Feeling as consciousness of value
- A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
Author: | Íngrid Vendrell FerranORCiDGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-696065 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10244-x |
ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Parent Title (English): | Ethical theory and moral practice |
Publisher: | Springer Science + Business Media B.V |
Place of publication: | Dordrecht [u.a.] |
Document Type: | Article |
Language: | English |
Date of Publication (online): | 2021/10/28 |
Date of first Publication: | 2021/10/28 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2023/10/12 |
Tag: | Consciousness of value; Emotion; Feeling; Feeling of value; Moral experience; Moral value; Value |
Volume: | 25 |
Issue: | 1 |
Page Number: | 18 |
First Page: | 71 |
Last Page: | 88 |
Note: | Work on this paper has been supported by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. |
HeBIS-PPN: | 51638404X |
Institutes: | Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International |