Working Paper
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (656) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (656)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (656)
Keywords
- Banking Union (14)
- monetary policy (12)
- regulation (11)
- COVID-19 (9)
- Covid-19 (9)
- ESG (9)
- systemic risk (9)
- banks (8)
- corporate governance (8)
- financial stability (8)
Institute
- House of Finance (HoF) (656) (remove)
This Policy Letter presents two event studies based on the pre-war data that foreshadows the remarkable way in which Russian economy was able to withstand the pressure from unprecedented package of international sanctions. First, it shows that a sudden stop of one of the two domestic producers of zinc in 2018 did not lead to a slowdown in the steel industry, which heavily relied on this input. Second, it demonstrates that a huge increase in cost of fuel called mazut in 2020 had virtually no impact on firms that used it, even in the regions where it was hard to substitute it for alternative fuels. This Policy Letter argues that such stability in production can be explained by the fact that Russian economy is heavily oriented toward commodities. It is much easier to replace a commodity supplier than a supplier of manufacturing goods, and many commodity producers operate at high profit margins that allow them to continue to operate even after big increases in their costs. Thus, sanctions had a much smaller impact on Russia than they would have on an economy with larger manufacturing sector, where inputs are less substitutable and profit margins are smaller.
Why bank money creation?
(2022)
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
(2023)
This paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amendments to remedy identified shortcomings.
The first applications of the new European CMDI framework, particularly in Italy, have shown that a bail-in of debt holders is especially problematic if they are households or other types of retail investors. Such debt holders may be unable to bear losses, and the social implications of bailing them in may create incentives for decision makers to refrain from involving them in bank resolution. In turn, however, if investors can expect resolution authorities (RAs) to behave inconsistently over time and bail-out bank capital and debt holders despite earlier vows to involve them in bank rescues, the pricing and monitoring incentives that the crisis management framework seeks to invigorate would vanish. As a result, market discipline would be suboptimal and moral hazard would persist. Therefore, the policy objectives of the CMDI framework will only be achieved if critical bail-in capital is not held by retail investors without sufficient loss-bearing capacity. Currently, neither the CMDI framework nor capital market regulation suffice to assure that this precondition is met. Therefore, some amendments are necessary. In particular, debt instruments that are most likely to absorb losses in resolution should have a high minimum denomination and banks should not be allowed to self-place such securities.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996 to 2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy.
This paper compares the shareholder-value-maximizing capital structure and pricing policy of insurance groups against that of stand-alone insurers. Groups can utilise intra-group risk diversification by means of capital and risk transfer instruments. We show that using these instruments enables the group to offer insurance with less default risk and at lower premiums than is optimal for standalone insurers. We also take into account that shareholders of groups could find it more difficult to prevent inefficient overinvestment or cross-subsidisation, which we model by higher dead-weight costs of carrying capital. The tradeoff between risk diversification on the one hand and higher dead-weight costs on the other can result in group building being beneficial for shareholders but detrimental for policyholders.
Cryptocurrencies have received growing attention from individuals, the media, and regulators. However, little is known about the investors whom these financial instruments attract. Using administrative data, we describe the investment behavior of individuals who invest in cryptocurrencies with structured retail products. We find that cryptocurrency investors are active traders, prone to investment biases, and hold risky portfolios. In line with attention effects and anticipatory utility, we find that the average cryptocurrency investor substantially increases log-in and trading activity after his or her first cryptocurrency purchase. Our results document which investors are more likely to adopt new financial products and help inform regulators about investors' vulnerability to cryptocurrency investments.
This paper compares the dynamics of the financial integration process as described by different empirical approaches. To this end, a wide range of measures accounting for several dimensions of integration is employed. In addition, we evaluate the performance of each measure by relying on an established international finance result, i.e., increasing financial integration leads to declining international portfolio diversification benefits. Using monthly equity market data for three different country groups (i.e., developed markets, emerging markets, developed plus emerging markets) and a dynamic indicator of international portfolio diversification benefits, we find that (i) all measures give rise to a very similar long-run integration pattern; (ii) the standard correlation explains variations in diversification benefits as well or better than more sophisticated measures. These Findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks.
This paper studies a household’s optimal demand for a reverse mortgage. These contracts allow homeowners to tap their home equity to finance consumption needs. In stylized frameworks, we show that the decision to enter a reverse mortgage is mainly driven by the dierential between the aggregate appreciation of the house price and principal limiting factor on the one hand and the funding costs of a household on the other hand. We also study a rich life-cycle model that can explain the low demand for reverse mortgages as observed in US data. In this model, we analyze the optimal response of a household that is confronted with a health shock or financial disaster. If an agent suers from an unexpected health shock, she reduces the risky portfolio share and is more likely to enter a reverse mortgage. On the other hand, if there is a large drop in the stock market, she keeps the risky portfolio share almost constant by buying additional shares of stock. Besides, the probability to take out a reverse mortgage is hardly aected.