation of this fiscal consolidation strategy and remains higher than the baseline in the long run. We explore the role of the mix of expenditure cuts and tax reductions as well as gradualism in achieving this policy outcome. Finally, we conduct sensitivity studies regarding the type of model used and its parameterization.
We examine both the degree and the structural stability of inflation persis tence at different quantiles of the conditional inflation distribution. Previous research focused exclusively on persistence at the conditional mean of the inflation rate. Economic theory, however, provides various reasons -for example downward wage rigidities or menu costs- to expect higher inflation persistence at the upper than at the lower tail of the conditional inflation distribution.
Based on post-war US data we indeed find slower mean reversion in response to positive than to negative shocks. We find robust evidence for a structural break in persistence at all quantiles of the inflation process in the early 1980s. Inflation persistence has decreased and become more homogeneous across quantiles. Persistence at the conditional mean became more informative about the degree of persistence across the entire conditional inflation distribution. While prior to the 1980s inflation was not mean reverting in response to large positive shocks, our evidence strongly suggests that since the end of the Volcker disinflation the unit root can be rejected at every quantile including the upper tail of the conditional inflation distribution.
This paper investigates the accuracy of point and density forecasts of four DSGE models for inflation, output growth and the federal funds rate. Model parameters are estimated and forecasts are derived successively from historical U.S. data vintages synchronized with the Fed’s Greenbook projections. Point forecasts of some models are of similar accuracy as the forecasts of nonstructural large dataset methods. Despite their common underlying New Keynesian modeling philosophy, forecasts of different DSGE models turn out to be quite distinct. Weighted forecasts are more precise than forecasts from individual models. The accuracy of a simple average of DSGE model forecasts is comparable to Greenbook projections for medium term horizons. Comparing density forecasts of DSGE models with the actual distribution of observations shows that the models overestimate uncertainty around point forecasts.
The withdrawal of foreign capital from emerging countries at the height of the recent financial crisis and its quick return sparked a debate about the impact of capital flow surges on asset markets. This paper addresses the response of property prices to an inflow of foreign capital. For that purpose we estimate a panel VAR on a set of Asian emerging market economies, for which the waves of inflows were particularly pronounced, and identify capital inflow shocks based on sign restrictions. Our results suggest that capital inflow shocks have a significant effect on the appreciation of house prices and equity prices. Capital inflow shocks account for - roughly - twice the portion of overall house price changes they explain in OECD countries. We also address crosscountry differences in the house price responses to shocks, which are most likely due to differences in the monetary policy response to capital inflows.