Career risk and market discipline in asset management
- We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
Author: | Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, Annalisa Scognamiglio |
---|---|
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-473495 |
URL: | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274340 |
Parent Title (English): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 602 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (602) |
Publisher: | Center for Financial Studies |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt, M. |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2018 |
Year of first Publication: | 2018 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2018/11/02 |
Tag: | asset managers; hedge funds; market discipline; scarring effects |
Issue: | 30 July 2018 |
Page Number: | 70 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 439736404 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |