Working paper / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut for Law and Finance
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14
Lassen Sie mich einleitend mit fünf Thesen zu Basel II beginnen: 1. Basel II stellt einen flexiblen Regulierungsansatz dar, welcher auf einem Mix von privater Selbstregulierung und einer ständigen Überwachung durch staatliche Aufsichtsbehörden beruht. Möglicherweise repräsentiert Basel II einen Prototyp für einen neuartigen Regulierungsansatz im 21. Jahrhundert. 2. An dem Prozess bei Basel II auf internationaler Ebene nehmen neben staatlichen Stellen auch Marktteilnehmergruppen teil. Die Verhandlungen, die derzeit noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, erfolgen außerhalb der etablierten Regierungszirkel. Die Regelungen werden in unterschiedlich zusammengesetzten Unter- und Nebengruppen beim Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht vorbereitet. 3. Basel II reflektiert den Fakt der sich rasch wandelnden Finanzmärkte und anhaltender Fortentwicklungen bei den Bankgeschäften. Insoweit bildet Basel II eher einen Prozess als einen festen Zustand ab. 4. Stärker als die bisherigen Aufsichtsregularien bewirkt Basel II einen Anpassungsdruck in Richtung eines globalen Standards, im Zuge dessen eine Nivellierung der bestehenden, historisch gewachsenen und national geprägten Finanzierungsformen latent einhergehen dürfte. 5. Basel II verlangt eine aufwendige Betreuung –sowohl im Hinblick auf dessen Ausgestaltung als Regelungswerk als auch auf dessen praktische Anwendung. Expertise gewinnt an Bedeutung. Daraus könnten möglicherweise Verunsicherungen oder gar ein latentes Unbehagen bei den Bankkunden resultieren. Hier erscheint eine Aufklärung über die sachlichen Zusammenhänge bei Basel II angebracht.
15
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
8
Der Titel des Vortrags benennt eine der wichtigsten Abgrenzungsfragen, die man sich zu stellen hat, sobald man es mit Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation zu tun hat. Was ist zulässiges Marktverhalten, was muss jeder Marktteilnehmer tun dürfen, ohne mit einem Bein im Gefängnis zu stehen und wo fängt die verbotene Kursmanipulation an? Eine bedeutsame Unterscheidung für die aktiven Akteure am Kapitalmarkt, um Klarheit darüber zu haben, was erlaubt ist und was nicht. Der Markt braucht das Vertrauen der Anleger, und Anleger vertrauen nur in ordnungsgemäß funktionierende Märkte, in Märkte, an denen Preisbildungsmechanismen funktionieren und kontrolliert werden. Daher ist es notwendig,Vorkehrungen zu treffen, die gewährleisten, dass Märkte funktionieren und Preise sich an Märkten manipulationsfrei bilden können und auch bilden. Auf der präventiven Seite tragen hierzu die Handelsregeln der verschiedenen Börsen bei, die insbesondere dezidierte Regelungen zur Preisbildung beinhalten. Sie sollen gewährleisten, dass Preise ordnungsgemäß zustande kommen und einen fairen Ausgleich von Angebot und Nachfrage darstellen. Ergänzt wird dieser präventive Aspekt durch die repressive Seite, nämlich die Ahndung von Fehlverhalten. Hierzu gab es bisher die Regelung des Kursbetrugs in § 88 Börsengesetz. Diese Vorschrift existierte inhaltlich bereits über 100 Jahre, in denen sie aber, wenn nicht tot, so doch zumindest annähernd scheintot war. Denn es sind kaum Verurteilungen oder sonstige Maßnahmen auf der Grundlage dieser Norm bekannt. Wollte man aus diesem Schattendasein allerdings folgern, dass aufgrund des integren Verhaltens der Marktteilnehmer eine solche Regelung obsolet sei, so wäre das ein Fehlschluss. Mit dem Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, das zum 01. Juli 2002 in Kraft tat, wurde dann auch eine Reform durchgeführt. Die alte Vorschrift wurde gestrichen und durch die neue Regelung des Verbots der Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation im Wertpapierhandelsgesetz ersetzt. Dort wurden §§ 20a und 20b neu eingefügt. Die Aufgabe der Überwachung dieses Manipulationsverbots und die Verfolgung von Verstößen wurde der BaFin übertragen.
9
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
10
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
21
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
1
Bei der Bestimmung von Eingriffsbefugnissen der BaFin jenseits der vom Gesetz vorgesehenen besonderen Kompetenzen ist Zurückhaltung geboten: Die Auffangermächtigung nach § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG ist keine Allzweckwaffe nach Art der polizeilichen Generalklausel, sondern soll lediglich die besonderen Ermittlungs- und Eingriffsbefugnisse der Behörde dort ergänzen, wo diese Befugnisse auch im Zusammenwirken mit anderen Rechtsfolgen von Pflichtverstößen nicht ausreichen, um die Regelungen des Gesetzes durchzusetzen und das Gesetz dieses Sanktionsdefizit auch nicht bewusst in Kauf nimmt. In den praktisch wichtigen Fällen der Erzwingung von Pflichtangeboten, der Änderung von Angeboten nach ihrer Veröffentlichung und des Einschreitens gegen unzulässige Abwehrmaßnahmen ist danach für den Rückgriff auf § 4 Abs. 1 Satz 3 WpÜG kaum Raum. Beim Rechtsschutz Dritter gegenüber der BaFin verfolgt das Gesetz eine mittlere Linie: Amtshaftungsansprüche wegen fehlerhafter Aufsicht und Ansprüche auf Einschreiten der Behörde sind durch die Öffentlichkeitsklausel des § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG in verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklicher Weise ausgeschlossen. Dagegen besagt § 4 Abs. 2 WpÜG nichts über die Schutzrichtung der Regelungen über das Angebotsverfahren. Die Vorschrift steht dementsprechend nicht einer Anfechtung begünstigender Verfügungen durch Dritte entgegen, soweit das Gesetz auch den Schutz ihrer Interessen bezweckt. Daher sind insbesondere Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft befugt, mit Widerspruch und Beschwerde gegen Befreiungen nach §§ 36 und 37 WpÜG vorzugehen, die in ihr Recht auf Abgabe eines Pflichtangebotes eingreifen.
12
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
22
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.