Multiple-bank lending : diversification and free-riding in monitoring
- This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndication. JEL Klassifikation: D82; G21; G32.
| Verfasserangaben: | Elena CarlettiGND, Vittoria Cerasi, Sonja Daltung |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-10690 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Deutsch): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2004,18 |
| Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | CFS working paper series (2004, 18) |
| Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2004 |
| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2004 |
| Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 13.06.2005 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | diversification; free-riding problem; individual-bank lending; monitoring; multiple-bank lending |
| GND-Schlagwort: | Kreditgeschäft; Unternehmenskooperation; Kreditrisiko; Portfoliomanagement; Kreditwürdigkeit; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten |
| Ausgabe / Heft: | June 1, 2004 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 222317981 |
| Institute: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
