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Der Beitrag nimmt kritisch zum gegenwärtig anhängigen EU-Gesetz über digitale Dienste (Digital Services Act, DSA) Stellung. Die Kernthese lautet: Big Tech muss reguliert werden, aber nicht wie im DSA vorgesehen. Zur Untermauerung dieser Position werden fünf grundlegend problematische Aspekte des DSA benannt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die derzeit verhandelten Fassungen des DSA (1) die Vertragsfreiheit nicht kommunikationsmächtiger Vermittlungsdienste missachten, (2) automatisiertes Overblocking begünstigen, (3) auch legale, aber in unspezifischer Weise „schädliche“ Äußerungen ins Visier nehmen, (4) einen vagen und für die Kommunikationsregulierung generell unpassenden Risikopräventionsansatz verfolgen und (5) eine Kommunikationsüberwachungsbürokratie errichten, die ihrerseits keinen zureichenden öffentlich-demokratischen Kontrollen unterliegt. Als Reaktion auf diese Befunde wird vorgeschlagen, (1) nur sehr großen Online-Plattformen inhaltliche Vorgaben im Hinblick auf ihre AGB zu machen, (2) die Verpflichtung/Berechtigung zum Einsatz automatischer Moderationssysteme auf offensichtlich rechtswidrige Inhalte zu beschränken, (3) im DSA auch keine indirekten Pflichten zur Unterdrückung legaler, aber „schädlicher“ Inhalte vorzusehen, (4) das systemische Risiko des Art. 26 Abs. 1 Buchst. c DSA ersatzlos zu streichen und (5) die DSA-Bürokratie staatsfern auszugestalten und einer parlamentarischen Kontrolle zu unterwerfen.
Using granular supervisory data from Germany, we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies via central banks’ purchase of corporate bonds. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policy makers, we document two unintended side effects. First, banks that are more exposed to borrowers benefiting from the bond purchases now lend more to high-risk firms with no access to bond markets. Since more loan write-offs arise from these firms and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates, we document a drop in bank profitability. Second, the policy impacts the allocation of loans among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment grade firms active on bond markets to mainly real estate firms without investment grade rating. Overall, our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing via the corporate bond markets has the potential to contribute to both banking sector instability and real estate bubbles.
We investigate the impact of uneven transparency regulation across countries and industries on the location of economic activity. Using two distinct sources of regulatory variation—the varying extent of financial-reporting requirements and the staggered introduction of electronic business registers in Europe—, we consistently document that direct exposure to transparency regulation is negatively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity in terms of inputs (e.g., employment) and outputs (e.g., production). By contrast, we find that indirect exposure to supplier and customer industries’ transparency regulation is positively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity. Our evidence suggests uneven transparency regulation can reallocate economic activity from regulated toward unregulated countries and industries, distorting the location of economic activity.
Using the negotiation process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the way regulators form their positions on regulatory issues in the process of international standard-setting and the consequences on the resultant harmonized framework. Leveraging on leaked voting records and corroborating them using machine learning techniques on publicly available speeches, we construct a unique dataset containing the positions of banks and national regulators on the regulatory initiatives of Basel II and III. We document that the probability of a regulator opposing a specific initiative increases by 30% if their domestic national champion opposes the new rule, particularly when the proposed rule disproportionately affects them. We find the effect is driven by regulators who had prior experience of working in large banks – lending support to the private-interest theories of regulation. Meanwhile smaller banks, even when they collectively have a higher share in the domestic market, do not have any impact on regulators’ stand – providing little support to public-interest theories of regulation. Finally, we show this decision-making process manifests into significant watering down of proposed rules, thereby limiting the potential gains from harmonization of international financial regulation.
Cryptocurrencies provide a unique opportunity to identify how derivatives impact spot markets. They are fully fungible, trade across multiple spot exchanges at different prices, and futures contracts were selectively introduced on bitcoin (BTC) exchange rates against the USD in December 2017. Following the futures introduction, we find a significantly greater increase in cross-exchange price synchronicity for BTC--USD relative to other exchange rate pairs, as demonstrated by an increase in price correlations and a reduction in arbitrage opportunities and volatility. We also find support for an increase in price efficiency, market quality, and liquidity. The evidence suggests that futures contracts allowed investors to circumvent trading frictions associated with short sale constraints, arbitrage risk associated with block confirmation time, and market segmentation. Overall, our analysis supports the view that the introduction of BTC--USD futures was beneficial to the bitcoin spot market by making the underlying prices more informative.
Supranational supervision
(2022)
We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks’ risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.
