Strategic trading and trade reporting by corporate insiders
- Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 Keywords: Insider Trading , Directors' Dealings , Corporate Governance , Market Efficiency
Author: | André Betzer, Jasmin Gider, Daniel Metzger, Erik TheissenORCiDGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-91473 |
Parent Title (German): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2011,04 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (2011, 04) |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2011 |
Year of first Publication: | 2011 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2011/02/14 |
Tag: | Corporate Governance; Directors' Dealings; Insider Trading; Market Efficiency |
GND Keyword: | USA; Insidergeschäft; Insiderregeln; Publizität; Publizitätspflicht; Börsenkurs; Markteffizienz; Kapitalmarkteffizienz; Internes Kontrollsystem |
Issue: | Version November 2010 |
Page Number: | 55 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 233053107 |
Institutes: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |