Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance
- In talent-intensive jobs, workers’ quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. Firms cannot insure workers against this risk if they compete fiercely for talent. In this case, the more risk-averse workers will choose less quality-revealing jobs. This lowers expected productivity and salaries. Public unemployment insurance corrects this inefficiency, enhancing employment in talent-sensitive industries, consistently with international evidence. Unemployment insurance dominates legal restrictions on firms’ dismissals, which penalize more talent-sensitive firms and thus depress expected productivity. Finally, unemployment insurance fosters education, by encouraging investment in risky human capital that enhances talent discovery.
Author: | Marco Pagano, Luca Picariello |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-473902 |
URL: | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274341 |
Parent Title (English): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 603 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (603) |
Publisher: | Center for Financial Studies |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt, M. |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2018 |
Year of first Publication: | 2018 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2018/11/02 |
Tag: | layoff risk; talent, learning; unemployment insurance |
Issue: | 2 October 2018 |
Page Number: | 42 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 439736412 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |