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This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests.
Das westphälische Modell für Staatsinstitutionen, einschließlich nationaler Exekutive, Legislative und Judikative, hat sich aus den Ereignissen europäischer Geschichte heraus entwickelt. Seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges dient es als grundlegendes Paradigma für Internationale Interventionen zum Wiederaufbau von gescheiterten - oder zum Aufbau von neuen - Staaten. Für die internationale Gemeinschaft fungiert das westphälische Modell als Maß zur Beurteilung ihrer Interventionen, wie zum Beispiel in Somalia, Kambodscha oder den Balkanstaaten. In den meisten Fällen gilt eine durch sie beaufsichtigte oder gar durchgeführte ‚freie und faire’ Wahl als hauptsächliche Massnahme zur Bildung eines ‚westphälischen’ und demokratischen Staates. Die Erfolgsrate solcher internationalen Friedenseinsätze und ‚state-building operations’ ist jedoch enttäuschend. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Misserfolge des letzten Jahrzehnts wird deutlich, daß sich die lokalen Gesellschaftssysteme der betroffenen Bevölkerungen oft beträchtlich von liberaler Demokratie unterscheiden. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall in Gesellschaften deren Ordnung nicht auf Staatsinstiutionen basiert. Ihnen liegen sozio-politische Systeme zugrunde die sich oft mit dem Paradigma des westlichen Staatssystems nur schwer vereinen lassen. Um im Rahmen internationaler Friedenseinsätze erfolgreich Staatstrukturen zu etablieren, ist es daher notwendig lokale Sozialstrukturen und lokale Konzepte politischer Legitimität und Autorität zu addressieren. Erst mit solchem Verständnis ist es möglich einen Staatsapparat in den Augen der Bevölkerung zu legitimieren. Ist Letzteres nicht der Fall, so kann sich eine Regierung zwar in Übereinstimmung mit internationalen Menschenrechten befinden, oder alle wichtigen demokratischen Einrichtungen vorweisen, jedoch dennoch dem Prinzip der Partizipation durch die Bevölkerung widersprechen. Ist dies das Endresultat eines internationalen Friedenseinsatzes, so hat die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre eigenen Werte bestaetigt. Jedoch herrscht kein Vertrauen zwischen der Bevölkerung und Regierung, da letztere nicht kompatibel mit dem Versaendnis der Bürger ist. Der ‚demokratische’ Staat ist nur schwerlich funktionsfähig.Der internationale Einsatz in Osttimor illustriert dieses Problem. Hier wurden die Vereinten Nationen (VN) mit dem Wiederaufbau und der Verwaltung eines Staates betraut (UNTAET ‚Übergangsregierung der Vereinten Nationen in Osttimor’). Zum ersten mal in der Geschichte übernahm die international Gemeinschaft damit die Souveränität über ein territoriales Gebiet...
This thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. In a first step, it is argued on phenomenological grounds that consciousness is a representational state and that explaining consciousness requires a study of the brain’s representational capacities. In a second step, Bayesian cognitive science and predictive processing are introduced as the most promising attempts to understand mental representation to date. Finally, in a third step, the thesis argues that the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” can be resolved if one adopts a form of metaphysical anti-realism that can be motivated in terms of core principles of Bayesian cognitive science.
Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant’s approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists’ perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists’ discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant’s question “What may I hope?” and presents the outlines of his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one’s hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant’s account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework.
A remark on the bank cases
(2021)
Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.