Resolving financial distress where property rights are not clearly defined: the case of China
(2022)
We use data on financially distressed Chinese companies in order to study a debt market where property rights are crudely defined and poorly enforced. To help with identification we use an event where a business-friendly province published new guidelines regarding the administration and enforcement of assets pledged as collateral. Although by no means a comprehensive reform of bankruptcy law or property rights, by instructing courts to enforce existing, albeit rudimentary, contractual rights the new guidelines virtually eliminated creditors runs and produced a sharp increase in the survival rate of financially-distressed companies. These changes illustrate how piecemeal reforms of property rights and their enforcement may have a significant impact on economic outcomes. Our analysis and results challenge the view that a fully fledged system of private property is a precondition for economic development.
Prospective welfare analysis - extending willingness-to-pay assessment to embrace sustainability
(2022)
In this paper we outline how a future change in consumers’ willingness-to-pay can be accounted for in a consumer welfare effects analysis in antitrust. Key to our solution is the prediction of preferences of new consumers and changing preferences of existing consumers in the future. The dimension of time is inextricably linked with that of sustainability. Taking into account the welfare of future cohorts of consumers, concerns for sustainability can therefore be integrated into the consumer welfare paradigm to a greater extent. As we argue in this paper, it is expedient to consider changes in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, in particular if society undergoes profound changes in such preferences, e.g., caused by an increase in generally available information on environmental effects of consumption, and a rising societal awareness about how consumption can have irreversible impacts on the environment. We offer suggestions on how to conceptionalize and operationalize the projection of such consumers’ changing preferences in a “prospective welfare analysis”. This increases the scope of the consumer welfare paradigm and can help to solve conceptual issues regarding the integration of sustainability into antitrust enforcement while keeping consumer surplus as a quantitative gauge.
Global consensus is growing on the contribution that corporations and finance must make towards the net-zero transition in line with the Paris Agreement goals. However, most efforts in legislative instruments as well as shareholder or stakeholder initiatives have ultimately focused on public companies.
This article argues that such a focus falls short of providing a comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change. In doing so, it examines the contribution of private companies to climate change, the relevance of climate risks for them, as well as the phenomenon of brown-spinning (ie, the practice of public companies selling their highly polluting assets to private companies). We show that one cannot afford to ignore private companies in the net-zero transition and climate change adaptation. Yet, private companies lack several disciplining mechanisms that are available to public companies, such as institutional investor engagement, certain corporate governance arrangements, and transparency through regular disclosure obligations. At this stage, only some generic regulatory instruments such as carbon pricing and environmental regulation apply to them.
The article closes with a discussion of the main policy implications. Primarily, we discuss and evaluate the recent push to extend climate-related disclosure requirements to private companies. These disclosures would not only help investors by addressing information asymmetry, but also serve a wide group of stakeholders and thus aim at promoting a transition to a greener economy.
Der Beitrag stellt dar, wie Online-Plattformen in den Bereichen Urheberrecht, Hassrede und Desinformation in der EU reguliert wurden. Die Analyse ergibt einen Regulierungskreislauf, der in vier Phasen ablief. Bis zum Jahrtausendwechsel war es die Legislative, die einen allgemeinen gesetzlichen Rahmen für die Online-Kommunikation in Gestalt von Äußerungsverboten und Haftungsprivilegierungen definierte. Dieser Rahmen wurde im folgenden Jahrzehnt von den Betreibern der neu entstehenden Plattformen unter Ausnutzung ihres privatautonomen Gestaltungsspielraums implementiert. In der dritten Phase ab ca. 2010 verschärften die Judikative und die Exekutive die sich aus dem allgemeinen gesetzlichen Rahmen ergebenden Mindestanforderungen an die Bekämpfung von Urheberrechtsverletzungen, Hassrede und Desinformation. In der vorläufig letzten Phase des Regulierungskreislaufs ab 2017/2018 ergriff wieder der Gesetzgeber die Initiative, indem die Standards, die in den Phasen zwei und drei entwickelt worden waren, kodifiziert und teilweise nochmals angehoben wurden. Damit ist der Kreislauf der unionalen Plattformregulierung allerdings nicht zu seinem Ende gekommen. Vielmehr ist bereits erkennbar, dass sich nun wieder eine eher experimentell-tastende Phase privatautonomer Implementierung und ko-regulativer Fortentwicklung des neuen gesetzlichen Rahmens anschließt. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer kurzen Bewertung dieser Entwicklung hin zu mehr hoheitlicher Kommunikationskontrolle.