G3 Corporate Finance and Governance
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This paper examines the dynamic relationship between firm leverage and risktaking. We embed the traditional agency problem of asset substitution within a multi-period model, revealing a U-shaped relationship between leverage and risktaking, evident in data from both the U.S. and Europe. Firms with medium leverage avoid risk to preserve the option of issuing safe debt in the future. This option is valuable because safe debt does not incur the expected cost of bankruptcy, anticipated by debt-holders due to future risk-taking incentives. Our model offers new insights on the interaction between companies' debt financing and their risk profiles.
We document the structure of firm-bank relationships across the eleven largest euro area countries and present new stylised facts using novel data from the recent credit registry of the Eurosystem - AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity and interest rates. The granularity of the data allows us to account for cross country differences in firm characteristics. Firms in Southern European countries borrow from a larger number of banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank compared to those in Northern European countries. They also tend to borrow more on short term, more expensive instruments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that Southern European countries rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with the smaller average size of Southern European firms. Instead, no clear pattern emerges in terms of interest rates, consistent with the idea that banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates.
Flows of funds run by banks or by firms that belong to the same financial group as a bank are less volatile and less sensitive to bad past performance. This enables bank-affiliated funds to better weather distress and to hold lower precautionary cash buffers in comparison with their unaffiliated peers. Banks provide liquidity support to distressed affiliated funds by buying shares of those funds that are experiencing large outflows. This, in turn, diminishes the severity of strategic complementarities in investors’ redemptions. Liquidity support and other benefits of bank affiliation are conditional on the financial health of the parent company. Distress in the banking system spills over to the mutual fund sector via ownership links. Our research high-lights substantial dependencies between the banking system and the asset management industry, and identifies an important channel via which financial stability risks depend on the organisational structure of the financial sector.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.