The design of vertical R&D collaborations

  • Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration. JEL Classification: L22, L24, O31, O32

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Metadaten
Author:Patrick Herbst, Uwe WalzORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63776
Parent Title (German):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2009,06
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2009, 06)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2009
Year of first Publication:2009
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2009/04/16
Tag:Managing Innovations; R&D Collaboration; Rent-Seeking; Vertical R&D
HeBIS-PPN:211776009
Institutes:Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht